Upper Canada Preserved — War of 1812 6-Book Bundle. Richard Feltoe

      In the aftermath of the battle of Sackets Harbor, both sides were forced to make significant changes in their future campaign strategies. The after-effects of this action also held a significant place upon the future decisions and actions of the senior commanders on both sides of the border.

      For Sir George Prevost, his return to Kingston was initially hailed by its citizens as the return of a conquering hero. However, this quickly turned to shock and dismay once they heard the unwelcome news that the expedition had failed. During the next few days this shock changed into a swelling backlash of personal criticism upon Sir George, especially once the eye-witness survivors told their versions of how a hard-won near victory had been turned into a panicked and humiliating defeat at the last moment — apparently exclusively by the commands of their inexperienced battlefield commander. Furthermore, the losses in manpower and resources at Sackets Harbor had compromised the effective fighting capabilities of the vital Kingston position, making it vulnerable to an American attack until reinforcements could be brought up from Lower Canada. Finally, news arrived from General Vincent reporting on the American successful invasion and the British Army’s retreat toward Burlington Heights. This brought the crisis of the threat on the Niagara into instant focus and made the necessity of sending Vincent reinforcements even more vital, even if it meant stripping Kingston of even more of its weakened garrison.

      From Prevost’s perspective, it now became necessary, nay vital that he engage in some damage control. In order of priority, he first needed to ensure that his dubious command decisions at Sackets Harbor be seen in the best possible light by his superiors, second that he silence his local critics, and thirdly, that he deal with the crisis on the Niagara. He began by writing his official account of events to Earl Bathurst in London, dated June 1, 1813. This communique (Bulletin No. 64) became a carefully phrased document that began by claiming that the expedition was not an attack to destroy the American base, but merely a deliberate diversionary show of force to disrupt the American activities on the Niagara and assist Vincent. In addition, he overestimated both the American troop numbers and the state of American defences to explain his troop losses and justify his decision to withdraw. He also attempted to shift some of the blame onto Sir James Yeo, by inferring that he (Prevost) knew nothing about the absence of the fleet until late in the battle (when in reality they were fully visible to Sir George throughout the action) and that the heavy troop losses and the failure of the “diversion” were therefore partially due to the failure of the fleet to provide the required artillery support to the landings.

      Altho’ as Your Lordship will perceive … the expedition has not been attended with the complete success which has been expected from it, I have the great satisfaction in informing Your Lordship that the courage and patience of the small band of troops employed on this occasion, under circumstances of peculiar hardship and privation, have been exceeded only by their intrepid conduct in the field, forcing a passage at the point of the bayonet through a thickly wooded country, affording constant shelter and strong positions to the enemy, but not a single spot of ground favourable to the operations of disciplined soldiers. The enemy filled the woods with infantry supported by field pieces, and kept up a heavy and destructive fire which could not, however stop the determined advance of His Majesty’s troops … who drove far superior numbers by a spirited charge to seek shelter within their blockhouses and enclosed works. At this moment the enemy were induced to burn their storehouses, but a heavier fire than that of musketry having become necessary in order to force their last position, I had the mortification to learn that the continuation of light and adverse winds had prevented the co-operation of the ships, and that the gunboats were unequal to silence the enemy’s elevated battery or to produce any effect on their blockhouses. Considering it therefore impracticable without such assistance to carry the strong works by which the post was defended, I reluctantly ordered the troops to leave a beaten enemy whom they had driven before them for upwards of three hours, and whom did not venture to offer the slightest opposition to the re-embarkation, which was effected with proper deliberation and in perfect order.[9]

      To deal with his local critics, while there is no direct documented evidence that he may have looked to divert criticism away from himself, the following sequence of timing remains suspiciously convenient. Having previously maintained a steadfast support of Major General Sir Roger Sheaffe against the complaints of those same civilian critics, Prevost suddenly reversed his position and issued the following terse statement in the publicly viewed General Orders, dated June 6, 1813.

      Major-General De Rottenburg will deliver over the command of the troops and the civil administration of the Province of Lower Canada to Major-General Glasgow, and is to arrive at Kingston on the 20th inst. Major-General Sir R. Sheaffe will meet Major General De Rottenburg at Cornwall on the 15th and from thence proceed to Montreal to assume the command of the troops in that district.[10]

      Interestingly, although Prevost had made a private mention of the need to make this replacement prior to the Sackets Harbor engagement (bulletin No. 63 to Earl Bathurst) on May 26, he had also specifically stated that this would only take place once the military situation on the Niagara had settled down, he had completed his reinforcement of General Vincent, and had received an approval confirmation of his intention from London. Now the change was pushed through without delay, and Prevost did not see fit to include this very significant item of news in his subsequent official communiqués to Earl Bathurst. In fact, it was not until Bulletin No. 72 dated June 24, 1813, after writing: “I have the honour to transmit to Your Lordship a copy of a public declaration given out by the American commandant of Fort Erie, after the enemy had taken possession of that post, and the proclamation which I deemed it necessary to issue in consequence of it,”[11] that Prevost dismissingly broached the subject of his unilateral entire change in command in Upper Canada.

      I avail myself of this opportunity of informing Your Lordship that finding upon my arrival at this place [which, in fact, had been almost two months earlier] that Major-General Sir Roger Sheaffe had altogether lost the confidence of the Province by the measures he had pursued for its defence, I deemed it most conducive to the good of the public service to remove that officer to Montreal and to Substitute Major-General De Rottenburg in his place.[12]

      Finally, to deal with the issue on the Niagara, Prevost began to muster a relief force and supplies that would need transportation aboard Yeo’s fleet if it was to arrive with any hope of being in time to assist Vincent. Unfortunately, Yeo’s co-operation on the matter was something of a question at

       that moment.

      For Sir James Yeo, the expedition to Sackets Harbor had been a severe test of his command abilities. To his credit he had successfully mounted an amphibious expedition in less than twenty-four hours, only a fortnight after taking up his new command, and with no real knowledge of the capabilities of his ships or crews. He had maintained the integrity of his fleet under variable weather conditions, suffered negligible losses during the course of the action, and brought his command home intact. On the other hand, while he was perhaps justified in exercising a degree of caution in view of his unfamiliarity with the waters, the uncertain weather, and the variable winds his fleet experienced, the fact that he personally went ashore and participated in the action, instead of supervising the movement of his fleet inshore to bombard the American positions, definitely left Yeo open to criticism — which was not helped by Prevost’s version of events and implied blame. In the aftermath of the events of May 28th, a series of communications took place between the two commanders, as well as from the two to their masters in London, about the relative degrees of responsibility for the failure of the expedition. This inevitably cooled and then soured relations between Sir George and Sir James for some time to come — just when the maximum degree of support and co-operation was needed in the British camp.

      For Commodore Chauncey, when the Lady of the Lake arrived at the Niagara River (late on May 29th) bearing the alarming news that the British fleet had sailed, he was