Into Action. Dan Harvey
104 had slipped the net. The military momentum gained as a result of Operation Rampunch was, however, neither politically nor diplomatically maintained, and so the advantage was lost. Mistakenly, the UN allowed local and Belgian officials to complete the measures the UN had initiated, but these proved unsuccessful. While the operation did see off a large part of the Belgian officer corps of the Katangan Gendarmerie, with additional UN pressure on Belgium, the deported mercenaries flown out by the UN were directly, although discretely, flown back in by Tshombe, only in additional numbers; the game was very much back on.
A by-product of the operation – of no small future significance – was the seizure of fourteen assorted Katangese aircraft (two Sikorsky helicopters, three Alouette helicopters, three Dakotas, four Doves and two Herons). Virtually the entire Katangese air complement had fallen uncontested into UN hands. However, five aircraft not at Élisabethville (two Fouga Magister Jets, two Doves and a Tri-pacer) escaped impoundment and while seriously diminished the skies were still the preserve of the mercenary pilots and, albeit much reduced, they still enjoyed air superiority; in the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king.
With no UN fighter aircraft available, the Katangan Fouga Magister was master. This combat jet trainer from Aérospatiale, though somewhat obsolete, remained unrivalled in the Congo skies. Swallow-like in appearance, with a highly distinctive butterfly tail, its cruising speed was 750 kph and it had a range of almost 1,000 km. It could strike any target with its rockets and 7.62mm machine guns or bomb it at will; altogether it was a lethal force multiplier. A lone Fouga was itself a serious single prospect to have to deal with and in the hands of Magain, the stocky Flemish–Belgian mercenary pilot, UN ground forces were particularly vulnerable and susceptible to its armaments.
After Operation Rampunch a vicious campaign of anti-UN propaganda was conducted by the Katangese government and anti-UN demonstrations were orchestrated in the centre of Élisabethville. There was also increased Gendarmerie activity and a noticeable intensification in the presence of mercenaries around the city. On 9 September roadblocks sprang up throughout the capital to impede UN troop movements and the following day in Jadotville (Likasi), a quiet mining town 160 km north of Élisabethville, a mercenary-led Gendarmerie force of over 2,000 troops cut off an isolated company of 157 Irish peacekeepers in what was to become known as the Siege of Jadotville.
CHAPTER 2
Company in Defence (Jadotville)
‘Enemy attack has commenced, please send strong reinforcements immediately’ was the radio message sent from A Company, 35th Irish Battalion in Jadotville to the battalion headquarters sixty miles away in Élisabethville. Their earlier transmission: ‘Alert on here’, radioed after an initial probing incident, was responded to with: ‘Defend yourself with maximum force.’ Now, the main attack had begun in earnest. The prelude to the ground assault was an intense, unexpected bombardment of mixed mortar bombs, 75mm artillery shells and heavy machine-gun fire onto the Irish positions. Then the onslaught proper began when over 500 infantry charged in waves toward A Company. By their sheer numbers and momentum alone they looked set to overrun the Irish defences, yet the peacekeepers defended themselves with every weapon available and with every fibre of will they possessed. This was a hard place to be, but the Irish were up for the fight. It was now the turn of the Katangans and mercenaries to be surprised, so stiff was the Irish resistance that their surge forward faltered, then eased off, and then the action was over – for now. Sporadic firing continued but the Irish had held out. Dusk began to fall and with it, to their delight, the Irish could hear the thump and thud of mortars exploding and the distinctive rattle of heavy machine gun fire ten miles away at Lufira Bridge. They knew then that reinforcements were on their way and when the firing ceased all they had to do was await their arrival. They waited, and waited and waited.
