China's Rise in Mainland ASEAN. Группа авторов
start-ups and platform providers, and, above all, human talents, while the private players should adopt and utilize technological capabilities and seek out strategic assets, which are skilled technical talents, innovation, and well-established networks of consumers.
1.3.Conclusion
Summarizing the 13 contributions to this volume, China’s rising influence in mainland ASEAN may be described as a bundle of past experiences and “upcoming” scenarios. A plausible augmented role of China as the “hydro-hegemon” of the Mekong River Basin is a possible avenue for sub-regional cooperation that, asymmetrical, though it is, needs to be taken up with great care in mainland ASEAN. No wonder the Lancang–Mekong Cooperation scenario, which was recently established, has brought about coverage of areas and action plans, while the countries concerned are still in doubt about this broad cooperative mechanism. As for implications and responses, trans-border human mobility and its impact could be part of the BRI China’s outbound policy with a new wave of Chinese migrants. This is the case in point for Thailand, and it could also happen elsewhere in the Southeast Asian region. China’s influence in Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar has far reaching implications for ASEAN’s sovereignty and its collective action, in addition to the efforts of each country to deal with a rise in economic standing, foreign policy, and social adaptation.
The recent changing landscape of China’s rise in mainland ASEAN is clearly shown in trade, investment, and even the external debt, in which regard the Southeast Asian countries have come to rely on increasingly with China (The World Bank, 2009).1 Vietnam’s perspectives on these aspects are clearly shown in the complexity that there would be if the country were swept into such increasing trends. The Lao cases on FDI are also interesting, both in terms of its determinants and policies and, in particular, the mining sector. These have made been possible with connectivity and integration, a result of ASEAN and China linkages that have become more closely knitted, through China’s own BRI and each of ASEAN’s opening up policies.2 A review of Dian-Viet Railway described in detail along with its metaphorical past, from the French colonial era, has tremendously helped to imagine the human factor for this cross-passing border. If that is the way to the future, more land logistics and transportation from Southern China will be connected to the mainland Southeast Asian region. This will also include the upcoming trends and challenges of e-commerce from China to the whole landscape of ASEAN, with different players, from firms and consumers down to policymakers, becoming much more involved.
This volume aims to fill a gap in knowledge and understanding about country and regional experiences in dealing with China’s rising influence. It takes the complete perspective from local experts in each region. The attempts were part of the Bangkok Conference at Chulalongkorn University in 2018, which suggested the topics and content of this volume merit dissemination to a larger and wider audience in the form of publication. In the process, it raises issues and major questions for fact finding and future research.
References
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1An excellent publication to learn on how markets shape the economic landscape. The World Bank (2009). Reshaping Economic Geography. Washington, DC.
2For a deep illustration of mapping connections from historical period to the present day, please see Dutta, A.K. & Chaudhury, A.B.R. (eds.) (2019). Connecting Nations: Political-Cultural Mapping of India and South East Asia. Primus Books, Delhi, India.
Chapter 2
Xi Jinping Thought and Mainland ASEAN∗
Vira Somboon
2.1.Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era
On October 24, 2017, the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) amended its Constitution by adding “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” to its main pillars of theory and practice. This addition consequently enshrined the Xi Jinping Thought on par with Marxism–Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, The Theory of Three Represents, and The Scientific Outlook on Development (Hongyu, 2017). The last two were presented by Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, respectively. In terms of identifying the thought with the specific name of the leader of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Xi Jinping is evidently the third and follows the ideas put forth by Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. The significance of this amendment was notorious. Mao’s thought provided the main thrust of theory and practice for the consolidation of the Chinese party and the state for many decades. Deng’s ideas guided China in the new scheme of reform and opening up for modernization and economic development from 1978 to this amendment in 2017, i.e. for four decades. The addition, was in a sense, the declaration of a new era to be led by Xi’s ideas and vision. This new era coincided with two upcoming centenary anniversaries, i.e. that of the CPC in 2021 and that of the PRC in 2049. From 2018 to 2049, the duration of time will be roughly three decades.
Xi was elected General Secretary of the party for a second term on October 25, 2017. Moreover, on March 10, 2018, the Constitution of the country was amended to abolish the two-term limit for presidency. The limit had previously been established in the Constitution of 1982 of China, during the period of Deng Xiaoping’s leadership, as a mechanism for preventing tyranny under a one-party system like the Chinese communist regime had chaotically experienced for several decades earlier (Buckley & Wu, 2018). Then, on March 11, 2018, Xi was unanimously elected by the National People’s Congress to a second term as president. The amendment and the reelection made it possible, in constitutional terms at least, for President Xi to hold office indefinitely, even, perhaps, for life. On the same day, he was also elected chairman of the state’s Central Military Commission (Ruwitch, 2018). It may be said that, at present, Xi Jinping has complete control over the party, the military, and the state of China as well as simultaneously providing main ideational, ideological, and discursive formations of the Chinese society. Of course, this “three-in-one leadership” (party–military–state), as Ziang Zemin put it, has been viewed as functionally necessary for the Chinese political system, and thus applied to supreme leaders before Xi (i.e. Ziang Zemin himself