Fallujah Awakens. Bill Ardolino

      The war in Anbar province was complex. The Americans were fighting an enemy who ruthlessly intimidated civilians, wore no uniform, and operated under an effective camouflage of a culture and language exotic to them. Reacting to attacks, combing intelligence reports to plan raids, and conducting a census of the peninsula’s population to ferret out insurgents were reasonable tactics. These approaches had their limits, however, especially given their slow pace and the pressure growing in the United States to end the war, regardless of the terms. The Marines needed local help, quickly, and their meeting with Sheikh Aifan Sadoun Aifan al-Issawi, “Dark,” in late December offered a fresh opportunity to generate such support.

      Whisnant and his military intelligence sergeant, Saint One, wanted a quick follow-up to their first meeting with Dark.¹ Together the two men drafted a report summarizing their initial impressions of the sheikh, whom they referred to as “Abu Sadoon”:

      Abu Sadoon is a confident individual who claims he is tired of talking about accomplishing something for the [Albu Issa] tribe and is ready for actually doing something. He talked for approximately 30 minutes about previous meetings in Jordan and his contacts that he supposedly has with [other U.S. governmental agencies]. He stated that he came back to Iraq because it is in his heart to come back.

      The main points of discussion centered on the following items:

      —Abu Sadoon doesn’t believe [paramount sheikh] Khamis [Hasnawi Aifan al-Issawi] has the moral will to take on the current fight for his tribal area even with help from coalition forces. Sheikh Khamis is afraid and would rather just sit in his house and hope for self-preservation. He’s concerned that current [U.S.] contacts are just concerned in creating a relationship with the sheikhs and nothing further than that. Abu Sadoon related that he’s not interested in just eating kabob, dates and nuts with [Americans], he wants to accomplish security and safety in his area.

      —Abu Sadoon offered to assist in any way possible in the intel fight of identifying the insurgents. Several insurgents were mentioned during this discussion[….] He then went on for approximately 10 minutes on how the insurgents use “nicknames” to fool [coalition forces]. [Whisnant] stated that his Marines were aware of this tactic and needed assistance in identifying the real insurgents because of … fake [ID cards] that have the incorrect name. Abu Sadoon said he would be willing personally or some of his trusted people would go along on … raids to [identify] residences of the real insurgents in the area. [He] turned the discussion to how a 3–6 month detainment undermines the entire process and doesn’t provide any hope or incentive for the average Iraqi to provide information on the insurgents.

      Abu Sadoon has solid placement and access to the information provided by virtue of his family and social connections in the area. He is actively seeking [American] assistance in security matters because of the situation with his extended family and tribal members. He is also motivated by money and ego. He states that working “underground” is the best thing and it would make him proud to see his area secure and safe again.²

      Before sending the report up the chain of command, Whisnant and Saint One sought the blessing of CWO-5 Jim Roussell. Nicknamed “the Wizard,” because of his status as the battalion’s resident counterinsurgency expert, Roussell had an unusual pedigree.³ The fifty-five-year-old had been mandatorily retired from the Corps in 2002 after thirty-seven years as an active duty and reserve Marine. Roussell had also been a cop for thirty-one years and held the rank of lieutenant in the Chicago Police Department. In 2004, the commander of 2nd Battalion, 24th Marine Regiment approached Roussell for advice on how to defeat an insurgency, before 2/24’s deployment to Mahmudiyah, Iraq.⁴ Roussell’s background in Marine infantry and intelligence, and his work in the Chicago Police Department’s gang unit, gave him an ideal skill set for tackling the Iraqi rebellion.

      Many of Iraq’s insurgent cells resembled criminal enterprises as much as they did radically religious enemies. The sixteen- to thirty-year-old toughs at the core of the insurgency had a great deal in common with the Windy City’s gangbangers. Many viewed the pursuit of money and power as a goal accompanied by or merely cloaked in the stated ambition of achieving religious purity and the humiliating expulsion of the American infidels. Robbery, extortion, and kidnapping were tools of their trade.⁵ The indoctrination of insurgent recruits also shared striking parallels with U.S. gang initiations.

      Common criminals, casual insurgents for hire, as well as some genuinely innocent men had been swept up in the mass detentions conducted by the U.S. military during the early stages of the war. Moderate Muslims and insurgent neophytes were both dumped into the general prisoner population, where they mixed with hardened criminals and hard-core Islamists preaching jihad. Much like in U.S. prisons, many of the newcomers in Iraq’s facilities joined one of these groups to survive, and once a member, death became the only easy way out. In addition, U.S.- and some Iraqi-run facilities tended to release individuals incarcerated for lesser crimes after only a few months. This created a destructive cycle of incarceration, (radical) ideological indoctrination, and then release. American detention facilities like Camp Bucca became incubators that unwittingly but continually refreshed the insurgency by churning out foot soldiers for violent jihad.⁶

      Roussell’s experience on Chicago’s streets gave him perspective on how to take a run at the gangs in Iraq. He started working with the men of 2/24 by delivering pre-deployment briefings on developing sources and analyzing intelligence. He soon concluded that he had more to contribute, however, and actually joined the battalion on its deployment, as well as 1/24’s subsequent tour on Fallujah’s peninsula.⁷ Most men his age didn’t make plans that involved coming out of retirement from the Marines to bounce around insurgent strongholds in Iraq’s Triangle of Death, with its bomb-laden roads and angry fighters wielding rocket-propelled grenades. To have done that once and then volunteered for a subsequent tour to go back and “finish the job” earned the old cop unusual respect from the men with whom he served.⁸

      Roussell’s contributions were wide-ranging. He discovered a weekly meeting held by the “real sheikhs” of Fallujah, as opposed to the “fake sheikhs” who’d posed as powerbrokers to claim U.S. business contracts. He had caught wind of the gathering while shooting the breeze with locals as he traveled a beat in and around the city. On a late December day, the bespectacled police officer simply showed up at the meeting and introduced himself; afterward he became a regular fixture at the gatherings. His age was an asset in his interactions with these men, who considered experience a prerequisite for respect. The relationships he developed with the sheikhs would prove crucial later, when he served as an intermediary in contentious exchanges between tribal leaders and Iraqi government politicians and security personnel.⁹

      Roussell also instructed young Marines, many of whom routinely grumbled about restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) and pined for more straightforward ass-kicking. During the Second Battle of Fallujah in 2004, after the city had been mostly evacuated of noncombatants, the ROE were liberal enough to be enthusiastically described by one Marine as “like setting a bunch of fat kids loose in a candy store.” The current fight, however, had been severely restrained to avoid counterproductive civilian casualties. It wasn’t so easy for the Americans to get shot at or blown up every day without wanting to “get some” in return. Most lusted after a stand-up fight, and Roussell understood where they were coming from. After all, he had been a young Marine once, with all the