Upper Canada Preserved — War of 1812 6-Book Bundle. Richard Feltoe
officers and 420 other ranks prisoner alone), had also suffered a significant number of casualties during the attack (killed: 14 other ranks; wounded: 2 officers, 46 other ranks; prisoner: 2 officers, 39 other ranks).
By the end of the week, General Proctor was faced with the unpleasant fact that he could no longer maintain his siege and would have to retreat back to Amherstburg. This seemingly surprising turn of events came about quite simply — the majority of Proctor’s Native and militia troops had deserted from the siege lines. This was partially because, having already become encumbered by large amounts of booty and trophies of war, the Natives became angry and considered themselves betrayed by the British when they were denied what they considered their right to collect further trophies or exact reprisals upon captured American prisoners, as was their custom. This situation became critical when, witnessing a group of Natives starting to rob and then attack a group of unarmed American prisoners, British soldiers had stepped in to halt the potential massacre. When this had proved useless, as the Native depredations continued, the British troops were left with no choice but to fight off their own supposed allies, at the cost of several men wounded and at least one killed from their own ranks. This serious incident fatally fractured the alliance and caused all but a handful of warriors to abandon the siege. In the case of the militia, the campaign had been started at the crucial point of the season when the men were most needed at home to plant their crops. As a result, following the submission of a strongly worded petition outlining their desperate concerns, many of the militiamen decided that their personal need to return to their homesteads for crop planting had become a higher priority (to prevent the future starvation of their families), than maintaining a drawn-out encirclement of an enemy fort in the middle of nowhere.
Nonetheless, even with the eventual withdrawal of Proctor’s forces on May 9th, the combined effect of the American losses at the battle of Fort Meigs, the damage to the fort, and the substantial negative impact it had on subsequent American efforts to recruit a new militia force, especially in Kentucky, meant that the campaign to retake Michigan and invade Upper Canada through the Detroit corridor was crippled for the foreseeable future. Consequently, General Dearborn and his army on the Niagara was the sole thrust of American operations against the enemy in Upper Canada.
Second in Dearborn’s list of troubles was that the general’s own command was beset by discontent and dissent. Always a temperamental commander, General Dearborn had increasingly favoured a clique of handpicked subordinates and isolated himself from his other officers. Now in failing health, and increasingly “crusty” in temper, his daily command duties had been assumed by an “outsider,” his ambitious second-in-command, Major General Morgan Lewis. This officer was one who Dearborn had previously dismissed as “totally destitute of any practical qualifications necessary for an officer of his rank.”[2] . In return, Lewis was no less contemptuous of “Granny” Dearborn and, seeing the victory at Fort George as his own, resented Dearborn garnering any credit for the action. Under this mutual antipathy, Lewis therefore saw no dereliction of his duty in detailing Dearborn’s command shortcomings within private reports to his brother-in-law, the secretary of war, John Armstrong. In addition, Lewis had his own set of supporters, which created a level of vicious political infighting within the American regimental commands that far outstripped Hull’s similar situation the previous year at Detroit. Consequently, following the battle at Fort George, when criticism arose over the failure of the entire American force to aggressively pursue the British forces in its retreat to Queenston and the recall of Winfield Scott from his advanced position, Lewis wasted no time in falsely claiming the order came directly from Dearborn, an assertion Dearborn vehemently denied.
In response to these allegations of lethargy, Dearborn ordered Lewis to march out with almost half the army in pursuit of the retreating Crown forces, but did not stipulate any specific destination. Lewis, however, was not prepared to march off into the unknown and demanded that he be given, in writing, a more explicit set of orders. Dearborn responded by directing Lewis to move on Queenston and then advance to Beaver Dams. Lewis, on the other hand, believed that the British had already left Beaver Dams and were heading toward Forty Mile Creek. He therefore contradicted his commanding officer and demanded to have his route changed so that he could cut off Vincent’s retreat, or at least catch and attack him while Vincent was on the march and unable to prepare any proper defences. He also pressed for a simultaneous naval landing of troops at Head-of-the-Lake (Hamilton) to ensure Vincent’s encirclement.
Retorting that Lewis’ information was a deliberate ploy by Vincent to send the Americans in the wrong direction, Dearborn categorically ordered Lewis to follow his previously assigned route. However, later, after Lewis had marched for Queenston, Dearborn had second thoughts and authorized the preparation of some of the remaining units for transportation up the lake if further intelligence revealed the British were on the march. A fact soon conveyed to Vincent (who was still at Beaver Dams) and actually precipitated his further retreat — which in turn prevented Lewis’ troops from intercepting him.
Reaching Queenston Heights, Lewis’ troops found only the debris of Vincent’s retreat, while the enemy continued to elude them. Because of poor logistical support, Lewis’ column had marched without securing a sufficiency of provisions or camp equipment. Consequently they were hungry, footsore, tired, and soaked (as intermittent downpours of rain drenched them). Sending out foraging parties to appropriate all available food, Lewis’ troops occupied any building that offered shelter from the inclement weather and settled down for the night. At the same time, back at Fort George, Dearborn received confirmed reports of Vincent’s retreat. In response, instead of directing Lewis to march directly toward the enemy and sending him additional support, Dearborn sent him written orders to detach General Chandler’s brigade back to the fort as quickly as possible. Reluctantly complying with his commander’s demands the following morning, Lewis was still determined to initiate his own pursuit with what remained of his force and ordered an immediate advance, only to receive yet another set of written orders from Dearborn. These specifically terminated Lewis’ plans, reducing him to providing garrison forces at Queenston, Chippawa, and Fort Erie, and then returning to Fort George with the rump remnant of his detached command. Furious and frustrated at being thwarted yet again, Lewis had, ironically, been hoist on his own petard — as his earlier demands for more specific written orders from Dearborn came back with a vengeance to curtail his independence of command.
Reaching Burlington Heights on the evening of May 31st, Brigadier General Vincent and his troops had immediately begun to dig-in. Outnumbered by at least three to one, Vincent knew that, barring a miracle, he had a vital decision to make as to his further movements. His position at Burlington Heights allowed him to continue to supply Brigadier General Proctor and the Lake Erie fleet. Any further retreat would cut that lifeline and effectively hand the western end of Upper Canada to the Americans. On the other hand, Vincent also recognized that if he remained in position, the Americans could use their naval superiority to recross Lake Ontario, land troops in his rear, and cut off his own retreat to York and Kingston. Fortunately, the Americans remained at Fort George, which persuaded Vincent to hold his position and send urgent appeals to Prevost at Kingston to send up reinforcements and supplies aboard Sir James Yeo’s flotilla. In the meantime, Embodied Militia volunteers, three companies of the Incorporated Militia, and bands of Native warriors secured the flanks of the British position, reported on American movements, and collected any supplies of food and abandoned equipment that could be found along the line of the retreat, thus denying them to the enemy.
Unbeknownst to General Vincent, his earlier appeals for reinforcements and supplies and the latest news of the American inertia at the mouth of the Niagara had another effect entirely when they were received at Kingston by Sir James Yeo and Sir George Prevost. For although it had been their original intention to support Vincent before the Americans took Fort George, this new development was seen as a heaven-sent opportunity to destroy Sackets Harbor, the base of Chauncey’s naval power on Lake Ontario, and simultaneously cut the American main supply line to the Niagara, thus creating the third circumstance that was to bedevil General Dearborn.
Sir James Yeo, overall commander of the British and colonial Naval forces in Upper Canada.
Lossing, Pictorial Field Book of the War