Fallujah Awakens. Bill Ardolino
found that a history lesson could assuage some of the young men’s frustration and cynicism about the gentler aspects of the doctrine.
The older Marine explained that the Corps boasted a proud tradition of counterinsurgency. From pioneering combat action patrols with locals in Haiti and Nicaragua during the early part of the Banana Wars to the successful model of living among the population in Vietnam’s A Shau Valley, Marines had done COIN well; the mobility of the expeditionary service branch made them a natural fit for such operations. When he framed the patiently nuanced tactics as essential to earning the young Marines’ rightful place in hallowed Marine Corps history, he thought that a few of them took to their responsibilities with greater enthusiasm, even if their trigger fingers still itched.10
Roussell’s counsel also paid dividends with higher-ranking officers. Even experienced, senior personnel needed reminders to walk them back from aggressive doctrine that could be counterproductive if it inflamed local sentiment. The warrant officer’s influence was, however, finite. There were plenty of times he wanted to “yank [his] hair out of [his] head” as Marine leadership attempted to make counterinsurgency progress while pulling American forces back to large bases and prematurely handing over security responsibilities to unready Iraqi soldiers and cops in late 2006. He felt that American troops needed to stop kicking doors, start listening, and “play the game, not the clock” to cultivate the intelligence necessary to beat the rebellion.11
Roussell’s ability to analyze local Iraqis was a resource that Whisnant and Saint One needed as they assessed Dark. The cop divided Iraqi partners into categories of “good bad guys” (GBGs) and “bad bad guys” (BBGs) to educate his fellow Americans, some of whom had trouble wrapping their heads around the idea of working with former insurgents and other questionable characters. BBGs were irreconcilable. They were wholly out for themselves and to kill Americans in their quest for religious purity, power, or both; they would eliminate anyone who got in their way. GBGs were also out for themselves, and they might never come to work hand-in-hand with the nascent Iraqi government or water any seeds of democracy, but they had interests that could align with U.S. interests. Their motivations and cultural sensibilities were a far cry from the idealized values of the Marine Corps, and many had even tried to kill Americans at some point in the war. But one could work with good bad guys. The hard truth was that the Americans needed to work with them. That was the nature of COIN.12
Roussell doubted the existence of straight up “good good guys.” It was his practical cop mentality. Every player, including every American, had an angle. You had to ascertain everyone’s motivation and match his or her interests with yours. One of the Wizard’s mantras was “something for something, nothing for nothing.” Another, less serious philosophy was “if their lips are moving, they’re lying.”13
Whisnant and Saint One’s meeting with Dark had intrigued Roussell. He wanted to see more such engagements. He told the two Marines that it was essential they leave no doubt about what they wanted and what they were willing to give in return. Roussell stressed, “We have to be careful to compare what we say, with what he thinks we mean. We have to be very clear.”14
On New Year’s Day 2007, Saint One and Whisnant met again with Dark, as well as with Sheikh Khamis Hasnawi Aifan al-Issawi. The elder, paramount sheikh’s presence conferred authority for Dark to work with the Americans on the tribe’s behalf. The encounter yielded more information, including a list of insurgents’ names and insight into growing splits among the Albu Issa subtribes. Dark also indicated that recent fighting had apparently ratcheted up after members of the Abu Hatim subtribe kidnapped two prominent leaders of al Qaeda in Iraq as part of the ongoing power struggle for the peninsula. Various sheikhs were bargaining for the release of the men in an attempt to douse the growing conflict, but Dark thought that the negotiations would backfire because the al Qaeda leadership would violate any settlement that secured the captives’ release and immediately retaliate with abandon. In addition to providing perspective on his tribe’s civil war, Dark repeated his offer of guides to accompany the Americans on night raids against high-value targets. Khamis was more hesitant about offering cooperation and observed the meeting coolly. He voiced skepticism about the Americans’ ability to protect his subtribe if he made an overt pledge of support.15
Roussell was consulted after the first two meetings, on December 26 and on New Year’s Day, but he wanted an opportunity to assess the sheikhs for himself. On January 6, Alpha Company conducted a helicopter-borne assault into the village of Abu Yousseff that would take them near Dark’s house in neighboring Albu Aifan. Roussell accompanied Saint One and Whisnant on the operation so he could visit both sheikhs afterward. It had rained on the day of the raids, which netted seventeen of twenty-seven targeted insurgents and several weapons caches. That night, Saint One, Whisnant, Roussell, an interpreter nicknamed “B. J.,” and Maj. Jim Hayes left the platoon’s ad hoc patrol base for the meeting. An alert march down a main road, followed by a slog through fields covered in thigh-high mud, delivered the Americans to Dark’s house.16
The men entered the residence, except Hayes, who remained outside to keep nervous watch. He did not trust these Iraqis, and he was a little alarmed by the small size of the American party. They were exposed. The Marine air officer was responsible for approving and vectoring requests for airstrikes from Marines in the field, so he had tagged along on the mission to get a firsthand look at the local topography. As the others were filtering into the house, Hayes called in his current coordinates to air controllers back at Camp Fallujah. If the worst looked likely—he’d seen videos of what happened to captured Americans—he would be able to call in a 500-pound bomb on their position. There was no way he was getting taken alive.17
The men who entered the house were welcomed with friendly greetings from Dark, who referred to both Whisnant and Saint One as “my brother” and to the elder Roussell as “my father.” The Marines didn’t explain Roussell’s presence or identity, but the young sheikh was perceptive.18 “I want to know why you are here,” Dark mused in English. “I think my brother [Whisnant] brought you to figure out who I am.”19 Sheikh Khamis’ greetings to the Americans were more restrained. The elderly man projected a regal aloofness that bespoke his position.
In the course of the two-hour meeting, the business facade projected by Dark and the Americans fell—a little. It was easy to like the talkative young sheikh, and the carefully crafted intrigue and formality of their initial meeting in December gave way to a few friendly jokes and more specific offers of cooperation. First, Saint One further assessed Aifan’s willingness to help and his knowledge of local insurgents by listing the names of high-value targets on whom the Americans had reliable information. Dark passed the test, verifying the identities of known BBGs. The Marines then showed the young sheikh pictures of the men they had caught on raids during the assault that day, and Dark expressed pleasure. He told them their targeting was accurate. He also chastised the Americans, however, for letting three others slip their cordon and escape. The Marines pressed for additional names and locations of insurgents, and Dark complied—with a few.
Khamis remained cordial but unsmiling, saying little as he sat and chain-smoked cigarettes. His quiet calm was characteristic foremost of his age as well as a paramount sheikh’s noble persona. But it was also a reflection of his refusal to enthusiastically choose sides in the war flaring between his Albu Aifan subtribe and members of subtribes affiliated with al Qaeda. His presence enabled him to observe, and it continued to show his hesitant endorsement of Dark’s leadership of a militia. But Khamis’ passivity seemed designed to preserve plausible deniability of direct involvement, should the younger sheikh’s campaign go poorly.20
“I am not a politician,” he told the Marines through the interpreter. “I am not part of the army. I want no part of the government, in any way. I am just a sheikh.”21 In fact, the old sheikh agreed to accept emissaries from al Qaeda for months after this meeting; he stressed his neutrality to the insurgent representatives until a later event forced his hand.22
Despite continuing to play both sides of the fence, Khamis had made a few small steps toward an alliance with the Americans by virtue of his vague promises and his appearances at meetings. Many in Fallujah had heard