Into Action. Dan Harvey
offensive military operation was now the task in hand. Taking on this manoeuvre was accompanied by various tactics and techniques, which they had trained for but was now for real. A deliberate full-blown company attack, they were now part of a battalion action, itself a portion of the plan involving a brigade formation operation. The challenge to be accomplished was to be conducted in darkness and within the urban environment of Élisabethville. Fighting in built-up areas is difficult, lengthy and more costly in terms of ammunition and also, potentially, casualties.
The Tunnel, a vital railway bridge intersection with a dual carriageway underpass, controlled a crucial avenue of access into central Élisabethville and was a key point from which to continue the attack and support future operations. The Gendarmerie, under mercenary supervision, had the time, means and weaponry to prepare and fortify selected key buildings and structures as strongpoints; the Tunnel itself ideal for this purpose. The string of mutually supporting bolstered-up buildings and improved protected positions were certain to offer stiff resistance. Due to its nature, a defence of this type is easier to withstand any assault. An attacker faced with fighting in a built-up area will immediately look first and foremost to bypass; next to neutralise, stand off and fire into; then to destroy by artillery, tank or air bombardment. Only as a last and least favoured option would an attacking force conduct an assault. The Tunnel was the centre of gravity of the Katangese defence of Élisabethville; it was on this that everything depended and A Company had to rupture it. Bypassing or reducing it to rubble were not options, the Tunnel had to be seized and held the hard way. It was boots-on-the-ground, troops-on-the-Tunnel time.
A crucial bottleneck, the Tunnel was the single access point, the vital valve controlling the flow to and from the city centre from the south. For approximately 2 km either side it was completely built-up, a critical choke point of strategic importance. To seize requires advance; advance demands forward movement; movement needs impetus; and maintaining impetus under fire is dependent on momentum. It is difficult to keep the continuous tempo of an attack after you have been fired upon at close range. The inclination is to remain under cover and from there return fire. Junior leaders have to push hard and despite training and instruction the tendency is for men to bunch together, to misuse ground and cover; an instinct that has to be fought against throughout such an action. The success of an attack in particular depends on the initiative, energy and determination of the junior leaders in applying the company commander’s plan. Giving effect to this offensive spirit is fundamental to getting and keeping men moving towards seizing the opportunities available and gaining the objective. When soldiers come under fire they want reassurance and direction.
The moral strength of the commanders as much as the physical means available is what really gives effect to planned actions. However, the most important weapon in any war is intelligence, and the UN didn’t do intelligence. Yet it was effectively at war. It was evident to the Irish that the task that lay ahead was not going to be easily achieved. There are many things that mitigate against such efficiency, some controllable, others not. Knowing the ground, particularly the terrain whereupon sits and surrounds the objective, is important. A Company were without proper maps providing any indication of the nature of the ground or buildings on the objective. Air photographs were not provided, organic fire support weapons – those within the Company were 60mm mortars and medium machine guns – were in short supply, and radio communications were poor. But every commander at every level knows you cannot possibly hope to possess all the advantages all of the time, the reality of the situation you are faced with is often far from the textbook ideal. Notwithstanding, the requirement remains, the objective has to be taken and the mission achieved.
What was a given was that the Katangese Gendarmerie were now a determined, well-equipped force. They were well led by battle-hardened, experienced, ruthless mercenaries who were a thinking adversary with a well-conceived campaign plan. Before this operation the Gendarmerie had been going from strength to strength and implementing this plan granted them a direction towards success. It began with harassing tactics, with close-in firing on UN camps at the time when the Irish and Swedish battalions were rotating. Their aim was to confine these raw new battalions to their camps. Next, they were determined to isolate the UN troops from their supply line; in this they were almost successful. The Irish, Swedish, Ethiopian and Indian battalions were denied routes Alpha and Bravo through Élisabethville. Finally, they aimed to seize the airport thus denying the UN its strategic APOD (Air Point of Disembarkation) and base.
Therefore, UN command had to counter and a plan to implement the destruction of Katangese resistance in the Élisabethville area was hatched. What would become known as Operation Unokat was a brigade in attack with a further brigade encirclement; in effect a division-sized operation. The operation was to be carried out in two phases: Phase One would contain and keep pressure on the Katangese Gendarmeries and mercenaries, in the Tunnel area particularly, with mortar fire pre-H-Hour (the exact time for the attack to commence). Phase Two, the Indian and Ethiopian battalions would surround Élisabethville by cutting off and blocking key routes – effectively sealing the city – preparatory to the destruction of the Katangese Gendarmerie and mercenary resistance by the Irish and Swedish battalions. This second phase was itself made up of two parts, one for the Irish 36th Battalion, the second for the composite 12th/14th Swedish Battalion. The one brigade-sized manoeuvre involved two deliberate and deep battalion-in-attacks – one Irish, one Swedish – supported by Indian 120mm heavy mortars.
The specific mission for the Irish Battalion, out of the brigade operation order, was the vital task of seizing and holding the Tunnel and to exploit forward positions in order to secure the right flank of the Swedish attack on Camp Massart, the Gendarmerie base. The UN brigade-in-attack plan for this offensive operation had therefore to synchronise the efforts of a number of elements of different nationalities, to coordinate their moving parts with fire support, properly integrated to a precise timetable, in order to dominate the fluid tactical situation. In turn, the individual battalions prepared their own respective attack plans, integrating with the specific details of the brigade’s mission and its coordinating instructions. Thus ‘Operation Sarsfield’ was brought into being, with A and B Companies launching the main attack on respective twin axes, mutually supported by C Company in reserve. The main effort of the entire brigade attack and overall divisional effort lay in the hands of the Irish, and as circumstances were to play out, hinged mostly on A Company’s efforts to seize the Tunnel.
In addition to its significant tactical importance, the Tunnel’s capture would have immense psychological value, smashing the Katangese grip on the city’s access, and allowing the UN to retake control of its freedom of movement and the overall situation. In exerting its military force in support of its mandated stand, the UN was making a massive statement to the world that it was prepared to back its position militarily. The loss of this major junction was crucial in breaking the morale and will of the Gendarmerie and the mercenaries. This was high-stakes stuff, tactically and strategically, both militarily and politically. It would be heavily defended and not easily given up.
The importance of the plan, its clear communication and effective execution, was emphasised at the ‘O’ Group, where the commander imparts his plan to his subordinates through the issue of orders. These full formal verbal orders are the key to ensuring that commanders within the battalion clearly understand the part they have to play in the upcoming action; that all important aspects are covered; and a precise prescribed formatted sequence is followed. That the mission completion is paramount is emphasised and the mission itself stated unambiguously, then restated for effect. Questions are answered and no effort is spared to ensure everyone has a clear understanding of the coordinated action to conduct the operation is arrived at. More than that, the commander will impress his personality on the operation and motivate his commanders verbally. It is here that leadership, that unseen but immediately obvious quality, comes directly into play and the unit cohesiveness of action is built around the commander’s intent, and Lieutenant Colonel Hogan’s intent was very clear: the Tunnel was to be seized and held and A Company were to do it.
Code Word: ‘Sarsfield’
On the afternoon of 15 December 1961, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Hogan, Officer Commanding, 36th Infantry Battalion, received orders for the UN offensive to commence early the following morning (16 December). He issued orders at 2100 hours and H-hour for the attack to commence on the Tunnel was fixed for