Upper Canada Preserved — War of 1812 6-Book Bundle. Richard Feltoe
arrival. Exhausted and sickly, Dearborn’s disgruntled troops were left with no option but to set-to to build their camps and begin the process of preparing for the planned invasion of the Niagara frontier.
York, Upper Canada, E. Hale, artist, circa 1804. The quiet bayside community of York, prior to the war. The Upper Canada Parliament Buildings and town blockhouse are visible in the distance (right). Note the proximity of the uncleared forest, dominating man’s attempt at settlement during this period.
Library and Archives Canada, C-34334.
CHAPTER 4
Line Versus Line:
The Battle of Fort George, May 27, 1813
Learning of the fall of York, Brigadier General John Vincent, commander of the British forces on the Niagara, was painfully aware that his army was effectively cut off from reinforcement and support. In addition, his main reserves of food, ammunition, weapons, etc., previously thought safe at York, were now in the hands of the enemy. Knowing he would be the next target, Vincent’s disposable defence force consisted of just over 1,000 regular troops and militia, stationed across over thirty miles (50 kilometers) of frontier.*[1] On May 8th the main American fleet appeared and landed the regiments used in the capture of York to the east of Fort Niagara, out of range of the British guns.
Although ill and effectively unable to fulfil his duties, General Dearborn continued to act as commander of the American army. However, despite the significant number of troops already assembled around Fort Niagara, Dearborn felt that it was important to augment this force. He therefore sent orders to Oswego for 700 men of that garrison (under Colonel Winfield Scott) to march for the Niagara frontier. In addition, Brigadier General Morgan Lewis was ordered to transfer a sizeable portion of the troops stationed around Buffalo to Fort Niagara. Finally, Commodore Chauncey was directed to return to Sackets Harbor and, after offloading the goods captured at York, embark additional reinforcements, artillery, and supplies for delivery to the Niagara to complete the invasion force.
Leaving the vessels, Governor Tompkins and Conquest, as guards off the mouth of the Niagara River, Chauncey sailed back to Sackets Harbor with the bulk of his fleet, only to find that once again the garrison was in an extreme state of alarm over rumours that the British were preparing to attack from Kingston. As a result, Chauncey deemed it prudent to leave three vessels at Sackets Harbor for its defence, while the remaining ships were despatched in pairs over a number of days, carrying troops under the command of Brigadier General John Chandler. Chauncey himself did not sail for the Niagara River until May 21st.
Upon Chauncey’s arrival, he found that in his absence General Dearborn had overruled his orders and used the Conquest and Governor Tompkins to transport about a hundred men of the Twelfth Regiment (Captain Morgan) on a raid to the Head-of-the-Lake. Their goal was to destroy both the British supply base at Burlington Heights and the local grain mills west of that position. On May 11th this force had landed on the sand spit that marked the harbour at Burlington Heights and, after driving off a small detachment of militiamen guarding a storehouse, had burned both it and the nearby King’s Head Tavern. Intending to advance further, they heard that a force of Canadian militia and Native allies were advancing on their position. They therefore returned to their boats and set sail for Niagara to report their “victory.”
The King’s Head, O. Staples, artist, 1910. This later rendition shows the sand bar dividing the western end of Lake Ontario (right) from the harbour of Burlington Bay (left). The building (centre) is the King’s Head Tavern, which was burned by the American’s during their visit in May 1813.
Toronto Reference Library, JRR-3263.
Not impressed that Dearborn had countermanded his directives for the use of his ships, Chauncey also found that while land-related preparations for the invasion had been made no one had thought to include acquiring the longboats by which the army could make its landing on the enemy’s shore. Chauncey was consequently left with the job of locating the essential craft if the invasion was to take place on time.
Watching the American preparations, Vincent was woefully aware of his precarious position. More than a third of his regular infantry, half his artillery, and two-thirds of the militia were guarding the southern end of the Niagara River under Lieutenant Colonel Bisshopp. In the centre, below the gorge, the six detached batteries located between Queenston and Fort George all required manning and infantry support in case the Americans attempted a repeat of their October crossing. Finally, at the river mouth, Fort George was still in a “very ruinous and unfinished condition,”[2] as other military priorities had used up the limited resources of men and materiel elsewhere, while the detached batteries fronting the river and lake were all exposed to flanking fire from the American fleet. Only a month earlier Vincent had proposed making a pre-emptive strike on Fort Niagara, to eliminate the then-undermanned American base. However, Sheaffe had vetoed this operation. Now the opportunity had slipped away and Vincent was facing a significantly superior force of land-based troops, fully supported by riverside artillery batteries and a naval flotilla that could land troops anywhere along the Lake Ontario shore in his rear, thus cutting him off from reinforcement or escape.
Without knowing where this enemy blow would fall, Vincent was forced to disperse his command to cover all eventualities. On the right flank Lieutenant Colonel Harvey’s troops watched the riverbank between Fort George and Queenston, while on the left flank Lieutenant Colonel Myers supervised the troops stationed at the river mouth and lakefront. Between the two detachments, at Fort George, Vincent held back a reserve of 300 men from the 49th Regiment, plus a number of ad hoc detachments, composed principally of sick and non-combatant troops, in order to move to whichever flank might come under attack. As the threat of invasion intensified, Vincent ordered his troops to be placed on alert each night.
For over a week the men turned out at 2:00 a.m. and remained under arms until daylight revealed that yet another night’s sleep had been lost without result. By the night of May 24–25th, the British and Canadian troops were exhausted and nerves were stretched to breaking point. Consequently, when sentries upriver heard noises at the American “Five Mile” meadow they raised the alarm and began firing, which cascaded toward Fort George as the sounds moved downriver. Dawn revealed the sounds to be a small flotilla of lightly manned boats skirting the American shore and making for Fort Niagara. As the boats passed by Fort George, the garrison opened up with five pieces of ordnance. In response, the American riverside batteries retaliated with no less than twenty-five cannon and mortars, deluging the fort with shell and incendiary “hot-shot.” By noon almost every building inside the fort, as well as the surrounding wooden stockade, was burning fiercely and the artillery crews, although initially attempting to maintain the unequal contest with the American batteries, were soon forced to abandon their posts.
A view of Fort George, Navy Hall and New Niagara, taken from the United States Fort of Old Niagara, E. Walsh, artist, circa 1805. A detail from a view showing the Canadian bank of the Niagara River at Newark (Niagara-on-the-Lake) in 1805. Fort George and Navy Hall lie to the left, while Newark is to the right.
Image courtesy of the Clement Library, University of Michigan.
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