Exile and Otherness. Ilana Maymind
of God’s incorporeality.125 We already mentioned his concern related to the excessive dependence on imagination, which he feared can lead to anthropomorphism. The correct belief is incongruent with an anthropomorphic image of God and Maimonides affirms God’s unity and argues that having a body means having form and matter and hence being divisible and subject to affects. Recalling Shinran’s conception of Amida Buddha as a highly relational and hence an affect-driven being, Maimonides’ view of God contrasts to that of Shinran. For Maimonides, “[A]ffection is a change” and God “is not touched by change. He is not like unto any thing of all those that are other than He, nor is He comprehended together with one of these things in any definition whatever.”126 Further, multiplicity leads to the grave misconception of many gods and introduces the notion of comparability, hence relative perfection. Whereas for Shinran, as we recall, Amida’s ethical perfection extends to those who become embraced by Amida’s Primal Vow, according to Maimonides, God is absolutely perfect. Multiplicity also vitiates God’s self-sufficiency. However, since God represents perfection and, given that affection relates to some change, God cannot be discussed in terms of affection.
God’s uniqueness also adds to God’s nonaffectability and hence to the lack of relationality. In the GP I: 35, Maimonides argues for God’s absolute uniqueness and His incorporeality. Here he insists that:
there is absolutely no likeness in any respect whatever between Him and the things created by Him; that His existence has no likeness to theirs; nor His life to the life of those among them who are alive; nor again His knowledge to the knowledge of those among them who are endowed with knowledge.127
Here we can draw some parallels to Shinran who does not discuss Amida’s attributes in corporeal terms. Maimonides’ God is discussed in terms of His actions. But for Maimonides, it is God’s incompatibility with humans that leads him to state that God’s attributes represent God’s actions rather than His qualities (GP I: 51).
Moreover, for Maimonides, God “performs actions resembling the actions that in us proceed from moral qualities.”128 Yet, Maimonides reiterates that compassion and affection felt by humans (as their perceived experience of God’s grace) cannot be attributed to God since God does not experience affection. Maimonides states: “It is not He, may He be exalted, is affected and has compassion. But an action similar to that which proceeds from a father in respect to His child and that is attached to compassion, pity, and an absolute passion, proceeds from Him . . . , not because of a passion or a change.”129
In Maimonides’ view, God’s actions can be analogous to the actions of a strict father130 who retains a strong intellectual differentiation between himself and his child and hence retains an unsurpassable distance. This type of a relationship does not produce reciprocity since, while God brings humans into existence and governs them, humans do not have any claims upon God. When the circumstances require, God exhibits not only His grace but also His jealousy, anger, and wrath. These actions do not result from any passions experienced by God, but are the outcome necessitated by the actions of those who transgress and deserve to be punished. Both God’s support and judgment are not emotional but are articulated through the commandments. Maimonides states that there are six positive and four negative commandments in the Torah starting with the principle commandments of “I am the Lord thy God” (Exodus 20:2) and “Thou shalt have no other gods before me” (20:3). These principle commandments exemplify the positive commandment to both love and fear God. Maimonides refers to love of God in terms of human contemplation of God’s works.
Contrary to Shinran’s view of Amida Buddha who does not encompass fear, Maimonides’ love of God is conjoined with the fear of God. Rather than personal recognition of one’s wickedness and imperfection that leads one to become embraced by Amida, it is the recognition of God’s perfection that guides the human sense of imperfection. God’s intelligence, incomparable to human intelligence, confirms God’s perfect unity by functioning as a self-recognizing entity:
The Holy One recognizes His own verity and knows it as it really is, and does not know it with an intelligence outside Himself as [humans] do; for [humans] and [human] intelligence are not one. But the Blessed Creator, He and His understanding and existence are one, in every aspect of His unity.131
Since God can only be discussed in equivocal terms, Maimonides builds his doctrine of negation which is based on the premise that humans can only know what God is NOT.132 Maimonides’ negative theology not only negates God’s corporeality but also denies “His having a likeness to created things and of His being subject to affections.”133 Maimonides’ conception of God is summarized under the rubric of “demythologizing” rabbinic Judaism by “depersonalizing” the Jewish conception of God.134 Maimonides’ “depersonalized” God has no resemblance to any gods of idolaters but also is quite contrary to Shinran’s Amida Buddha, particularly because of the absence of any relationality.
Maimonides connects one’s perception of God with one’s ethics. Idolatry in his view testifies to a lower level of human intellectual and hence ethical development. Maimonides’ insistence on God’s incorporeality attests to his understanding of human ethical development.135 According to Maimonides, God realized that the Israelites, embedded in the pagan environment, could not abandon idolatry instantaneously. As a result, some of the commandments (i.e., the sacrifice of the animals) served as the intermediary steps similar to the other anthropomorphic verses of the Torah. In other words, paganism is a preliminary stage in any developed ethical religious system. The first intention of the commandments, Maimonides states, was to put an end to idolatry and eradicate “unhealthy opinions” and “crazy notions.”136 The elimination of idolatry is the “first divine intention,” whereas the ethical improvement of the individuals and the just governance of society are the “second divine intention.” This second intention represents a qualitatively higher intention (see GP 3.27, 3.29, and 3.32). In order to attain intellectual perfection, humans first need to part with an archaic way of thought.
We juxtapose here Maimonides’ view on idolatry expressed in the GP with those in Laws of Idolatry chapter 2. Keeping in mind a possibility of a varied target audience, we recognize here that Maimonides appears more intensely anti-pagan in his legal works than in the Guide. In Laws of Idolatry Maimonides emphasizes controlling one’s thoughts.137 One’s mental state appears as important, if not even more important than one’s physical acts. The focus on the importance of the mental acts is stressed in the GP as well, specifically in III: 8 when Maimonides characterizes human evilness by expanding on the Talmudic expression that “thoughts about sin are worse than the sin.”138
Maimonides is concerned with internalization of incorrect views that could lead in turn to the improper beliefs. In GP I: 50, Maimonides states that “belief is not the notion that is uttered, but the notion that is represented in the soul when it has been averred of it that it is in fact just as it has been represented.”139 A relationship between a belief and an action is demonstrated in one’s actions. The foundation for correct actions lies in the idea of habituation.140 In Pereq Heleq (Sanhedrin, chapter 10), Maimonides addresses human propensity for subscribing to the wrong opinions. In the introduction to Pereq Heleq, he articulates his view of the hierarchy of human ability to interpret complex ideas. He identified three types of interpretations of the words of the sages and three groups of people and reaffirms his conviction in the superiority of intellectual comprehension. The third group is the smallest elite group and is characterized by their predisposition for rational thought. Maimonides favors this group for their ability to recognize hidden wisdom and concealed meaning. Maimonides states: “if you belong to the third group, when you encounter a word of the sages which seems to conflict with reason, you will pause, consider it, and realize that this utterance must be a riddle or a parable.”141
While humans have a free will to choose, Maimonides is concerned that human intellectual limitations can lead them to perceive reward and punishment in rather concrete terms and to make the wrong choices. Not following the commandments is connected to the fear of punishment. Yet Maimonides remains consistent in his endorsement of human free will because humans can choose not to abide by these principles while being aware of the consequences.