Into Action. Dan Harvey
to slip by. Having been given his mission he now had to prepare his plan to achieve it, and these efforts would only culminate when – having estimated the situation he was tasked with – he would develop and impart this plan via his ‘O’ Group (orders group) and launch the troops of his battalion into the forthcoming fray as fully prepared as he possibly could make them.
To craft his plan he had to consider what the mission accomplishment tasked him with, both stated and inferred. What did he have available in terms of military assets to achieve it, did he need additional support, and how was he going to organise all of this to best effect? In the given circumstances he and his staff had to determine the risks associated with the various options in light of the successful accomplishment of the essential tasks required of him and decide which were acceptable. Military men do not gamble. They take risks, but they weigh the different degrees of risk between one course of action and another, mentally and methodically war-gaming and scoring each. When it comes to analysing the mission, the trained military mind set works backwards, so to speak. A reverse logic and mental process kicks in, beginning with the objective to be achieved then analysing the time and physical space available to achieve it, in order to establish the correctly sequenced chain of events to be set in motion. This then drove the schedule of activities that had to occur. Out of this process fell clarity, the more concise construct of the essential mission for the 36th Battalion plan. Its precise purposes and specific tasks.
There is an old army saying that ‘time spent on reconnaissance is time well spent’. An initial ‘map recce’ is first conducted aided by any air photographs that are to hand. This informs the undertaking of the on-the-ground physical reconnaissance, important in the assessment of terrain and developing the various courses of action. The advantages and disadvantages of each course of action are considered and compared and a decision arrived at. In this case the maps were of limited use, there were no air photographs and physical reconnaissance was restricted so as not to give the game away to any observant Gendarme or mercenary. It was nonetheless useful in confirming the obstacles that would slow the advance, disrupt their movement and impede the manoeuvre towards the objective; the Tunnel. It was a built-up area, highly suited to defence. There were open spaces, good for the defender’s observation and fields of fire, bad for the Irish troops’ cover and concealment, and of course the Gendarmerie and mercenary defenders held the key terrain, which held key advantage and upon whose capture the entire mission hinged. Consideration of the defenders’ situation would try to identify how they were physically positioned, on and near the objective, where were his strong points and of what strength and with what equipment. What were his capabilities, to avoid, and his weaknesses, to exploit? Lieutenant Colonel Hogan and his staff brainstormed the various options, seeking a preference. They asked themselves if tasked to defend the tunnel how they might organise it. Finally, Hogan gave consideration to his own troops. They were for the most part seasoned, sound, non-commissioned officers (corporals and sergeants) and young – many very young – privates, mostly inexperienced and certainly ill-prepared for what had confronted them thus far and what faced them now.
Still not recovered from the lengthy journey from Ireland, the apprehension of strange new surroundings was debilitating in itself, allied to the general air of nervousness, concern, tension and stress of the continued hostilities. The discomfort of having no beds and snatching a few hours sleep here and there all had a huge wearing-down effect on their physical and mental energy. However, all of them had been exposed to the almost non-stop series of incidents since their arrival and during the build-up of his plan Lieutenant Colonel Hogan knew that would make a difference, a big difference. Rather than attempting the undertaking without any experience they were well and truly ‘blooded’, some among them not gung-ho exactly, but after enduring for days the retaliatory mortar fire at Liege crossroads – some in storm drains with water up to chest height and with casualties suffered – they were keen to have a go.
The second battle of Katanga was well and truly under way and 5 December 1961 had marked a deadly new phase to the conflict. The UN had been stunned by the loss of life and now its on-the-ground lines of communications were being slowly strangled; its competence and commitment challenged; its operation’s very existence threatened. Forcefully facing up to this adversity presented an opportunity for the UN to get on the front foot and Operation Unokat would close the net around Élisabethville. Operation Sarsfield would see the Irish, as part of Operation Unokat, go after the high value target that was the Tunnel, the immediately adjacent railroad and the hospital complexes. Operation Sarsfield was about to commence. They deployed expecting a fight, and a fight was what they were about to get.
A Company in Action
With live ammunition in their weapons, the minutes and seconds ticked down. With a real ‘enemy’ ahead of them, also waiting to fire live rounds at the Irish troops, A Company was poised to become involved in large-scale action. (See map on p. viii.) Elements of the Operation had already been set in motion, but the code word for the commencement of the Irish attack: ‘Sarsfield’, had yet to be transmitted by the battalion commander. The men of A and B Companies were to move across staggered start lines, their parallel axis of advance along the railway line and Avenue des Savoniers, respectively. A Company were to advance with Nos 1 and 2 Platoons’ forward left and right, with Commandant Joe Fitzpatrick in the centre. No. 3 Platoon would advance rear right and the Company HQ, under Captain Kevin Page, rear left. Already ahead of them and forward left were B Company. C Company minus was moving behind in reserve. Both companies had already sustained casualties during the week since their arrival. The men were worn down, weary but not yet fully exhausted, and despite their tiredness were in good spirits. Nonetheless, when out beyond the point of no return, having crossed their start lines, understandably each would be contemplating the now inevitable fight and so were apprehensive – some terrified – yet all ready to face the difficulties ahead of them and enduring the strain. But all definitely on edge, their unease and concern palpable. Theirs was an ability to control this fear and suppress its effects, in a word, this was courage.
Commandant ‘Bill’ Callaghan (later Lieutenant General and Force Commander of UNIFIL 1981–86), then OC of B Company, explained:
The night of the battalion orders – the evening before the attack on the tunnel – in the battalion headquarters at Leopold Farm, there was an evident tension and anxiety, and afterwards I remember saying to myself somewhat understatedly, ‘I hope this goes well’. Nonetheless, there was also a feeling that we had been given a job and that job we were going to do. We had a shared objective, but different parallel axes of advance.
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