Into Action. Dan Harvey
of Newbridge, Jadotville’s railway line connected to Northern Rhodesia, today Zambia, as part of the copper belt. Post-independence the white Europeans stayed on, maintaining their links with mining and their equally firm links with Belgium.
Digging In
Red, hard-compacted and copper-saturated, the soil was no more ideal than the site to have to dig into. Yet that was what Commandant Quinlan decided A Company’s best form of defence would be, in a situation which offered very few advantages. The tense situation, having begun with intimidation, had now become one of danger. Cut off and surrounded, Commandant Quinlan ordered A Company’s four platoons to dig in. It was a basic infantry tactic when tasked to hold ground in a conventional warfare scenario, however no one had expected to be doing so as peacekeepers. But under the circumstances his clear presence of mind had a logic to it. It was becoming increasingly likely that A Company would have to put up a defence and he was giving his men the best chance of doing so to best effect. (See map on p. vii.)
Trenches – holes dug into the ground to get in to, fire from, and be protected by – was what ‘digging in’ was all about. It could not be done haphazardly and there were guiding principles involved, principles that had to be adapted to the terrain and the circumstances. There were other considerations: time and materials available, both for digging-in with and for actual use in trench construction, were also important factors. It has been said that the most important tool any soldier can have is a spoon, since you can dig with it as well as eat. A Company were not reduced to that though, and despite the searing heat and blinding dust set about their task in earnest. The seriousness of the situation was not lost on them, as they knew from their training that digging-in offered them the best defensive option to defeat an enemy attack, providing cover from view, protection from fire and, if their trench included overhead cover, shelter from airbursts and shrapnel. It was crucial that the correct siting of trenches in relation to the terrain and to each other facilitated the optimum possibilities for interlinking, mutually-supporting arcs of fire. An individual trench was required to have a fire-bay and a shelter-bay, with proper overhead cover, and all to be camouflaged.
A ten-man section dictates a combination of two and three-man trenches, with the sections’ fire support light machine gun (Bren gun) requiring careful sighting to derive best effect from it. A platoon would have three such sections, plus two-by-two-man trenches at platoon headquarters – the platoon commander and platoon sergeant being in different trenches. The dimensions of an ‘infantry trench’ are not exact but are usually armpit deep with elbow rests for occupants in the standing position. The use of depth in defence, or as it is also known, ‘defence in depth’, is essential to prevent enemy exploitation of a penetration, should they overrun the forward trenches. The depth will absorb the enemy’s momentum, the penetration progressively destroyed by the fire from those in trenches sited in depth. Sited ‘two forward, one back’, be it sections, platoons, companies or even battalions, this was how depth and mutual support was achieved.
This was not, however, the alignment allowed under the circumstance experienced by A Company. They were dispersed more than was recommended, strung out in groups of two, two-platoon positions, with 800 metres in between the two, two-platoon groups. The textbook frontage for a company, two platoons forward, one behind, was anywhere between 600 and 1,500 metres. A Company’s area of responsibility was a far too large quarter of a mile by a half a mile. Good communications grants good command, and the reverse is also the case. Inter-platoon communications, however, were not readily facilitated by the old No. 88 radios, which were obsolete and whose batteries were awkward and defective.
An obstacle forward of the front trenches to be covered by fire is also very useful, but A Company had no barbed-wire, mines or trip flares. It was now that the absence of their 81mm mortars was acutely felt. A Company did, however, have six 60mm mortars located with Support Platoon, which had a range of 750 metres; as well as two 84mm recoilless rifles with a range of 550 metres used for anti-tank purposes, and two Second World War vintage belt-fed, water-cooled Vickers machine-guns mounted on tripods with a range of 900 metres. Each man had the newly-purchased FN automatic rifle, while NCOs and officers had the Gustav sub-machine gun, and each ten-man section had a light support weapon, the Bren gun. Also available were the two mounted Vickers machine guns with the Armoured Car Section.
