Exile and Otherness. Ilana Maymind
and metaphysical) perfection.205 In their view, for Maimonides ethics relates to the faculty of the soul since the body disintegrates as the result of death. Other scholars206 to the contrary hold that for Maimonides practical ethics is primary. Given Maimonides’ view of God, the ultimate aim is to attain knowledge of God’s actions (i.e., loving-kindness, justice, and righteousness) rather than His incomprehensible to humans’ metaphysical essence.207 Keeping in mind that Maimonides often argues that the latter goal is unattainable, Maimonides’ ultimate aim seems unrelated to the pursuit of purely theoretical, metaphysical truths.
However, this interpretation seems to overlook the significance of Maimonides’ words that the true human perfection “consists in the acquisition of the rational virtues”: which are “the conception of intelligibles, which teach true opinions concerning the divine things.”208 To reiterate, Maimonides maintains that there are four types of perfections: “The first and the most defective . . . is the perfection of the possessions.”209 The second is the perfection of the bodily constitution (a corporeal perfection). The third is the perfection of moral virtues, which is “a preparation for something else and not an end in itself.”210 The fourth is “the true human perfection.”211 In other words, ultimate perfection transcends any material concerns and assumes a metaphysical stance. In sum, ultimate perfection is “neither the perfection of possession nor the perfection of health nor the perfection of moral habits is a perfection of which one should be proud or that one should desire; the perfection of which one should be proud and that one should desire is knowledge of Him.”212 This statement once again exemplifies the tension between the ideal and the real state of the affairs since in GP III: 51, Maimonides states that, “mostly this [perfection] is achieved in solitude and isolation.”213
The attempts for solitary pursuits are again disrupted by the politico-religious demands. Maimonides links a distraction from intellectual cognition with “the evils of this world” which is “proportionate to the duration of the period of distraction.”214 If one cannot attain solitude, one is still capable of imitating God’s actions. Maimonides articulates imitatio Dei in III: 51: “If, however, you have apprehended God and His acts in accordance with what is required by the intellect, you should afterwards engage in totally devoting yourself to Him, endeavor to come closer to Him, and strengthen the bond between you and Him—that is, the intellect.”215 We recall that Maimonides’ crucial discussion of imitatio Dei appears already in GP I: 54 where God is discussed in terms of His actions. Man’s imitating God relates to Maimonides’ conception of ethics, although the focus on ethics is more apparent in Maimonides’ legal works than in the Guide. In the Mishneh Torah, Maimonides discusses how one imitates divine activity.216 To imitate God means perfecting one’s character traits and ethical activity to the extent of one’s ability. The fact that the emphasis is placed on the actions alludes to the fact that the Torah, at least partially, is a political document that spells out the guidelines for perfect political leadership capable of “translating” knowledge and divine science into the rules of governance. The human expression of imitatio Dei is this precise translation. The rules of governance demand intellectual perfection. The politico-religious focus once again intersects with the solitary pursuits in Maimonides’ discussion of the nature of prophecy. Ostensibly, one’s politico-religious environment might be a major factor.
The issue of solitude underscores this discussion again: “every excellent man stays frequently in solitude and does not meet anyone unless it is necessary.”217 Solitude allows for the strongest bond since one’s thoughts are totally devoted to God and are emptied of anything else. But how does one engage in daily activities? Maimonides states that when one’s consciousness is empty of anything but God “his intellect is wholly turned toward Him.” He invokes Song of Songs: “I sleep, but my heart waketh; it is the voice of my beloved that knocketh.”218 According to Maimonides, Moses’ uniqueness allows him to be engaged in performing outward activities and yet retain a complete inner concentration on God. Some scholars suggest219 that Maimonides circumvents the tension between theoretical and practical perfection by stating that bodily actions do not always necessitate the lack of intellectual focus. He suggests that the commandments enhance intellectual focus.220
Perhaps imitatio Dei, in fact, harmoniously integrates intellectual perfection and practical activities.221 This interpretation requires reading between the lines and some222 contend that the last chapter of the Guide, III: 54 is a true representation of Maimonides’ position that refutes the view that Maimonides interprets human perfection in terms of a life of contemplation as a means to apprehend God. These scholars maintain that Maimonides’ assertion that knowledge of God comes through one’s knowledge of God’s deeds represents his true conviction. However, this position might be overlooking the fact that for Maimonides, the apprehension of God can take place “in a measure corresponding to [human] capacity.”223 This caveat returns us to the question as to who is capable of attaining this apprehension, but also to the conditions in which this apprehension can occur. We should also keep in mind that this capability should be coupled with one’s inclination. Nonetheless, one is to be both inclined yet also capable of emulating God’s actions.224
The noted tension between the solitary and politico-religious concerns can also be seen in the concluding chapters of GP wherein Maimonides addresses the commandments in a slightly different vein as well. Whereas in III: 25–49 focus on the observance of the commandments pertains to the multitude, in GP III: 51, to the contrary, emphasis is on the exceptional individuals. Recalling the famous Parable of the Palace discussed in III: 51, Maimonides stipulates that only the ones who engage in intellectual speculations really enter the “antechambers”—attain apprehension of the intelligibles and, hence, enter the “inner court.” This is the only group that achieves human perfection. Here again perfection appears metaphysical as attaining this perfection cancels the need for any material sustenance and one assumes immortality: “For his intellect attained such strength that all gross faculties in the body ceased to function.”225 We note that ultimate perfection to attain immortality is not necessarily in line with the intention to maintain perfect political society.
Let us look once more at the central tension discussed throughout this chapter, namely, the tension between the life of contemplation (solitary pursuits) and the politico-religious involvement. We argue that this tension is present, to some degree, in both Shinran’s and Maimonides’ thought and is exacerbated by their respective politico-religious conditions. Maimonides’ view of statesmanship and politics can be termed a “modified intellectualism.”226 Perhaps Maimonides’ approach demonstrates less tension than we have been arguing thus far? This is precisely what Leo Strauss is claiming.227 His argument is built on the premise that Maimonides is much more a Platonic than an Aristotelian thinker and thus endorses the Platonic “philosopher-king.” If this is the case, then according to Leo Strauss, Maimonides experiences less of a tension and a modified intellectualism leaves room for integrating the solitary pursuits and the politico-religious approaches.228 Notwithstanding, we suggest that Maimonides’ willingness to compromise to preserve the tradition was a more prominent feature than this model suggests.
Given his affinity for the solitary pursuits, I am asking the question: How did being in exile affect the tension between solitary pursuit and politico-religious engagement that Maimonides experienced? Ostensibly, many of Maimonides’ writings exhibit a clear tension between the ethical character traits needed for the individual’s own perfection and the traits germane to the well-functioned social environment. We argue that a similar tension illuminates some of the struggles experienced by Shinran when he declares himself as not having any followers and yet is writing letters to his students to elucidate his own position.229 If his thought was only devoted to self-perfection or, more accurately to say, enlightenment, he would not have been concerned about explaining his thought. While we cannot say that Shinran had a similar politico-religious engagement, we suggest that the tension between solitary pursuits and a more communal involvement also had been exacerbated by his exile. Maimonides’ thought is colored by the tension between the need to focus on political considerations and the desire for the solitary pursuits. The focus on political considerations is predicated