China's Rise in Mainland ASEAN. Группа авторов
to the questions posted at the beginning of this section, however, can be found in Xi Jinping’s lecture: “Forging a Strong Partnership to Enhance Prosperity of Asia,” which he delivered on November 7, 2015, at the National University of Singapore on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Singapore. The main points he made here strongly reflect the themes of the new era we have seen above.
As we have always seen in his Marxist-based narratives, Xi underscores history both in terms of past events and the developmental laws of mankind. China and many of its Southeast Asian neighbors are not only geographically connected by mountains and rivers but also share “a recorded history of more than 2,000 years,” enriching each other in all dimensions including values, religions, arts and cultures (Xi, 2015, p. 8). The historical occasions that highlight this connection, especially in the case of Singapore, were the voyages of Zheng He in the early 15th century and the subsequent migrations of Chinese people from Guangdong and Fujian provinces to Southeast Asia (Xi, 2015, p. 6). As for the present, “the tide of history moves on and we must follow it,” Xi proposes, it is time for “a new historical starting point” for China to expand and deepen its relations with its neighbors against the backdrop of Asian dynamic economic growth (Xi, 2015, pp. 11–12).
However, it was hinted in this lecture that, for China, Singapore holds the most significant status among Southeast Asian nations. Xi Jinping underscores the fact that Deng Xiaoping visited Singapore in 1978, establishing relations and cooperation between the two countries and, more importantly, it was the exemplar and models provided by Singapore under the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew that showed the way for China. Xi points out that “Singapore succeeded in pursuing a development path suited to its national conditions by combining Eastern values with an international vision” (Xi, 2015, p. 7). Deng came to witness “first-hand” the achievement of Singapore and drew important lessons from it. Exchange and cooperation subsequently followed, with opportunities for both. Xi Jinping himself visited Singapore many times and was actively involved in this cooperation from 1999 to 2007 while he held leading positions in Fujian, Zhejiang, and Shanghai, which formed major areas of governmental links and economic transactions between the two countries (Teo Chee Han’s welcoming remarks in Xi, 2015, pp. 1–2). Xi recounted that, in 2010, (while Vice-President) he joined Lee Kuan Yew in unveiling a commemorative marker in honor of Deng Xiaoping on the banks of the Singapore River (Xi, 2015, p. 7). According to Xi, at least in 2015 alone, China was Singapore’s biggest trading partner, while Singapore was “an important investment destination” for China. It is not surprising that their long relations and “closely aligned” development strategies will be expanded “into an all-round cooperative partnership progressing with the times” in this new era (Xi, 2015, pp. 7–8).
The same theme of peaceful development, a shared future of humanity and global security without a hegemonic order, is also insisted on in the context of Southeast Asian countries. It is also addressed with reference to Asia as a whole. Xi specifies endeavors for cooperation in four major aspects (Xi, 2015, pp. 12–13). First, “to uphold peace and stability” in Asia — it is a task for which China shares responsibility with all of its neighbors. Second, to “form synergy” in development strategies so that mutual assistance and cooperation can be further enhanced, resulting in “more momentum to growth” in all participating countries. Third, Asian countries should “actively pursue security cooperation,” taking a “holistic approach” in dealing with “both traditional and non-traditional security issues” (see Somboon, 2019, for further discussions). Fourth, “the close bonds” among Asian peoples, whose civilizations share “collective Asian values and an Asian identity,” should be strengthened.
However, we should note Xi’s adamant standpoint when it comes to issues China regards as its own core interests. This can be seen from the matter of the South China Sea being addressed in this lecture right after the four aspects of cooperation mentioned above. As Xi firmly puts it in anticipation of the audience’s skepticism:
I know that people have been closely following China’s policy on the South China Sea. Let me make this clear: The South China Sea islands have been China’s territory since ancient times. It is the bounden duty of the Chinese government to uphold China’s territorial sovereignty and legitimate maritime rights and interests. The starting point and ultimate purpose of China’s policy toward the South China Sea is to maintain peace and stability there (Xi, 2015, p. 14).
This is an unyielding position expressed in straightforward terms. Xi often uses differing historical contexts to explain China’s change in many of its stances and policies. However, the statement above, with its emphasis on persistence from “ancient times”, should remind us of how history may not bring a different situation in certain matters. And this includes issues concerning South China Sea.
Like the other Xi Jinping pivotal speeches, the BRI was also highlighted in this lecture. Xi referred to both Central Asia and Southeast Asia as parts of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. He emphasized again that the project, including its financial support through the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Silk Road Fund, is about “openness, development and cooperation… on the basis of equality and mutual benefit,” and confirmed that China’s neighboring countries are the main partners in this initiative and will be the first to benefit from it (Xi, 2015, p. 11). Nevertheless, we should bear in mind that, among China’s neighboring ASEAN countries, Singapore plays the most significant role in various ways. These include the geo-political position of Singapore at the crossroads in the “maritime silk road” scheme of the BRI in the Asia-Pacific region and, simultaneously, its geo-economical position as an end destination of the “silk road economic belt” complex connecting Southern provinces of China, via roads and railway links through many Mainland ASEAN countries, with global economic activities.
2.6.Mainland ASEAN in China’s New Era: “One Belt, One Road, One River?”
Mainland ASEAN, consisting of Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia (the peninsular part), Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam, is crucially situated at the focal point of China’s connectivity schemes linking with its southern and western provinces. It is impossible to deal with all the relevant areas, dimensions, and scopes here. Our discussion focuses only on the Mekong River sub-region, which nonetheless represents various key issues.
The Mekong River, which flows through three provinces of China, running across Myanmar, Lao PDR, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam, is around 4,909 kilometers in length and is the 10th largest river in the world (Mekong River Commission, n.d.). The Mekong River Basin includes substantial areas of Laos, Thailand, China, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Myanmar (listed in order of the size of the basin area in respective countries). Covering an area of 795,000 square kilometers, it ranks 21st among river basins worldwide. Its area in Indochina amounts to 40% of the total area of Mainland ASEAN riparian countries, while its area in China covers only 2% of the whole country (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2011). The river is described as consisting of two parts, i.e. the upper Mekong, which refers to its origin and passage in China and is called “Lancang” in Chinese, and the lower Mekong, which refers to its passage through Mainland ASEAN countries which is called “Mekong” proper. According to the China-based Lancang–Mekong Cooperation Framework (to be discussed below), this particular geographical and economic setting “(feeds) altogether 360 million people” (including the population in the three Chinese provinces along the Lancang); and all the riparian countries of the Mekong “are home to 230 million people and boast a combined GDP of over US$600 billion and an average annual growth rate of nearly 7%” (Lancang–Mekong Cooperation, 2017b). As a sub-region, the Mekong River Basin constitutes a major ecosystem and has the potential for development and connectivity. It is of note that, when we speak of Mainland ASEAN as an entity, the Mekong area and linkages often represent a salient unit of their own (whether geographical, geo-political, or geo-economical) that involve half of the ASEAN member countries.
Unsurprisingly, the sub-region has been a major focus of the attempts at international cooperation, resulting in many multilateral and multifaceted mechanisms. The Mekong Committee was initially established under a statute endorsed by the United Nations in 1957 and was