Post Operation ‘Rum Punch’, and with the successful capture of Gendarmerie HQ in Élisabethville on the Sunday morning of September 1961, Commandant Pat Quinlan returned from a 35th Irish Battalion conference to where his troops, A Company, were under canvas around the perimeter of Élisabethville airport, securing it to ensure the airport remained operational in the event of an attack. He announced to his company officers, Captain Liam Donnelly, Support Platoon, Lieutenant Joe Leech, No. 1 Platoon, Lieutenant Tom Quinlan (no relation), No. 2 Platoon, Lieutenant Noel Carey, No. 3 Platoon, and Company Sergeant Willie Hegarty, that they were to pack up immediately and be ready to move by 1300 hours to a town called Jadotville, sixty miles away. A Company were to be transported by Swedish trucks, as they had no vehicles of their own, and were to be joined by two armoured cars from the cavalry group under Lieutenant Kevin Knightly. Everything was rushed in order to meet the deadline for the arrival of the Swedish transport and in their haste they were told to leave their 81mm mortars and emergency pack rations. These would be sent on later.
A week prior to their move, a Swedish force under Major Meade consisting of one Swedish APC company and B Company, 35th Irish Battalion, was sent to Jadotville on the same mission. In addition they were to patrol towards Kamina and observe and report to Brigade HQ in Élisabethville any build-up of Katangan troops. On arrival, Major Meade was ordered out of Jadotville by the town’s Burgermeister (mayor) and, as he found no trouble or rioting in Jadotville, requested to be withdrawn. As B Company were crossing the Lufira Bridge, ten miles from Jadotville in the direction of Élisabethville, they passed their fellow soldiers from A Company, heading towards Jadotville. Naturally, they questioned in their own minds the decision to send A Company to replace two companies who had just decided to withdraw as they saw no rioting in Jadotville. Why was a company being deployed sixty miles from base without adequate transport, logistics or heavy support weapons? It violated every military principle they knew.
Sent to Jadotville to defend the town and its white European population against possible riotous unrest, the Irish were to be made feel unwelcome from their arrival and ultimately had to defend themselves from those they were sent to protect. Instructed to occupy the area by ONUC headquarters, they had done so to prevent atrocities and a massacre, yet soon it would be A Company themselves who would be beleaguered and under siege. The reasons that caused such a deployment have been much ruminated upon ever since. High-level political manoeuvrings, manipulated by the Belgians as a ruse to entrap UN troops, were considered foremost as a possibility. Simply directed to deploy in Jadotville, A Company had no prerogative where they could select the location of their campsite. They just had to take over an area that had initially sufficed for those before them; chosen for accommodation purposes and convenience for quick access to the town’s European quarter rather than with any regard to thoughts of tactical defence.
Preparing a trench for the defence of Jadotville.
Courtesy of the Military Archives, Dublin
Located on the town’s outskirts, in essence it was billet accommodation pure and simple. Consisting of single-storey villas and outhouses centred around the Purfina service station and garage, Support and No. 1 Platoon faced towards the golf course and No. 2 Platoon occupied villas on the left of the road. Company HQ was to the left of Purfina garage, while No. 3 platoon, on the other side, also occupied villas and tents. The distance between the platoons was about 750 metres, an area containing a number of deserted villas. There was a railway crossing at the entrance to the town and to the left was the huge Union Minière Mining Company and hundreds of tin huts on the hilly ground to A Company’s left. Close to the area of their positions, for up to 450 metres, was scrubland with high elephant grass. All this was conducive to covered concealment for unobserved encroachment by any attacking force and the site was chosen purely for its suitability to accommodate the soldiers rather than any thought of defence, offering its occupiers neither an all-round field of observation nor 360 degree interlocking arcs of fire. In short it would be difficult to defend, and in a short time, unknown to A Company, they were going to have to defend it. This time it would not be the primitive Baluba tribesmen they would be fighting but a mercenary-led force of Katangese Gendarmerie.
Katanga’s attraction was its vast copper, cobalt and uranium mineral wealth, and Jadotville was a thriving copper mining town. Its 10,000 or so white Europeans mainly worked in mining or associated services, while 50,000 Katangans, living