Lieutenant Noel Carey recalls the dig-in as follows: ‘That evening [Commandant Quinlan] ordered all platoons to dig in, camouflage trenches and hide spoil [dug-out earth]. We worked desperately in [the] stifling heat and hard ground but that night all were dug in and camouflaged by placing scrub and elephant grass over the trenches and removing spoil. Commandant Quinlan personally checked trench positions, all-round protection and fields of fire.’ Commandant Pat Quinlan’s decision to have A Company dig in was far-seeing, effective and, crucially, was to save Irish lives.
The Noose Tightens
On the morning of Saturday, 9 September, A Company’s ration truck was stopped at the Lufira Bridge on its resupply run to Élisabethville and returned empty. Commandant Quinlan ordered Lieutenant Carey to go into Jadotville and see what was happening. Taking the Land Rover and an escort of three NCOs, they were stopped at the closed railway gates. Going forward on foot, Lieutenant Carey was confronted by a large number of armed Katangan troops and a Belgian mercenary officer who refused him entry to the town. Insisting that the UN enjoyed freedom of movement, Carey nonetheless continued to be denied access and was not allowed through. He returned to Commandant Quinlan to inform him of what had occurred and in turn Quinlan reported the matter to Battalion HQ in Élisabethville. In reply, Commandant Quinlan was assured all was well and to stay in situ – A Company were not to withdraw.
The following day, remaining very concerned overnight about the deterioration in the circumstances at Jadotville, Commandant Quinlan sent Captain Liam Donnelly and Medical Officer Commandant Joe Clune to Battalion HQ in Élisabethville to give a first-hand account of A Company’s situation. Although they were stopped at Lufira Bridge, they were eventually allowed through when Captain Donnelly pretended to be sick. In Élisabethville, the Officer Commanding 35th Irish Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Hugh McNamee, and his staff were hosting a dinner for Conor Cruise O’Brien, UN Special Representative in Katanga. On completion of the dinner, Captain Donnelly reported on the up-to-date scenario playing out in Jadotville and of Commandant Quinlan’s concern regarding this new situation; most especially that the stated reason for A Company’s deployment there no longer held sway. Instead of the need to protect the white population against any threat, they were now threatening the UN Irish troops. Furthermore, they reported that A Company were surrounded by a large formation of mercenary-led Katangan troops, being added to daily, and that Lufira Bridge was effectively blocked. Commandant Quinlan’s recommendation was that A Company be withdrawn or substantially reinforced. He was assured that all would be well, that matters were under control and there was no need to worry. With this assurance, Captain Donnelly and Commandant Clune returned across the Lufira Bridge to Jadotville.
The tension continued to mount in Jadotville and the prevailing atmosphere was becoming more pointed by the day as the stand-off continued. A Company’s dug-in platoons were well dispersed, perhaps too spread out, but they had to deny tactical advantage to the Katangans, who were continually attempting to encroach into the Irish-occupied area. Rumours of possible attacks by mobs from the surrounding villages heightened the already fraught nerves of the Irish. Neither withdrawn nor reinforced, an encircled A Company waited anxiously for the next development. It would not be long in coming.
The Battle Begins
At 0700 hours on Wednesday 13 September, Lieutenant Carey received a message from Battalion HQ stating, ‘Operation Morthor had taken place in Élisabethville. All installations taken over by UN Forces and all quiet. Inform Commandant Quinlan.’ The Operation had been organised to remove, once again, all mercenaries from Katanga. This time, however, the Katangans were well informed of UN intentions and several Indian troops were killed while occupying the post office. Nevertheless they captured their objective, having killed a large number of Katanganese, and gunfire was to be heard all over Élisabethville as the Katangan forces and mercenaries resisted fiercely. The UN took casualties, including two members of the Irish Cavalry Corps who were killed after their armoured car was ambushed in the city.
This was