Upper Canada Preserved — War of 1812 6-Book Bundle. Richard Feltoe
the following day, the burned out British positions at Chippawa, Queenston, and Fort George were all being garrisoned by American troops. One immediate consequence of this loss of British control of the upper reaches of the Niagara River was that the Americans were able to tow out five armed vessels from their navy yard on the Scajaquada Creek and load them with vitally needed supplies for delivery to the shipbuilding yards at Erie, Pennsylvania, on Lake Erie, completely reversing the balance of naval power on that lake.
Despite having suffered severely in losses of manpower and supplies, most of Vincent’s surviving troops, especially the militia and Native allies, expected that their commander would concentrate his forces at Beaver Dams and then make a counteroffensive on the American invaders, especially once the troops from Chippawa, Fort Erie, Burlington Heights, and additional parties of Native warriors from the Grand River were added to the sum. Instead, and to their grave concern, directives arrived for the commandeering of every wagon in the area and the destruction of any stores and supplies that could not be immediately transported, as the army was ordered to retreat to Forty Mile Creek.
This further withdrawal was ordered because Vincent had received disturbing reports of the Americans re-embarking a substantial number of troops on board their fleet with orders to sail along the lake and land behind his already diminished army, thus trapping it between two enemy divisions. It was therefore essential that he move quickly, before his options ran out. Despite this valid tactical necessity, many of the officers of the militia, as well as Norton and his Native warriors, took this action as proof that Vincent’s intention was to completely abandon the Niagara to the Americans and possibly retire on York or even Kingston. Indeed, after remaining less than two days at the eminently defendable position at Forty Mile Creek, when new orders were issued that the army was to continue in its retreat to Burlington Heights their fear became a virtual certainty. Furthermore, far from being encouraged to stay with the regulars and continue to fight the invaders, most of the militia units were officially disbanded and told to return to their homes to await the advancing Americans and submit to certain capture and possible imprisonment or parole. As a result, morale plummeted, the Native warriors left en masse to see to the protection of their families and homes along the Grand River, and even the most ardent Crown supporters wondered if this was the end of Upper Canada as a province. Everything now hinged on the actions of the Americans.
CHAPTER 5
Victories, But for Whom?
Despite having achieved major military victories at Fort York and Fort George, instead of being lauded as the hero of the hour, Major General Dearborn found himself beset by the old adage that bad news often comes in threes.
First, according to his original plan, following the successful conclusion of his invasion of the Niagara frontier, Dearborn’s army was to have moved west to link up with Major General Harrison’s forces to recover the Michigan Territory. Unfortunately, this entire part of the campaign had been effectively scuttled by the unexpected aggressiveness of Brigadier General Proctor and his forces at Amherstburg.
Ever since the death of General Brock, in October 1812, General Proctor had been repeatedly denied more than a trickle of reinforcements and supplies by General Sheaffe, who favoured defending the Niagara frontier. In addition, Proctor’s latest intelligence reports indicated that the balance of power in the west had swung dramatically in favour of the Americans. There were three reasons for this:
The loss of York in April had included the town’s warehouses, which contained vital naval construction materials destined for the shipyard at Amherstburg. Those supplies had either been burned or fallen into the hands of the Americans.
The British abandonment of Fort Erie had allowed the previously trapped American vessels at Black Rock to escape and unite with the new ships being constructed at the Americans’ Lake Erie Naval Base at Erie (PA).
A new set of massive fortifications (Fort Meigs) was being constructed on the Maumee River, and would almost certainly become Harrison’s base of operations for a new campaign to retake the Michigan Territory and possibly invade Upper Canada.
While Proctor knew there was nothing he could do about the events at York and Erie, the more time Harrison had to complete his preparations the more dangerous and difficult it would be for Proctor’s diminished and poorly supplied forces to eliminate this base or stop any subsequent invasion. Believing that he had no realistic alternative, and despite the considerable odds against it succeeding, Proctor ordered a pre-emptive offensive operation to besiege and capture Fort Meigs. For this campaign he cobbled together a combined force of 533 British regulars, 63 Fencibles, 462 Canadian militia, and 1,200 Native warriors.[1]
THE SIEGE OF FORT MEIGS, MAY 1–9, 1813
Sailing from Amherstburg on April 23rd, Proctor’s force landed at the mouth of the Maumee River that evening. They then had to overcome bad weather and mud choked trackways as they hauled their cannon overland, eventually reaching Fort Meigs on April 29th, whereupon they began erecting siege lines. By May 1st artillery batteries were erected on both the north and south sides of the Maumee River and they began a bombardment of the fort from two flanks. Following four days of round-the-clock firing, and constantly being berated by his Native allies for engaging in a siege rather than making an immediate frontal attack, Proctor still did not think that enough damage had been done to make any formal assault practicable.
Inside the fort, however, General Harrison was deeply concerned about his defensive capabilities. The British artillery barrage was inflicting such a degree of damage on his fortifications that it required constant repairs to maintain the defences. In addition, casualties had mounted to the point where he had been forced to build numerous earth embankments within the fort to shelter his troops from the artillery fire. Finally, his own lack of artillery ammunition required him to issue an offer of payment for each spent British cannonball that was located and brought in for reuse by the American batteries. Thus, when he received word on May 4th that a relief column of 1,200 Kentucky militia were approaching his position, Harrison decided to make an attempt to break the siege. He therefore communicated his plan to the commander of the relief column, Brigadier General Green Clay, for the two forces to work in concert. The following morning, forces from Fort Meigs made a sortie to attack the southern British batteries from the front. At the same time, the relief force moved forward in two columns. The “northern” column, under Colonel William Dudley, consisted of some 800 men in twelve boats. Their orders were to sail up the river and land on the northern bank of the Maumee River, destroy the northern British artillery positions, and then withdraw to the fort. Simultaneously, the “southern” column of 400 men, under General Clay in six boats, was to fight its way overland directly toward the southern batteries, catching the enemy between itself and Harrison’s sortie.
Initially, the American plan met with some success, with the northern battery being overrun and the guns spiked. However, a portion of the Kentucky militia disobeyed their explicit orders to maintain regimental discipline and went on a rampaging chase of Proctor’s retreating Native allies. In the thick forest the Natives ambushed the incautious militiamen, inflicting a catastrophic number of casualties. At the same time, a strong counterattack by the Essex and Kent Embodied Militias, backed by men of the 41st Regiment, soon recaptured the batteries and routed those Kentuckians who had obeyed Harrison’s orders. By the time the fighting ended, of the 800 men originally in this northern American force only 150 are recorded as escaping back to their boats. At the same time, the sortie from the fort also initially succeeded in penetrating the British lines and spiking some of the guns before they too were evicted by a counterattack. Clay’s southern column came under heavy fire while in the process of landing, and instead of attacking the British positions, took only what they could carry, abandoned their boats, and diverted directly to the fort. They linked up with Harrison’s garrison, but lost the remainder of their supplies and boats as plunder to the British and Native warriors.
Despite suffering heavy losses, which the Americans only officially listed as 81 killed and 189 wounded, Harrison’s garrison had gained some of the extra manpower and supplies it desperately needed and was able to continue to hold out. Proctor’s army, despite having recovered his batteries and inflicted such severe