THE CONSOLATION OF PHILOSOPHY (Collector's Edition). Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius
have.’
‘All things, then, seek the good; indeed, you may express the fact by defining good as that which all desire.’
‘Nothing could be more truly thought out. Either there is no single end to which all things are relative, or else the end to which all things universally hasten must be the highest good of all.’
Then she: ‘Exceedingly do I rejoice, dear pupil; thine eye is now fixed on the very central mark of truth. Moreover, herein is revealed that of which thou didst erstwhile profess thyself ignorant.’
‘What is that?’ said I.
‘The end and aim of the whole universe. Surely it is that which is desired of all; and, since we have concluded the good to be such, we ought to acknowledge the end and aim of the whole universe to be “the good.”’
Song XI. Reminiscence.
[10]
Who truth pursues, who from false ways His heedful steps would keep, By inward light must search within In meditation deep;
All outward bent he must repress His soul’s true treasure to possess.
Then all that error’s mists obscured Shall shine more clear than light, This fleshly frame’s oblivious weight Hath quenched not reason quite; The germs of truth still lie within, Whence we by learning all may win.
Else how could ye the answer due Untaught to questions give, Were’t not that deep within the soul Truth’s secret sparks do live?
If Plato’s teaching erreth not, We learn but that we have forgot.
XII.
Then said I: ‘With all my heart I agree with Plato; indeed, this is now the second time that these things have been brought back to my mind—first I lost them through the clogging contact of the body; then after through the stress of heavy grief.’
Then she continued: ‘If thou wilt reflect upon thy former admissions, it will not be long before thou dost also recollect that of which erstwhile thou didst confess thyself ignorant.’
‘What is that?’ said I.
‘The principles of the world’s government,’ said she.
‘Yes; I remember my confession, and, although I now anticipate what thou intendest, I have a desire to hear the argument plainly set forth.’
‘Awhile ago thou deemedst it beyond all doubt that God doth govern the world.’
‘I do not think it doubtful now, nor shall I ever; and by what reasons I am brought to this assurance I will briefly set forth. This world could never have taken shape as a single system out of parts so diverse and opposite were it not that there is One who joins together these so diverse things. And when it had once come together, the very diversity of natures would have dissevered it and torn it asunder in universal discord were there not One who keeps together what He has joined. Nor would the order of nature proceed so regularly, nor could its course exhibit motions so fixed in respect of position, time, range, efficacy, and character, unless there were One who, Himself abiding, disposed these various vicissitudes of change. This power, whatsoever it be, whereby they remain as they were created, and are kept in motion, I call by the name which all recognise—God.’
Then said she: ‘Seeing that such is thy belief, it will cost me little trouble, I think, to enable thee to win happiness, and return in safety to thy own country. But let us give our attention to the task that we have set before ourselves. Have we not counted independence in the category of happiness, and agreed that God is absolute happiness?’
‘Truly, we have.’
‘Then, He will need no external assistance for the ruling of the world. Otherwise, if He stands in need of aught, He will not possess complete independence.’
‘That is necessarily so,’ said I.
‘Then, by His own power alone He disposes all things.’
‘It cannot be denied.’
‘Now, God was proved to be absolute good.’
‘Yes; I remember.’
‘Then, He disposes all things by the agency of good, if it be true that He rules all things by His own power whom we have agreed to be good; and He is, as it were, the rudder and helm by which the world’s mechanism is kept steady and in order.’
‘Heartily do I agree; and, indeed, I anticipated what thou wouldst say, though it may be in feeble surmise only.’
‘I well believe it,’ said she; ‘for, as I think, thou now bringest to the search eyes quicker in discerning truth; but what I shall say next is no less plain and easy to see.’
‘What is it?’ said I.
‘Why,’ said she, ‘since God is rightly believed to govern all things with the rudder of goodness, and since all things do likewise, as I have taught, haste towards good by the very aim of nature, can it be doubted that His governance is willingly accepted, and that all submit themselves to the sway of the Disposer as conformed and attempered to His rule?’
‘Necessarily so,’ said I; ‘no rule would seem happy if it were a yoke imposed on reluctant wills, and not the safe-keeping of obedient subjects.’
‘There is nothing, then, which, while it follows nature, endeavours to resist good.’
‘No; nothing.’
‘But if anything should, will it have the least success against Him whom we rightly agreed to be supreme Lord of happiness?’
‘It would be utterly impotent.’
‘There is nothing, then, which has either the will or the power to oppose this supreme good.’
‘No; I think not.’
‘So, then,’ said she, ‘it is the supreme good which rules in strength, and graciously disposes all things.’
Then said I: ‘How delighted am I at thy reasonings, and the conclusion to which thou hast brought them, but most of all at these very words which thou usest! I am now at last ashamed of the folly that so sorely vexed me.’
‘Thou hast heard the story of the giants assailing heaven; but a beneficent strength disposed of them also, as they deserved. But shall we submit our arguments to the shock of mutual collision?—it may be from the impact some fair spark of truth may be struck out.’
‘If it be thy good pleasure,’ said I.
‘No one can doubt that God is all-powerful.’
‘No one at all can question it who thinks consistently.’
‘Now, there is nothing which One who is all-powerful cannot do.’
‘Nothing.’
‘But can God do evil, then?’
‘Nay; by no means.’
‘Then, evil is nothing,’ said she, ‘since He to whom nothing is impossible is unable to do evil.’
‘Art thou mocking me,’ said I, ‘weaving a labyrinth of tangled arguments, now seeming to begin where thou didst end, and now to end where thou didst begin, or dost thou build up some wondrous circle of Divine simplicity? For, truly, a little before thou didst begin with happiness, and say it was the supreme good, and didst declare it to be seated in the supreme Godhead. God Himself, too, thou didst affirm to be supreme good and all-complete happiness; and from this thou didst go on to add, as by the way, the proof that no one would be happy unless he were likewise God. Again, thou didst say that the very form of good was the essence both of God and of happiness, and didst teach that the absolute One was the absolute good which was sought by universal nature. Thou didst maintain, also, that God rules the universe by the governance of goodness, that all things obey Him willingly, and that evil has no existence in nature. And all this thou didst unfold without