Institution Building in Weak States. Andrew Radin
threat.
Delay tactics are one easy way for domestic elites to limit the impact of foreign reform. Officials may ignore foreign requests, seek more time to comply, or be purposefully absent. The presence of foreign trainers or advisers is expensive and therefore time limited, while domestic officials will remain in control for the indefinite future. For example, one foreign account explained that Iraqi officials used the expression “they have the watches, we have the time. Translation: the Americans (like the British and others) will be here for a while and then be gone; be patient, we will frustrate and exhaust them, and we will have our country to ourselves.”54 Delay tactics are especially effective when foreign officials rapidly rotate since newly deployed foreign officials often have little information about what has been achieved or agreed on in the past. Over multiple years, delay tactics may convince foreign actors to curtail or abandon their reform goals and spend their limited resources elsewhere.
Elites may also oppose reform by extracting resources from state institutions. This may include siphoning off payrolls, engaging in contract fraud, or even stealing equipment or arms. For example, “ghost payrolls,” in which more individuals are paid than those who actually work, is a persistent problem in Afghanistan and other societies.55 Theft degrades the capabilities of the state institution that foreign actors seek to support, and it reallocates international resources to local actors.
Elites can also co-opt or politicize a state institution. Elites may influence recruitment or promotion decisions, ensure the selection of loyal officials to senior positions, or build informal organizations under their personal control within state institutions. In Iraq, for example, as discussed in chapter 5, Badr militia groups seized control of the Ministry of Interior and developed militias outside of official control within the Iraqi police. In Kosovo, international officials observed that elites had personal relationships with judges and prosecutors and could prevent prosecution of their supporters.56 As in the case of theft, co-optation and politicization can redirect state institutions to fulfill the private interests of elites, undermining accountability and the rule of law.
The theory expects that, where moderate or high levels of international resources are present, the impact of private opposition can be mitigated and at least some meaningful improvement can be achieved (Hypothesis 2D). Reform threatening the ruling elites’ patron-client networks creates a competition between foreign actors who use the techniques specified by the international resource theory (described below) to pursue reform and elites who use various means of private opposition. Resources to address elite obstruction may include a powerful mandate that enables the removal or sanction of elites, a high-functioning bureaucracy that can coordinate across foreign organizations and make swift decisions, and sufficient money and personnel to observe the functioning of state institutions. Gerard Toal and Carl Dahlman, for example, show how domestic officials in Bosnia were able to delay and disrupt minority return, in part by ignoring internationally backed decrees and laws. They write that the international community in Bosnia was eventually able to achieve greater minority return thanks to increased authority to remove politicians and pass laws, improved coordination between international organizations, and more personnel in areas where return was happening.57
There are two factors that limit foreign-supported reform in the face of private opposition, even when high international resources are present. First, foreign actors ultimately rely on domestic officials to run state institutions. So long as domestic officials are involved, there is likely some means for ruling elites to use their networks to block reform. All contemporary foreign interventions involve some form of “indirect rule,” meaning that foreign reformers exercise influence through local officials and that domestic officials are ultimately responsible for providing most state services.58 Even in well-resourced missions in Germany, Japan, and Kosovo, domestically recruited police were quickly substituted for foreign-provided officers.59 And liberal, Western-led interventions generally assume that authority and governance will eventually be transferred to domestic actors.60
Second, foreign actors have limited local knowledge, meaning that they lack a detailed understanding of how a state institution or society operates.61 To counter private opposition, foreign actors must be able to distinguish it from normal bureaucratic friction. This requires identifying some details of elites’ networks; recognizing when and how elites attempt to co-opt or undermine state institutions; and attributing delays, missing equipment, or ineffectiveness to intentional obstruction. Few foreign officials have such local knowledge.62 In Kosovo, for example, observers noted that UN Mission in Kosovo officials were “remarkably incurious about the Kosovo Albanians.”63 Another common challenge is that few foreign officials speak the local language and must instead communicate through a translator or depend on local officials’ foreign-language skills. Given inevitable gaps in local knowledge, the theory expects that the effectiveness of foreign reform facing private opposition will be modest.
PREDICTIONS FOR REFORMS THREATENING NEITHER OR BOTH NATIONALIST GOALS OR PATRON-CLIENT NETWORKS
Some reform efforts may pose a threat to neither nationalist goals nor patron-client networks. In such cases, the theory predicts that foreign actors will be able to improve state institutions depending on the resources they possess, following the international resource theory described below (Hypothesis 3). Table 2.4 outlines the process hypotheses for reforms threatening neither and both nationalist goals and patron-client networks.
Without a threat to nationalist goals or patron-client networks, the theory expects that elites and the mass population will generally support reform and will not engage in significant public or private opposition (Hypothesis 3A). As in the case of reform threating patron-client networks, the theory expects general public support for reform (Hypothesis 3B). Greater international resources are expected to enable greater improvement in the state institution, according to the techniques suggested by the international resource theory (Hypothesis 3C). Still, the absence of a good reason to oppose reform does not necessarily mean that elites and bureaucracies will take positive action to implement it. Ruling elites may still engage in limited private opposition even in the absence of a significant threat to their networks, but their opposition is likely to be less intense than if these networks were under major threat (Hypothesis 3D).
TABLE 2.4. Hypotheses for Reforms Threatening Neither and Both Key Interests
| Threat of demands or recommendations to domestic interests | Outcome | Process |
| No threat to nationalist goals or ruling elites’ patron-client networks | H3: The international resource theory applies—greater resources will lead to more improvement. | H3A: There will be limited systematic public or private opposition. H3B: Public opinion is expected to support or not strongly oppose reform. H3C: Higher international resources will enable greater improvement, according to the techniques suggested by the international resource theory. H3D: Elites may engage in low-level private obstruction to protect interests absent a threat to their networks, but it will be of lower intensity. |
| H3E: If significant private or public opposition does emerge, it will limit reform as predicted by H1 and H2. H3F: Reforms that do not identify changes that improve the effectiveness, accountability, or rule of law of a state institution will achieve little improvement. | ||
| Threat to both nationalist goals and ruling elites’ patron-client networks | H4: No improvement in state institutions. | H4A: Public opposition is most likely because it is most effective, but private opposition is also possible. |