Institution Building in Weak States. Andrew Radin
actors to diminish the importance of nationalism.
To understand whether a reform threatens nationalist goals, it is first necessary to identify the dominant nationalist goals for the relevant groups. Nationalist goals refer to the minimum political objectives associated with a group’s nationalist aspirations. Identifying these goals is not always straightforward since individuals within groups have varying political objectives. Some individuals may espouse more radical preferences for secession or takeover of the central government, while more moderate individuals may seek improved political representation or greater autonomy. The balance of radical and moderate preferences may shift over time. Each of the case studies in chapters 3 through 6 analyzes the history of the society, elite discourse, and surveys (where possible) to map the nationalist beliefs of the key groups within the society. From this analysis, the case studies identify the dominant nationalist goals, meaning the minimum goals that were most consistently articulated by the group’s leaders and backed by the members of the group (summarized in table 2.1). These assessments are meant to distinguish widely shared nationalist goals that, if challenged, would generate widespread popular unrest from the more fringe goals, which are likely to inspire a smaller reaction.
The case studies then evaluate the threat to nationalist goals by considering whether foreign demands or recommendations, if implemented, would undermine the relevant groups’ nationalist goals or make them unachievable. For example, a reform effort may threaten nationalist goals by eliminating local control over a police force, which would undermine an institution critical to regional autonomy. Demands may also threaten nationalist goals by requiring changes to the constitution that would reduce ethnic dominance or autonomy. Finally, as in Kosovo, foreign actors who exercise temporary sovereignty over a territory may threaten nationalist goals by indefinitely delaying the territory’s self-governance. Some members of a group may claim for political reasons that foreign demands or recommendations threaten nationalist goals even if there is little threat. Determining which foreign demands or recommendations actually threaten a group’s dominant nationalist goals inevitably involves some subjective judgment, so the case studies seek to be as transparent as possible in their assessments. Where there is uncertainty, the analysis errs on the side of not identifying a threat.
TABLE 2.1. Dominant Nationalist Goals of the Major Groups in the Case Studies
a Because East Timor was a case of successful secession, there were no group divides in the post-conflict political arrangement.
b As discussed in chapter 6, while there were linguistic and social divisions in Ukraine, including around the usage of the Russian language, there were not clearly delineated or stable groups, and pro-Ukrainian nationalism strengthened throughout the country after 2014. See Fedorenko, Rybiy, and Umland, “The Ukrainian Party System before and after the 2013–2014 Euromaidan,” 624.
Many works observe that nationalist goals are an obstacle to peace because they offer a motivation or means for elites to obstruct international efforts. For example, Stephen Stedman describes how elites may “spoil” peace processes depending on their interests and capabilities.26 Similarly, Zürcher and his coauthors observe that elites may have the primary objective of ethnic dominance or independence, objectives that I refer to as nationalist goals, and they claim these may be threatened by the development of democracy.27 As mentioned in chapter 1, few works recognize that elite pursuit of nationalist goals reflects the widespread popularity of nationalist goals and that popular support for nationalist goals plays a bottom-up role in blocking reform, as I discuss next.
Hypotheses for Reform Threatening Nationalist Goals
The domestic opposition theory expects that a reform that threatens a major group’s nationalist goals will have an outcome of little or no improvement in the quality of the state institution (Hypothesis 1).28 Below I specify several process hypotheses for how the theory expects that this outcome could occur (see table 2.2). The more that the process of given reform effort follows these predictions, the more that the domestic opposition theory offers insight for that particular reform. The outcome hypotheses are numbered 1–6, while the process predictions are numbered based on the associated outcome prediction (e.g., H1A, H1B, . . . , H2A, H2B).
When a reform effort threatens nationalist goals, the theory expects elites and the mass population to engage in public opposition, meaning open and unconcealed efforts to stop or undermine reform (Hypothesis 1A). Public opposition can undermine reform by convincing the foreign actor that the population opposes reform, that the demands or recommendations associated with a reform are illegitimate, and that the reform should therefore be abandoned or altered. While there is an extensive literature on the role of public demonstrations in political change, there is relatively limited focus on the role of public demonstrations against the international community.29
TABLE 2.2. Hypotheses Given a Threat to Nationalist Goals
| Outcome | Process |
| H1: Little or no improvement in the quality of state institutions. | H1A: There is widespread and recurring public opposition in the form of elite objections or mass demonstrations. H1B: Within the group whose nationalist goals are threatened, public satisfaction toward the mission or reform will decline. H1C: Widespread and recurring elite objections convince foreign actors that if they persist with their demands or recommendations, the state institution they seek to build will not be effective or legitimate. H1D: Widespread and recurring public demonstrations create cognitive dissonance with foreign reformers’ belief in popular sovereignty. H1E: The desire to avoid threatening nationalist goals can make foreign reformers preemptively adjust their demands or recommendations. |
Public opposition depends on the attitudes and behavior of both the mass population and the elites but may be executed by either actor. Elites execute public opposition primarily through elite objections, in which they voice their opposition to reform in public speeches or written statements, media appearances, discussions with foreign officials, or votes against legislation. Public opinion often motivates elites to object to a reform and makes elite objections more credible. The mass population can also execute public opposition through mass demonstrations, including protests, rallies, or riots where the intent of the demonstration is to oppose the foreign actor or a specific reform effort. Elites often have a role in setting the stage for or responding to mass demonstrations, but actions by non-elites are what characterizes mass demonstrations.
The relative threat of nationalist goals influences the size and scale of public opposition, which in turn determines whether this opposition will be effective. In cases where reform threatens nationalist goals, public opposition becomes widespread and recurring, and therefore compelling to foreign reformers. Large-scale public opposition depends on the interaction between mass attitudes and elite behavior. Elites compete with one another, so they have a strong incentive to gain support by opposing unpopular reform threatening nationalist goals. Elites may engage in “outbidding,” meaning the adoption of increasingly extreme positions to compete for leadership within their group, resulting in an overall cascade of elites voicing more radical, pronationalist views. The literature on nationalist mobilization and ethnic violence explains that elite outbidding, in combination with popular sentiment opposing reform, enables and encourages large-scale mass demonstrations.30 As the literature on civil resistance explains, larger public protests are usually more effective in creating