China's Rise in Mainland ASEAN. Группа авторов

China's Rise in Mainland ASEAN - Группа авторов


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limit, its abolition for the presidency provides Xi Jinping with the legitimate possibility to remain as the “three-in-one leader” of China for decades to come (Buckley & Wu, 2018).

       2.2.The Questions of China’s New Era

      In his speech on “Developing Philosophy and Social Sciences with Chinese Features”, Xi Jinping uses Karl Marx’s writing for an insightful discussion on the significance of theoretical thinking and how to go about it. The question, not the answer, Xi argues by quoting Marx, is the key to theoretical formation. The question identifies where we start our enquiry and also defines where our research will end and what the solution will be. In terms of philosophy and social sciences, the question reflects the practical circumstance of the time or the era. If we can grasp the right question that proclaims the situation of the time, we will be more likely to reach a relevant and successful solution. Xi confirms that the CPC, since the time of Chairman Mao, has always formulated the right questions such as its own unique conception of Marxism and the Communist Party in the context of Chinese conditions and, since the time of Deng, the right question on the path of development conducive to the specific conditions of China (Xi, 2017b, pp. 370–372). As he puts it in Hegelian terminology, the right question reflects the “Zeitgeist” or the spirit of the era (Xi, 2017b, p. 370). With correct thinking, “we have put forward new theories in light of new practices, which provide us with scientific guidance in formulating policies and advancing our works” (Xi, 2017b, p. 372).

      Xi Jinping Thought or as it is officially entitled “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” underlines the important points he makes in the above-mentioned speech and implies an understanding of the questions for this “New Era”. In another speech, “The New Normal: How to Respond and Adapt,” delivered in December 2015 at the Central Conference on Economic Work, Xi succinctly identified what he viewed as the questions of the time. As he put it, “I have emphasized repeatedly that we must escape the Thucydides Trap and the middle-income trap. The former is related to the political sphere — we should carefully tackle the relationship with other major countries such as the United States. The latter is about the economy — we must improve the quality and effectiveness of economic growth” (Xi, 2017i, p. 262). To reemphasize, the questions of the new era are the Thucydides Trap and the middle-income trap, and I think that, for President Xi, the two cannot be arranged simply by priority since they are closely related to each other.

      The term “Thucydides Trap” refers to the ancient Greek historian and political theorist, Thucydides (460–395 BC), who wrote The History of the Peloponnesian War, a masterpiece narrating and analyzing the great war between Athens and Sparta and their confederations and colonies, which involved almost all the ancient Greek city-states throughout the Eastern Mediterranean at that time (431–404 BC). At the beginning of the book, Thucydides argues that the war was the inevitable outcome of the growth of the rising power of Athens, which had become a threat in the perception of Sparta that had previously held a hegemonic position particularly in the Spartan sphere of influence (Thucydides, 1996). Thucydides’s account has been turned into a main thesis for many adepts on war and interstate relations that the rise of a new major power rivaling a previous one in the international arena will inescapably lead to a large-scale war — hence the term “Thucydides Trap” (or Thucydides’s Trap). To be sure, this conceptual framework has been discussed by contemporary International Relations scholars in the current context of China’s rise versus the US’s global position (Allison, 2017).

      Many of Xi Jinping’s stances and elaborations may be seen as attempts to “escape” this oversimplified version of Thucydides’s Trap. Xi uses the idea of history and its differing circumstances under the progress of mankind as a point of reference. In his speech in Germany in 2014, he raised the question: “What is the trend of today’s world?” And his answer clearly aimed at avoiding the trap. In his own words:

      The answer is unequivocal. It is the trend of peace, development, cooperation and mutually beneficial progress. China does not subscribe to the outdated logic that a country will invariably seek hegemony when it grows strong. Are colonialism and hegemonism viable today? Absolutely not…. China has stated on numerous occasions that it opposes hegemonism and power politics in all forms, does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, and will never seek hegemony or expansion (Xi, 2014a, p. 292).

      The terms “hegemony” and “hegemonism” are exactly the idea and practice underlying the process and result that have made the Thucydides’s Trap inevitable. By rejecting hegemonism as China’s international aspiration, Xi expresses a strong confidence in China’s determination and capacity to escape the trap (see, e.g. Xi, 2017h, p. 43).

      As for the second, the “Middle-Income Trap,” it is a term used to signify the stage where a country has achieved considerable economic growth and uplifted a majority of the population to the range of middle-income status but has become slow to increase the potential for further development, thus making it prone to stagnation and leading to a decline in its competitiveness. In this respect, even at the height of China’s economic achievement in 2014, Xi stated in his speech to the annual national gathering of Chinese scientists and engineers that China needs to transcend “economic growth mainly driven by factor inputs such as natural resources” since it is unsustainable in the long run. “The old path is a dead end,” he stated and then asked, “Where is the new road?” His answer: “It lies in scientific and technological innovation, and in the accelerated transition from factor-driven and investment-driven growth to innovation-driven growth” (Xi, 2014b, pp. 132–133). This notion was then applied to a new scheme for economic adjustment initiated in early 2016, proclaiming a new strategy to avoid the middle-income trap. This is “Supply-side structural reform,” which entails the promotion of innovation in technology, further development of the real economy, and improvement of the standard of living of ordinary people. And it aims, in the terminology of Marxist historical materialism, “to develop productive forces and to improve relations of production,” involving all aspects of politics, ­economics, society, culture, as well as ecology (Xi, 2017f, p. 275).

       2.3.The Goals and Characteristics of China’s New Era

      The most recent and comprehensive document further elaborating on the thought discussed above is undoubtedly the lengthy report titled “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” which Xi Jinping delivered at the 19th National Congress of the CPC on October 18, 2017 (Xi, 2017g). Among the many important issues raised and discussed in the document, Xi reiterates his narrative of the history of China. This narrative begins with the history of Chinese civilization, which has been in continuous existence for more than 5,000 years and has contributed numerous major achievements to the progress of mankind. China, however, failed to ­capture the earliest trend of industrialization and fell into the “darkness of domestic turmoil and foreign aggression” with the Opium War of 1840 (Xi, 2017g, p. 11). Many attempts were made by people with heroic intentions and deeds to liberate the nation from its miserable condition, but they all failed because of their inability to change the nature of the old society and consolidate the power of the Chinese people. The “Chinese Dream of National Rejuvenation,” as he terms it, began with this struggle and became successful at its earliest stage after the CPC was founded and finally achieved its goal in governing the country. After that, China went through many phases of ups and downs in the attempt to genuinely develop and rejuvenate the nation (Xi, 2017g, pp. 11–12).

      The policy of reform and opening up led by Deng Xiaoping resulted in “three strategic goals for achieving socialist modernization in China.” These include, first, the provision for people’s basic needs and a decent standard of living, which has been significantly achieved. Second, the party aims to develop China into “a moderately prosperous society with a stronger economy, greater democracy, more advanced science and education, a thriving culture, greater social harmony and a better quality of life” by the year 2021 when the centenary of the CPC will be celebrated. After that, within a period of 30 years until the centenary of the PRC, China will arduously develop itself in order


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