Exile and Otherness. Ilana Maymind
same course in treating it as in the medical treatment for bodies.”168 We already discussed Maimonides’ unfavorable view of matter, how does Maimonides conceive of the human soul?
Maimonides’ Views of Human Body and Human Soul
Maimonides’ views of human body are borne out of his view of human psycho-physical constitution. Since there is no counterpart that deals with the issue of the body and the soul in the Jewish tradition, Maimonides follows the Aristotelian model but gives it a specifically Jewish “twist.” He shadows Aristotle’s articulation of the soul’s five faculties (nutritive, sentient, imaginative, appetitive, and rational) and in Eight Chapters strongly asserts that despite the soul’s five faculties, it is a “single soul.”169 The soul, he argues, possesses moral habits and in order to cultivate these virtues, the soul should be treated similarly to the way a physician cures the body. Whereas the physician needs to know all the parts of the body, the “physician of the soul” should likewise be well aware of all the faculties of the soul. The most important faculty of the soul is rationality. According to Maimonides, all parts of the soul, but the intellect, are “like matter,” “the intellect is [soul’s] form.”170 Given the absence of any philosophical definition of the soul in the Jewish tradition, Maimonides invokes Solomon’s statement that “Indeed, without knowledge a soul is not good.”171 By referring to this statement, he connects the intellect (rational part of the soul) to overall human perfection and implicitly links Greek philosophy’s focus on the attainment of intellectual knowledge with a similar focus within the Jewish tradition.
We note that in the Guide, Maimonides relates welfare of the body to the multitude, whereas the perfection of the soul he attributes to the capable individual’s ultimate perfection. Despite his negative views of the body, he admits that only when the body attains its perfection (i.e., health, well-being), one can strive for the ultimate perfection: “to become rational in actu” or “to have an intellect in actu.”172 Perfection of the welfare of the soul is geared toward formation of correct opinions “corresponding to [human] respective capacity.”173 The welfare of the soul (intellectual perfection) presents a qualitatively higher value that any other perfection and does not appear to be directly related to any moral qualities. We recall that in GP I: 34 Maimonides posits that to attain human perfection requires “to train [oneself] at first in the art of logic, then in the mathematical sciences according to the proper order, then in the natural sciences, and after that in the divine sciences.”174
Maimonides’ struggle between solitary pursuits and the politico-religious involvement sheds some light on his view of the pursuits of the masses as well. In his opinion, the welfare of the soul, which often results from solitary pursuits, relates to the perfection of the elite, whereas the welfare of the body relates to the multitude. His own experience led him to recognize, however, that one cannot lead a solitary existence and achieve the perfection of the body (the welfare of the body). It entails having protection, a shelter, food, and other necessities that ensure one’s proper physical functioning. Given that man’s nature, following Aristotle, is political,175 bodily perfection can only be attained through man’s political association often at the expense of solitary pursuits. The welfare of the body becomes connected to one’s political association and is further linked to the well-being and well-functioning of the state. In order to improve human life, “the abolition of [humans’] wronging each other” and “useful for life in society so that the affairs of the city may be ordered.”176 Preventing humans’ wronging each other and ensuing human peaceful coexistence are predicated on following the commandments. Nonetheless, Maimonides provocatively posits that certain matters are “only for a few solitary individuals of a very special sort, not for the multitude.”177
Maimonides challenges the idea of extreme piety and oscillates between favoring a more moderate approach178 and the rejection of it. In the Commentary to Mishnah Avot, chapter 5: VII, Maimonides defines a “wise” man as someone who perfected both moral and intellectual virtues. Specifically, Maimonides posits that the wise man has seven virtues: four moral virtues and three intellectual virtues. The moral virtues are exhibited in one’s humble behavior such as not speaking before someone who is greater in wisdom; not interrupting; and being capable of admitting lack of knowledge. These qualities do not have a direct relation to any ethical dilemmas, but rather testify to one’s respectfulness and willingness to accommodate the needs of others. The intellectual virtues, in turn, relate to one’s ability to skillfully present one’s opinion; not being easily swayed by the arguments of the others; and being able to question, and to respond skillfully to the questioning of others.179 These intellectual virtues undoubtedly highlight one’s rational abilities and demonstrate the “extraordinary wisdom” in terms of learning and determining “what is proper to be given precedence, . . . [and] what is proper to postpone.”180
While Maimonides defines the intellectual values of the “wise” man, he does not provide a similar description of the “saintly” man, but rather contrasts a saintly man with a wicked man. In line with his renouncement of any extremes, he endorses moderation and presents the wicked man as the one who leans toward the extreme. The saintly man is further described as temperate: slow to any feelings of anger as contrasted with an intemperate wicked man unable to control his anger. Maimonides argues that a “saintly” man is someone who holds the heightened moral virtues, but in this case, these virtues deviate from the mean and “incline a bit toward an extreme.”181 The term “saintly” is used interchangeably with the term hasid (“pious”) precisely because of this “increase (beyond the mean).” This deviation from the mean is in accord with Maimonides’ view that in some cases a wise man goes beyond the conception of conventional good and evil: “For the exaggeration in a matter would be termed hasid, whether that exaggeration would be in the good or in the evil.”182 But is a hasid, someone engaged in the solitary pursuits, well-suited for political leadership? We now turn to Maimonides’ view of the prophecy and prophets.
Maimonides’ View of Political Leaders and Prophets
The observed tension in Maimonides’ assessment for a proper place for the perfect individual leads to the question: can one engage in a pursuit of solitude if human needs cannot be met outside of the social and political environment? Moreover, what conditions are most conducive to a political leader? Discussing a political leader, Maimonides reiterates his skepticism for passions, which he ties to the appetitive faculty of the soul. He argues that a secular, political leader should never “let loose the reins of anger nor let passion gain mastery over him.”183 Yet, Maimonides offers an astute political comment arguing that on some cases mercy and grace, but similarly anger and wrath, might need to be exercised for the reasons of safety “not out of mere compassion and pity, but in accordance with what is fitting.”184 Nonetheless, even when the actions of hard-heartedness or vengeance are needed for a greater good, “it behooves that acts of mercy, forgiveness, pity, and commiseration should proceed from the governor of a city to a much greater extent than acts of retaliation.”185 If grace and mercy are the actions dissociated from God’s affection but represent a human phenomenon, then acts of anger, vengeance, and jealousy similarly originate and are carried forward by humans. Human governance is the pinnacle of all these actions resulting more often than not from an uncontrollable, unbridled human passion. Human passions can become detrimental when humans are placed in conditions that they cannot fully control or when they lack an adequate understanding of the events. The fundamental problem that holds back human perfection remains to be grounded in the nature of intellect in relation to human body and soul, particularly body’s desires. Perhaps the most onerous hindrance is a human completely severed from any desire for intellectual pursuits.
But how cogent is the relationship between solitude and piety and the philosophical ethics articulated through the adherence to the commandments? Remembering that for a pious man God is the ultimate lawgiver, is Maimonides able to successfully avoid the controversy between the philosophical view on the rational part of the soul with its tendency for deliberation, and piety’s dislike for theoretical speculations? As discussed above, the mean (which in itself can be seen as a part of deliberation) determines what is good for the soul (the state of equilibrium). The commandments,