THE CONSOLATION OF PHILOSOPHY (Collector's Edition). Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius
Where hidden lies the good all hearts desire— This blindness they can bear; With gaze on earth low-bent, They seek for that which reacheth far beyond The starry firmament.
What curse shall I call down On hearts so dull? May they the race still run For wealth and high renown!
And when with much ado
The false good they have grasped—ah, then too late!— May they discern the true!
IX.
‘This much may well suffice to set forth the form of false happiness; if this is now clear to thine eyes, the next step is to show what true happiness is.’
‘Indeed,’ said I, ‘I see clearly enough that neither is independence to be found in wealth, nor power in sovereignty, nor reverence in dignities, nor fame in glory, nor true joy in pleasures.’
‘Hast thou discerned also the causes why this is so?’
‘I seem to have some inkling, but I should like to learn more at large from thee.’
‘Why, truly the reason is hard at hand. That which is simple and indivisible by nature human error separates, and transforms from the true and perfect to the false and imperfect. Dost thou imagine that which lacketh nothing can want power?’
‘Certainly not.’
‘Right; for if there is any feebleness of strength in anything, in this there must necessarily be need of external protection.’
‘That is so.’
‘Accordingly, the nature of independence and power is one and the same.’
‘It seems so.’
‘Well, but dost think that anything of such a nature as this can be looked upon with contempt, or is it rather of all things most worthy of veneration?’
‘Nay; there can be no doubt as to that.’
‘Let us, then, add reverence to independence and power, and conclude these three to be one.’
‘We must if we will acknowledge the truth.’
‘Thinkest thou, then, this combination of qualities to be obscure and without distinction, or rather famous in all renown? Just consider: can that want renown which has been agreed to be lacking in nothing, to be supreme in power, and right worthy of honour, for the reason that it cannot bestow this upon itself, and so comes to appear somewhat poor in esteem?’
‘I cannot but acknowledge that, being what it is, this union of qualities is also right famous.’
‘It follows, then, that we must admit that renown is not different from the other three.’
‘It does,’ said I.
‘That, then, which needs nothing outside itself, which can accomplish all things in its own strength, which enjoys fame and compels reverence, must not this evidently be also fully crowned with joy?’
‘In sooth, I cannot conceive,’ said I, ‘how any sadness can find entrance into such a state; wherefore I must needs acknowledge it full of joy—at least, if our former conclusions are to hold.’
‘Then, for the same reasons, this also is necessary—that independence, power, renown, reverence, and sweetness of delight, are different only in name, but in substance differ no wise one from the other.’
‘It is,’ said I.
‘This, then, which is one, and simple by nature, human perversity separates, and, in trying to win a part of that which has no parts, fails to attain not only that portion (since there are no portions), but also the whole, to which it does not dream of aspiring.’
‘How so?’ said I.
‘He who, to escape want, seeks riches, gives himself no concern about power; he prefers a mean and low estate, and also denies himself many pleasures dear to nature to avoid losing the money which he has gained. But at this rate he does not even attain to independence—a weakling void of strength, vexed by distresses, mean and despised, and buried in obscurity. He, again, who thirsts alone for power squanders his wealth, despises pleasure, and thinks fame and rank alike worthless without power. But thou seest in how many ways his state also is defective. Sometimes it happens that he lacks necessaries, that he is gnawed by anxieties, and, since he cannot rid himself of these inconveniences, even ceases to have that power which was his whole end and aim. In like manner may we cast up the reckoning in case of rank, of glory, or of pleasure. For since each one of these severally is identical with the rest, whosoever seeks any one of them without the others does not even lay hold of that one which he makes his aim.’
‘Well,’ said I, ‘what then?’
‘Suppose anyone desire to obtain them together, he does indeed wish for happiness as a whole; but will he find it in these things which, as we have proved, are unable to bestow what they promise?’
‘Nay; by no means,’ said I.
‘Then, happiness must certainly not be sought in these things which severally are believed to afford some one of the blessings most to be desired.’
‘They must not, I admit. No conclusion could be more true.’
‘So, then, the form and the causes of false happiness are set before thine eyes. Now turn thy gaze to the other side; there thou wilt straightway see the true happiness I promised.’
‘Yea, indeed, ’tis plain to the blind.’ said I. ‘Thou didst point it out even now in seeking to unfold the causes of the false. For, unless I am mistaken, that is true and perfect happiness which crowns one with the union of independence, power, reverence, renown, and joy. And to prove to thee with how deep an insight I have listened—since all these are the same—that which can truly bestow one of them I know to be without doubt full and complete happiness.’
‘Happy art thou, my scholar, in this thy conviction; only one thing shouldst thou add.’
‘What is that?’ said I.
‘Is there aught, thinkest thou, amid these mortal and perishable things which can produce a state such as this?’
‘Nay, surely not; and this thou hast so amply demonstrated that no word more is needed.’
‘Well, then, these things seem to give to mortals shadows of the true good, or some kind of imperfect good; but the true and perfect good they cannot bestow.’
‘Even so,’ said I.
‘Since, then, thou hast learnt what that true happiness is, and what men falsely call happiness, it now remains that thou shouldst learn from what source to seek this.’
‘Yes; to this I have long been eagerly looking forward.’
‘Well, since, as Plato maintains in the “Timæus,” we ought even in the most trivial matters to implore the Divine protection, what thinkest thou should we now do in order to deserve to find the seat of that highest good?’
‘We must invoke the Father of all things,’ said I; ‘for without this no enterprise sets out from a right beginning.’
‘Thou sayest well,’ said she; and forthwith lifted up her voice and sang: Song IX. Invocation.
[9]
Maker of earth and sky, from age to age Who rul’st the world by reason; at whose word Time issues from Eternity’s abyss: To all that moves the source of movement, fixed Thyself and moveless. Thee no cause impelled Extrinsic this proportioned frame to shape From shapeless matter; but, deep-set within Thy inmost being, the form of perfect good, From envy free; and Thou didst mould the whole To that supernal pattern. Beauteous The world in Thee thus imaged, being Thyself Most beautiful. So Thou the work didst fashion In that fair likeness, bidding it put on Perfection through the exquisite perfectness Of every part’s contrivance. Thou dost bind The elements in balanced harmony, So that the hot and cold, the moist and dry, Contend not; nor the pure