Society of Singularities. Andreas Reckwitz
– namely, as cultural singularity markets. On these markets, objects, subjects, places, events, and (at least in part) collectives compete to be recognized and acknowledged as goods of unique cultural value. Singularities are thus divided into a structure of competitive singularities. This is a matter of markets that do not operate according to the criteria of industrial society and its standard markets. Now, performances seek attention and visibility; they aspire to affect their audience and to be evaluated as singular in processes of valorization. At their heart, these are thus markets of attention, visibility, and affect. They encourage a fundamental and genuine cultural economization of the social, in which not only commercial enterprise and the digital network participate but also most social spheres (media, education, cities, religion, relationships, etc.). As we will see in greater detail, these are attractiveness markets on which a specific form of singularity capital is accumulated. Here, both objects and subjects – but also cities, schools, religious communities, etc. – strive to create their unique profile, which has become one of the central forms of culture in late modernity.
Cultural singularity markets are not the only version of the social in which singularities operate in late modernity. As I will discuss later on, two other – and differently constructed – forms of the social have likewise developed a singularistic structure: heterogeneous collaborations and neo-communities. Heterogeneous collaborations do not arrange singularities in the form of public markets but rather as a plurality of singular participants (mostly subjects, but occasionally objects as well), whose diversity allows them to forge productive alliances and collaborations. Such is the case, for instance, in the many projects and networks that represent genuinely late-modern versions of the social. In neo-communities, on the contrary, the collective as a whole becomes a singularity – it is formed, that is, into a relatively homogeneous and unique entity. Such is the case in religious, political, or ethnic communities. Singularity markets, heterogeneous collaborations, and neo-communities all derive from historically traditional forms of the social – standard markets, communities, and also networks – but they have further developed these forms in such a way that they now represent three genuinely singularistic forms of the social populated by late-modern subjects. They can conflict with one another, but they can also combine and work together in surprising ways.
As I have already mentioned, the singularistic lifestyle, which is so dominant in late-modern culture, is primarily sustained by the new middle class. Its basic formula, by which it distinguished itself from the seemingly conformist and leveled middle-class society of organized modernity, is that of successful self-actualization. Here, the post-materialistic value of the actualized self is tied to the motive of social success and prestige. The resulting comprehensive singularization and culturalization of all aspects of life – living, eating, traveling, fitness, education, etc. – thus goes hand in hand with investing in one’s own singularity capital for the sake of status, and with representing one’s own unique life to others. To some extent, the model here is the “norm of deviance” or, in more positive terms, the norm of performative authenticity – of socially performing one’s own uninterchangeable uniqueness.23
For the new middle class, culture has come to acquire the form of hyperculture, which is altogether characteristic of late modernity. In the case of hyperculture, potentially everything past or present can flexibly be valorized as culture. Be it high or low culture, local or global, contemporary or historical – all potential elements of culture are essentially on equal footing and are regarded as potential sources for enriching one’s lifestyle. Hyperculture is distinguished by its cultural cosmopolitanism, within whose framework the elements of culture can be combined in seemingly endless ways. Uniqueness thus tends to derive from the model of compositional singularity: it is forever being arranged and curated from a diverse set of new and ever-changing elements. In fact, it is this compositional logic that enables late-modern culture to fabricate singularities on a mass scale.
The society of singularities has systematically created a series of new social and cultural polarizations, and these will be discussed at length in the following Part. It is important to keep in mind that these polarizations are not ancillary or accidental features but rather a direct consequence of the logic of singularization leaving behind social niches and becoming structurally formational for all of society. They are the result of society evaluating what counts as valuable and unique. It is here where processes of valorization and devaluation occur that are definitive of late-modernity. Five different levels can be distinguished:
The basic level is that of the polarization of goods on the markets of singularity, which is the precondition for all other polarizations. As markets of attention and valorization, singularity markets tend to form radically asymmetrical patterns. They are winner-take-all markets in which a few goods attract extreme amounts of attention, visibility, and value, while most goods achieve nothing of the sort. Cultural singularity markets are thus inclined to award things in excess and disregard other things entirely.
This is reflected on a second level: the polarization of working conditions, which has two aspects. Essentially, a dualism now exists between the highly qualified activities of the knowledge and culture economy on the one hand, and the simple or standardized activities of the service sector on the other. In late modernity, the professions that produce cultural singularity goods can claim legitimacy, status, and resources, whereas functional and “profane” labor cannot. What is more, tendencies toward polarization exist within the field of highly qualified professions. This field itself has adopted the features of a cultural singularity market on which performances, profiles, talent, and their recognition circulate, and this leads in its own way to the asymmetry of a winner-take-the-most market.
Third, all of this has given rise to a polarization of classes and lifestyles. The latter applies in particular to the relationship between the culturally ascendant new middle class on the one hand, and the culturally declining new underclass on the other. Whereas the new middle class can be understood as the cosmopolitan basis of culturalization and singularization processes, the new underclass has been socially and culturally devalued. Beyond the leveled middle-class society, this has thus resulted in more or less subtle cultural conflicts and tendencies toward segregation that affect such things as education, living conditions, and health.
Fourth, the polarization of goods, labor, and lifestyles has led to a polarization of social spaces. Regional, national, and global markets of spatial attractiveness have formed, and these have led to diverging developments in “attractive” places and regions that are said to have been “left behind.” Whereas the former house the creative economy and the new middle class, the latter face the threat of being devalued altogether.
Finally, a political polarization has taken place in late modernity that can be interpreted as a reaction to the other levels of polarization. On the one hand, there is an “apertistic” (opening) and differential (difference-promoting) liberalism that is based on a combination of competition and cultural diversity. On the other hand, there is a slew of anti-liberal, (sub)political forms of cultural essentialism and communitarianism (ethnicity, nationality, religious fundamentalism, right-wing populism) that have mobilized collective identities against the hyperculture and its markets. Of course, these identity movements operate within the logic of the society of singularities. They, too, are based on a culture of singularity; however, theirs does not function on global markets but is rather situated within particular collectives (religious, national, ethnic, etc.). As a result of this polarization, the society of singularities is characterized throughout by cultural conflicts.
Notes
1 Social-theoretical interpretations of archaic societies are controversial. For antipodal views, see Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, which stresses the aspect of idiosyncrasies, and the third chapter of Talcott Parsons’s Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1966), which focuses primarily on collectivism. 2 Consider, for example, the openness with which transgender persons are treated in native American societies. See Sue-Ellen Jacobs et al., eds., Two-Spirit People: Native American Gender Identity, Sexuality, and Spirituality