Fallujah Awakens. Bill Ardolino
and restore the traditional tribal order. The Americans represented one of the options that had grown more attractive as the “Persian Shia” (Iranians) solidified their political power in Baghdad through Shia Iraqi proxies, and al Qaeda in Iraq and other radical insurgent groups violently wore out their welcome in Sunni Anbar. Khamis legitimately disliked the takfiri insurgents, even if not with the outward intensity of his nephew Dark. He thought the radicals’ actions were “wrong,” and he resented them for forcing a violently conservative ideology on the “good Muslims” of his tribe.24
Another political twist complicated the Americans’ hope to deal with Khamis as the ultimate authority of the tribe: Although the elder sheikh held titular and some de facto power as paramount sheikh, some Marines concluded that he was also something of a figurehead. In fact, Americans believed that Khamis’ uncle Sheikh Khaled Hasnawi and his older brother, Sheikh Taleb Hasnawi, were more significant leaders and ran the Albu Issa from behind the scenes. Sheikh Barakat Sadoun Aifan al-Issawi, an older brother of Dark’s who remained in exile, also held sway and had been a well-known insurgent earlier in the war. The Americans speculated that all of these men had passed on any claim to be paramount sheikh because the mantle came with a target on the wearer’s back. They were content to exert influence while holding a lesser title, making Khamis the most attractive target for assassination.25
Though Dark showed deference toward the paramount sheikh during the meeting, he also aggressively prodded Khamis to cooperate with the Americans and support his development of the tribe’s militia. Khamis remained hesitant. He told the Americans that he feared his family members would find out about his meetings with them, and he continued to withhold his open cooperation. He and his nephew argued about the degree to which his tribe should be seen as a public ally of the Marines.26 “We need to do this,” Dark said. “Let’s do this, it is the only way.”27 The younger sheikh only bought his uncle’s tolerance by portraying initial efforts as “underground,” defensive in nature, and necessary to blunt al Qaeda and competing sheikhs’ power grab for control of the peninsula.28
In turn, Dark demanded concrete promises of support from the Americans and asked them to set up a permanent base near his village. His people would require protection as they openly organized and declared war on the insurgents. Only with security sufficient to undermine the takfiris’ brutally effective intimidation campaigns could he build confidence in his small band of fighters and rally the men of his tribe.29
“How long will you stay?” asked Dark.30 It was an important question. The tactics and force dispositions of American units sometimes changed with the decisions of rotating commanders. Roussell considered this “playing the clock”—that is, based on a Marine unit’s six- or seven-month deployment—rather than “playing the game.” One unit’s forward operating base might be shuttered by the next at the discretion of a commander on the ground or direction from senior officers.31
In early January, just prior to President George W. Bush’s announcement of the “surge,” U.S. forces were still playing out a strategy of pulling back to let Iraqi security forces take the lead. In Fallujah’s case, as in many other areas, the effort was premature. Besides the fact that the Iraqi Army and police were operationally unready, the peninsula’s tribes considered the Iraqi security forces untrustworthy competitors. To many of the Sunnis of Anbar, the Iraqi Army units were Shia outsiders from Baghdad and the south of the country; the police were variously suspected of being sellouts, tools of the Iraqi government, the Americans, or competing tribes.32
Khamis’ and Dark’s tribesmen did not yet have the manpower, weapons, or official permission to openly arm and defend themselves against any inevitable revenge for cooperating with Americans.33 Retribution from al Qaeda was one of Dark’s and Khamis’ repeatedly expressed worries about an alliance. Dark knew that if he was going to stand up to the insurgency, he needed both license to fight and for Americans to agree to stay nearby and help protect his people.34
Roussell was impressed with Dark’s enthusiasm for action, which was a rarity among sheikhs in the area. He also viewed the young sheikh as an opportunist who craved advancement and aggressively projected the image of a brave fighter, as epitomized by his frequent choice to wear a dark blue ammunition-carrying vest draped over “combat casual” clothes. In truth, Roussell judged Dark to be more of an organizer than a gunfighter, but organization was something the Albu Issa needed to marshal their forces against the radicals dedicated to insurgency. Organizers also lived longer; many day-to-day combatants, including two of the young toughs who made up the core of Dark’s security forces in those early days, wound up maimed or killed. It was a common price paid by the gunfighters of Iraq.35
Dark had also formed equally perceptive opinions of the Americans. In a later interview with U.S. researchers, he summarized them in words that perfectly mirrored Roussell’s working philosophy: “We have a theory,” explained Dark. “The Americans don’t have continuous friendships. They always have their interests. Their relationships with people are based on how much benefit they can get from a person.”36 In essence, he and his American counterparts varied little in their perception of the utilitarian nature of their new “friendship” with one another. Dark asked for the release of fellow tribesmen being held by the Americans, as well as for some cars, radios, and construction contracts to create jobs for his tribe. One of his requests continued to stand out in terms of repetition and forceful expression: his men needed weapons and the license to carry them.37
Having received permission from their superiors prior to the meeting, Saint One and Whisnant were finally able to offer Dark something concrete. They asked him for a list of thirty trusted fighters who would be vetted for permits to openly carry weapons. In addition, other men in his village were granted the right to brandish rifles only, and only at checkpoints or while stationed on the rooftops of their houses. This would enable them to defend their homes while still differentiating them from insurgent fighters traveling through the area. After the meeting, Whisnant made a recommendation to higher command to fulfill most of Dark’s latest requests for cars, contracts, weapons, and ammunition. The major also agreed to stick around and protect his new allies: he directed his men to establish a new, permanent patrol base in an abandoned mansion near the village of Albu Aifan. Some of the Marines nicknamed it FOB [Forward Operating Base] Dark.
Saint One, Whisnant, and Roussell now dared to be optimistic. They thought they could “make this work.” If locals identified the bad guys and took ownership of the fight against insurgents, the bleak war for the peninsula could swing in favor of the Americans and their new Iraqi allies. The agreements of the two preceding weeks marked the start of a genuine working relationship.38 Like many relationships, however, this one would be tested—severely and soon.
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