Upper Canada Preserved — War of 1812 6-Book Bundle. Richard Feltoe
BATTLE OF SACKETS HARBOR,
MAY 29, 1813
Following the American victory at York, activities at Sackets Harbor had been closely monitored and reported on by Prevost’s agents, who sent detailed intelligence on the continued build up of troops at the harbour. As a result, when Chauncey and his fleet returned on May 11th, the state of alert at Kingston was raised by that same evening. On May 26th, Sir George Prevost recorded his observations in a report to Earl Bathurst about the current situation:
The enemy, continuing to avail themselves of their naval ascendancy on Lake Ontario, left Sacketts Harbour on the 20th inst. & have appeared off Fort George with sixteen vessels laden with troops, which they disembarked the following day…. Col. Vincent being apprehensive of an immediate attack from a force in number vastly superior to his own, I have advised Commodore Sir J’s Yeo to sail with the vessels ready for service to reconnoitre the enemy’s flotilla, in order that he may form an opinion upon the practicability of conveying about three hundred men, being the whole disposable force I can command at present and which are held in readiness to embark at a moments notice …[3]
Prevost also directed Yeo to make a reconnaissance toward Sackets Harbor, to confirm the absence of any interception threat from Chauncey’s fleet if Yeo’s flotilla sailed with Vincent’s reinforcements. At noon the following day, Yeo returned post-haste to Kingston, bearing news that the enemy’s principal shipbuilding centre was indeed empty of shipping. With the combined reports from Vincent and Chauncey, and looking to take advantage of the moment, Prevost decided to completely revise his campaign strategy and make an immediate surprise strike at Sackets Harbor, before Chauncey’s fleet could return. Without any proper preparations of supply, artillery support, ammunition, food, or even a coherent plan of action, during the course of the afternoon of May 27th every available vessel was assembled and loaded with detachments of troops.*[4]
South East View of Sackett’s Harbour, copied from the original engraving by W.Strickland, 1815. (Below) The same viewpoint in 2012.
Library and Archives Canada, C-8153.
By evening the ad hoc attack force of some 900 men was embarked and the flotilla sailed south to attack Sackets Harbor. Awaiting them was a composite American garrison force that was, according to various sources, comprised of between 1,450 to nearly 2,000 men, drawn from units of regular and militia infantry, artillery, naval crews, U.S. Marines, dockyard workers, and local volunteers.
At dawn the following day, while still some miles from their target and under light intermittent winds, the British flotilla was sighted by a line of three American picket boats left behind by Chauncey for exactly this situation. Swinging about, the Lady of the Lake sailed westward toward the Niagara River to warn Chauncey, while the Fair American and Pert ran south, toward the American base, firing their cannons as an alarm warning. The element of surprise was now lost. In response, without any direct orders for a plan of attack and seeking to maintain the initiative, Major William Drummond (104th) began to independently disembark some of his troops into his landing boats, intending to march overland to initiate the assault. However, in this he was abruptly overruled by Prevost, who ordered the troops re-embarkation and the continuation of the flotillas slow advance toward Sackets Harbor.
By later that morning, the wind had reversed direction and was blowing directly against the flotilla, causing it to lose way. With no hope of making a surprise attack, Prevost called off the landing and ordered the return of the expedition to Kingston. Almost immediately thereafter, however, the winds shifted once again and then subsided, becalming the fleet. At the same time, masthead lookouts reported the approach of a flotilla of eight large bateaux, rowing up from the south and obviously heading for the American harbour with what later was determined to be around 300 men from the Ninth and Twenty-First Regiments under Major Thomas Aspinwall’s command at Oswego. To counter this reinforcement, a gunboat, manned by a detachment from the Glengarry Light Infantry, along with three large canoes filled with Native warriors, were ordered to engage the enemy and, if possible, force them to retreat. Coming under fire from the approaching British boats, far from engaging the smaller enemy units, or retiring as an intact unit, the American boats veered off and scattered, with the majority deliberately running themselves aground on the nearby lakeside shoreline. Whereupon the American troops aboard abandoned their vessels and made for the nearby woods at high speed. Following close behind, the Natives landed and chased after the fleeing Americans. In a series of hand-to-hand engagements in the woods, the Americans were at a serious disadvantage and suffered casualties accordingly, losing over thirty-five men killed to the Natives’ one. In fact, despite their numerical superiority, a large number of American troops were soon seen returning to their fully loaded bateaux, whereupon the boats set course directly for the becalmed British flotilla under a white flag. Upon their arrival, the some 115 troops aboard demanded British protection from the Natives as surrendered prisoners of war.
Despite being pleased by the turn out of events with the convoy, Prevost had nonetheless lost three hours in which to make his assault with favourable winds and his plan for a rapid strike was completely frustrated as the winds died and daylight ended. Faced with the choice of retiring to Kingston without being able to claim to have made any attempt to eliminate what others would consider a vulnerable American base, or attacking what he knew would now be a fully alerted and prepared enemy position, the deliberate surrender of Aspinwall’s troops tipped the balance. Consequently, Prevost reversed his position yet again and ordered the attack to commence at first light the following morning.
On shore, the titular commander of the American base, Lieutenant Colonel Electus Backus (First Light Dragoons), had been making rushed preparations for the British assault from the moment the first alarm was raised. However, despite being a regular army officer, he found himself increasingly superseded by the local militia commander, Brigadier General Jacob Brown. Brown had originally been directed by General Dearborn to only gather a reserve of 300 to 400 militia, in order to “aid” Backus and his official “regular” garrison in case of an attack. Instead, Brown reinterpreted this directive as an authorization and a direct request to take over command of Sackets Harbor and oversee its entire defence.
With the British fleet becalmed offshore as night fell, Brown implemented the defensive plan for the harbour created by Colonel Alexander Macomb in February and took it upon himself to personally direct the placement of each newly arriving detachment of militia troops and make plans for a fighting retreat to the holdout position of Fort Volunteer if the remainder of the positions fell. He also issued directives for all additional local militia units in the immediate region to march to the harbour to bolster the defensive forces. By the early hours of the morning all of the available American forces had been positioned.*[5]
Because much of the immediate coast was composed of sheer rock outcrops and low cliffs, the closest reasonable landing ground not covered by the defensive fortifications and artillery positions were to the south of the harbour at Horse Island. Offshore, the boats had been filled with troops since shortly after 10:00 p.m., awaiting the first light of dawn to begin their approach. As a result, despite the virtually calm wind conditions, a constant cold drizzle and onshore swell had given the exposed troops in the heavily packed small boats an uncomfortable and rocky night, while the local currents scattered the boats from their assigned stations. Once it was light enough to see, the boat crews had the double effort of regaining their stations against the currents and starting the attack on time.
Looking to make their initial landing almost exactly where Brown had predicted, on the mainland to the south side of Horse Island, the British