Institution Building in Weak States. Andrew Radin
mandates that comprise an intervention or there may be a single organization composed of suborganizations.79 When these organizations do not coordinate—or, worse, actively disagree—intervention outcomes are expected to suffer. Domestic actors may be able to play different organizations against one another, and disagreeing organizations may inefficiently allocate resources to tasks or adopt tasks that are poorly suited to their own capabilities.80 Deployed international organizations must also coordinate with states and international organizations outside of the mission. One way to address coordination problems is to alter the formal structure of the organizations deployed on the ground, such as by centralizing control over different international organizations, as was attempted in the case of Kosovo.81 Even when there is a single hierarchy of civilian organizations, in many interventions, including Kosovo, there is also a separate military command structure, which tends to produce coordination problems between the civilian and military efforts. Changes in leadership may also improve coordination. Arguably, Paddy Ashdown, the High Representative of the international community in Bosnia from 2002 to 2006, was more able to coordinate international organizations than his predecessors and successors (see chapters 4 and 5).
A final component of bureaucratic capacity is organizational learning. Lise Morjé Howard writes that peacekeeping success depends on organization learning, as indicated by an organization’s ability to gather information, coordinate internally, engage with the environment, and exercise leadership.82 Similarly, Thorsten Benner and his coauthors observe that, to succeed, “the UN Peace operations apparatus had to transform itself into a ‘learning organization,’ ”—in other words, adapt its structure to respond to changing circumstances.83
Hypotheses for the International Resources Theory
Much of the literature on international resources evaluates the success of intervention at the level of the society rather than at the level of the state institution. Using the arguments above, I draw out specific hypotheses for how resources are likely to impact the outcome and process of reform, summarized in table 2.5.
The literature points to a clear outcome prediction: greater resources lead to more successful institution building (Hypothesis 5). The case studies assess this hypothesis by aggregating the measures of the four categories of resources described above to develop an overall assessment of the level of resources in a given stage of a reform effort. The case studies then consider whether the level of improvement in the state institution accords with this level of resources.
TABLE 2.5. Hypotheses for the International Resources Theory
| Predicted Outcome | Process Hypotheses |
| H5: Greater resources tend to lead to more successful institution building. | H5A: Capacity building can improve the quality of state institutions. H5B: Foreign actors can use their resources to persuade or coerce domestic elites. H5C: Interveners may seek to influence who wins elections. H5D: Foreign organizations can temporarily substitute for local state institutions and thereby enable the longer-term development of state institutions. H5E: Foreign organizations can encourage reform by engaging the mass public through publicity campaigns and developing civil society. H5F: Foreign organizations can impose changes in laws or regulations. |
The literature also identifies six techniques that foreign actors can use to improve state institutions, which I specify as process hypotheses. First, foreign actors can engage in capacity building to improve the quality of state institutions (Hypothesis 5A). Capacity building refers to the range of activities intended to strengthen the target state institution to perform its specified functions, including mentoring, advising, training, providing equipment, or building infrastructure.84 Although capacity building may primarily improve the effectiveness of a given state institution, it may also support compliance with the law (such as by providing human rights training to police) or accountability (by enhancing minority participation or transparency). Capacity-building activities benefit from a stronger mandate, money, and the presence of skilled international personnel.
Second, depending on their resources, foreign actors can persuade or coerce domestic elites to improve state institutions (Hypothesis 5B). Foreign reformers can offer advice, make a locally desired political outcome conditional on the fulfillment of reform, and, given executive authority, threaten to replace or actually fire officials who do not comply with foreign requests.85 Attempts to advise or persuade elites or local officials is common, but the skill of foreign personnel determines whether it will be effective. Conditionality can be especially effective when reforms are required for EU or NATO accession or the transfer of power from foreign actors to domestic officials.86 However, the effectiveness of conditionality depends on the political context and the presence of sufficient bureaucratic resources to ensure that promised rewards are provided only in return for compliance.
Third, interveners may seek to influence who wins elections (Hypothesis 5C). The literature notes the potential for “electoral engineering” in postwar societies, in part with the goal of encouraging the selection of “moderate” elites who are likely to support reform. Techniques to achieve this goal include formulating electoral systems to reward moderate candidates, providing training or advice to specific parties, or sanctioning or excluding parties that might undermine international objectives.87
Fourth, foreign actors can temporarily substitute for a given state institution and thereby enable longer-term development (Hypothesis 5D). Substitution for local capacity is common early in interventions, such as in the case of foreign police helping to provide basic law and order in the absence of a functioning local police force.88 In some cases substitution may continue after domestic institutions have begun to operate, especially when the functioning of these organizations falls far below the standards set by foreign actors. While the same foreign personnel may be responsible for both capacity building and substitution, the two activities are different: the former seeks to train local officials, while the latter seeks to perform services on their behalf. The path dependence theory, below, argues that the provision of government functions by foreign actors in fact discourages domestic actors from developing their own capacities. Nevertheless, many foreign actors believe that the temporary fulfillment of basic functions is essential to avoid collapse and enable subsequent reform.
Fifth, foreign institution builders can make reform more popular through publicity campaigns and developing civil society (Hypothesis 5E). Public opinion in any society is important for the success of reform. Ashdown notes that “the struggle to reconstruct a state and society cannot be won without first gaining the support of the local population,” and he emphasizes that public consent is ultimately required for foreign actors to use their executive powers.89 Former US ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad similarly observes that “effective communication is vital to the success of any reconstruction program.”90 Developing civil society organizations is also believed to strengthen the ability of the mass public to exercise their opinion and potentially encourage elites to improve state institutions.91
Sixth, foreign organizations with executive legal authority can improve the quality of state institutions by imposing changes in laws or regulations without the approval of domestic officials (Hypothesis 5F).92 For example, in Kosovo, Timor-Leste, and Iraq, international administrations used their authority to create the basis for a legal code in the absence of an elected legislature. Imposition is feasible only if there is an administer mandate, and it likely also depends on bureaucratic capacity, as effective planning and unity of effort are critical to ensure that the imposed law has a meaningful impact and that domestic actors accept imposition.93 Changing the law or formal rules does not necessarily make it more likely that domestic officials will comply with the law, however.