Upper Canada Preserved — War of 1812 6-Book Bundle. Richard Feltoe
heavy fire from both the detachments placed on the island, and the militia units on the mainland. Seeing their planned landing ground occupied by the enemy and taking increasing numbers of casualties, the flotilla veered off toward the north side of the island, only to expose themselves to the additional artillery fire of the 32-pounder gun placed at Fort Tompkins atop the bluffs overlooking the harbour. What they did not know was that even this approach had been sufficient to persuade some of Brown’s militiamen to begin deserting.
Continuing to suffer casualties, the leading wave of boats landed on Horse Island, persuading the small detachment of American defenders to retire across the narrow and partially submerged causeway that linked the island to Brown’s prepared entrenchments. Here they joined his remaining force of militia, apparently fully prepared to take on the British from an excellent defensive position. As far as Brown was concerned he had the British penned on an island, with only a single narrow route through which they could approach his prepared earthwork defences, manned with infantry and backed by artillery — everything that a defending commander could wish for to inflict the heaviest casualties on his enemy.
A current (2012) view of Horse Island, as seen from the positions taken by General Brown’s militia forces at the start of the battle. The line of projections in the water that mark the partially submerged remnants of the sandbar causeway are indicated for clarity.
According to General Brown’s later account of the action:
Every exertion was then made [by myself] to inspire my little force with confidence, and assure them that if they would but lay firm and restrain their fire, I was confident that every man must nearly kill his man. I then took my position in the centre by the left of the men at the 6-pounder, directly in front of the column approaching from the island and all was silent with me….[6]
Unfortunately for Brown, the calibre of the men he was facing was that of regular troops, trained for battle and ready to take casualties to achieve their objective. Despite facing the prospect of advancing across an entirely exposed and partially submerged narrow causeway of shingle, sand, and soft mud some 300 yards (275 meters) long and at points less than ten feet (3 meters) wide, before reaching Brown’s prepared entrenchments, the men of the 100th Regiment formed a narrow solid column and, after fixing bayonets and “porting arms,” commenced a disciplined advance across the causeway that steadily increased in pace and culminated in a charging of the bayonets at the last moment. Faced with this onslaught of cold steel, despite having the advantage of firepower and defensive positions, the relatively untrained American militiamen increasingly saw their military role in the conflict as concluded and proceeded in ones, tens, then entire sections to abandon their posts and head for the nearby woods with all speed. Only a few even attempted to fire their weapons, while those who initially stood their ground soon found themselves defending positions that were untenable and either joined the rout or retired back toward the succeeding lines of American troops stationed nearer the Basswood Cantonment barracks and Fort Tompkins.
Previously supremely confident of his self-proclaimed expertise in establishing his defensive positions and seeing his predictions initially fulfilled as to the point of British landing, Brigadier General Brown saw his plans disintegrate before his eyes. In his own words:
Not a shot was fired from their column, the front approaching charging bayonets….
To my utter astonishment, my men arose from their cover and broke & before I could realize the disgraceful scene, there was scarcely a man within several rods of where I stood … I made all the noise I could for my men, put my handkerchief on the point of my sword and made every sort of signal possible that they might notice, but in vain….[7]
Recognizing that the initial encounter was irrevocably lost, Brown quickly mounted his horse and joined his men in putting distance between himself and the enemy.
With the causeway and beachhead secure, the British continued to advance, but were soon slowed by the combined fire of American artillery from Fort Tompkins, the thick entanglements of the lines of abattis flanking the American positions, defensive fire from units of militia that had reformed under cover of the abattis, and a distinct lack of their own artillery support. This latter factor was the combined result of the main British fleet remaining becalmed well out of firing range, the supporting gunboats carrying artillery pieces that could not elevate sufficiently to provide fire support, and the blunder of putting the land artillery pieces in one set of boats and the crews in another, neither of which was anywhere near reaching the shore. There was also an unfortunate instance of friendly fire upon the 104th Regiment by men of the Lower Canada Voltigeur Regiment. This regiment had been one of the last units to land, and under the prevailing conditions of poor visibility (due to the heavy gunsmoke hanging in the damp and still morning air) they had been unable to determine the status of the events taking place before them. As a result, one overly excited officer (Captain William Johnson) did not take the time to properly identify the body of troops to his front, and simply fired his command into the backs of the indistinct shape. He was soon told, in no uncertain and unflattering terms, of his catastrophic blunder by the victim regiment’s commanding officer, Major William Drummond.
Looking to regain the initiative, the main body of attackers, consisting of the 8th (Kings), 100th, Royal Newfoundland, and Glengarry Light Infantry Regiments, led by Colonel Young (8th [King’s] Regiment), moved along the trackway running at the edge of the low cliffs toward the Basswood Cantonment and Fort Tompkins. At the same time a second body, consisting of the 104th, Canadian Voltigeurs, and Native warriors under Major Drummond (104th), were detached with orders to move to their right and approach the village from that quadrant. Shortly thereafter this column also subdivided, with the Voltigeurs and Natives moving even further to the right with orders to press any defenders making a stand among the undergrowth of the woodlands and lines of abattis and secure the flank of the main British thrust. Because of the broken and entangled nature of the terrain on this flank, this force soon found itself broken into small detachments, each taking its own line of advance and fighting its own battle with whatever defenders chose to make a stand..
On the American side of the field, with the militia contingent collapsed and on the run and General Brown nowhere to be found, command of the support troops and remaining defensive positions fell to Lieutenant Colonel Backus once again. Advancing his reserves from the cantonment, and backed by Lieutenant Louis Laval and his 6-pounder artillery piece, as well as some of the retreating militia, Backus established a new line of defensive fire along the inner line of abattis that began to take a steady and increasing toll upon the advancing British force. However, despite putting up a stout and brave resistance, the determined advances of the British on the flanks and equally deadly return fire forced the Americans to begin a fighting retreat back toward Fort Tompkins. Meanwhile, away from the fighting, General Brown later claimed he was otherwise occupied in an attempt to reform some semblance of a militia force that could then rejoin the action and bolster the American line. Unfortunately, he found that there was considerable reluctance on the part of many detachments to rejoin the engagement. While those who did initially appear willing, they quickly dispersed when they encountered parties of British troops, Voltigeurs, and Natives active on that part of the battlefield.
Behind the American lines, the defenders assigned to man the artillery batteries at Navy Point and Fort Volunteer had remained relatively inactive throughout the morning as the increasingly louder sounds of battle drifted back from over the hill, indicating that the British were gaining ground. The two vessels, Fair American and Pert, had already been ordered by Lieutenant Wolcott Chauncey (brother to Commodore Chauncey and senior naval officer at the harbour) to use their long sweep oars to propel themselves out of the harbour and off to the north to avoid being trapped by the British