Institution Building in Weak States. Andrew Radin
4).
Bosnia was my first observation of the dynamic I would later observe firsthand in Ukraine. On one hand, foreign reformers must advocate for changes to correct the problems they observe, or else those problems will persist. On the other hand, any changes they seek have consequences for elites leading the government, the officials working within an institution, and the broader population of the society. Reforms of state institutions are inherently political, even if foreign actors may claim that they are pursuing only technical changes. Threatening core interests can provoke domestic opposition that makes a reform effort less successful than it might have been if the reformer had asked for less in the first place. International resources and preexisting institutions did set the context for reform, but the occurrence or absence of domestic opposition typically proved more important.
To understand the dynamics I observed in Bosnia, I developed a domestic opposition theory to understand when and how domestic actors can oppose reform. I also used the literature to derive competing predictions about how international resources and path dependence shape reform. This chapter presents the hypotheses of these theories, which I draw on in the case studies in chapters 3 through 6. I first present a framework for dividing reform efforts into multiple stages for analysis. Then I explore the origins of foreign demands and recommendations. The next three sections lay out the domestic opposition theory, considering in turn nationalist goals, patron-client networks, and reforms that threaten both interests or neither interest. The final sections of the chapter detail the alternative theories, on international resources and path dependence.
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING THE STAGES OF A REFORM EFFORT
The domestic opposition theory and the case studies divide reform efforts into multiple stages. During a stage of reform, the foreign actor seeks to implement particular demands or recommendations. Each stage of reform is divided into the four steps shown in figure 2.1.
In the first step, foreign actors formulate and articulate the changes in the target state institution that they seek to accomplish. These changes may include adjustments in the formal rules, structures, or common practices of the institution. Desired changes may be framed as demands or recommendations depending on the international resources and the political and legal structure in place, including whether a foreign reformer has legal authority over a society or is acting more as an adviser to the sovereign government of the country. Where possible, I identify specific changes rather than general goals, for example, focusing on the requirement that a police institution is subordinate to the central government rather than a general goal that the accountability of the police force is improved. In identifying demands and recommendations, the case studies also focus on practical and realistic changes that foreign reformers sought to achieve rather than aspirational goals that they may have articulated. In the second step, domestic actors, including both elites and mass publics, decide whether to accept the reform or to oppose it either publicly or privately. In the third step of a reform stage, a state institution is more or less improved due to the behavior of foreign and domestic actors. In the fourth step, the foreign actor may either end the reform effort or may reformulate a new set of demands or recommendations and begin a new stage of reform. The new set of desired changes may be developed because of a recognition of past failure or because of some external decision, such as pressure from the countries supporting the foreign mission.
FIGURE 2.1. Steps in a Stage of Reform
This framework builds on the existing works analyzing peace or state building as a strategic interaction between foreign and domestic actors.1 The framework presented here breaks new ground by focusing on specific state institutions rather than society-level dynamics. The proposed steps in a stage of a reform effort do not necessarily happen in sequence. For example, the ruling elites may oppose a reform over the course of several years at the same time as the state institution is being gradually improved. Through its simplification of more complex reform efforts, the framework offers a means to understand how different actors’ decisions contribute to the ultimate outcome of reform.
ORIGINS OF FOREIGN DEMANDS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
Why do foreign reformers pick particular demands or recommendations? Understanding the origin of reformers’ proposed changes can help build confidence that these changes are indeed the cause of the success of reform efforts. There could potentially be some other factor determining both the success of reform efforts and foreign demands or recommendations. In practice, while factors such as international resources do shape the changes that foreign reformers propose, demands and recommendations are highly variable and generally unpredictable. Understanding the origin of demands and recommendations is also useful for gaining insight about how foreign actors can improve reform efforts in the future.
My experience in Ukraine, described in the previous chapter, demonstrates a common approach by which foreign reformers identify demands or recommendations, which is also reflected in other case studies. According to this approach, foreign reformers first analyze the problems with a state institution. Based on this analysis, they identify structures or practices from developed countries that, if put into practice, would correct these flaws. These structures or practices then become their demands or recommendations. Given that nationalist goals or the ruling elites’ patron-client networks may be the cause of flaws of a particular state institution, it is not surprising that reforms often threaten these interests and, hence, provoke domestic opposition.
Several works explain how particular ideas within the organizations that pursue intervention may lead reformers to take this approach without paying sufficient attention to local practices. Lant Pritchett and Michael Woolcock explain that international development efforts tend to adopt a strategy of “skipping straight to Weber,” meaning that they seek to “reach service delivery performance goals in developing countries by simply mimicking (or adopting through colonial inheritance) the organizational forms of a particular ‘Denmark,’ ” meaning a model developed country.2 Roland Paris similarly observes, “Without exception, peace-building missions in the post-Cold War period have attempted to ‘transplant’ the values and institutions of the liberal democratic core into the domestic affairs of peripheral host states.”3 Liberal ideas may shape demands in other ways.4 One core liberal idea is respect for human rights. Pursuing human rights may lead foreign actors to demand free and fair elections, the protection and inclusion of minorities and women, and the universal application of judicial procedures.5 Liberal values are also associated with integrative approaches to resolving ethnic conflict, including attempting to reduce the political importance of ethnicity, undermining segregation, and prioritizing individual over collective group rights.6 In societies where nationalist goals include political rights and privileges for a particular ethnic group, liberal values may thus lead foreign actors’ demands to threaten nationalist goals or perhaps patron-client networks.
Foreign missions with greater resources may be more likely to pursue ambitious demands or recommendations that threaten domestic interests. Officials within these missions may believe that their resources enable them to achieve greater change in state institutions. Higher resources, especially a stronger mandate, may lead foreign missions to formulate their desired changes as obligatory demands rather than as recommendations. There may also be pressure from the countries funding the mission for more rapid improvements in state institutions. However, foreign missions with higher resources do not consistently propose more threatening demands or recommendations, as indicated by the range of threats in the case studies (see table 1.2 in the previous chapter). Reforms that are framed as demands are also not necessarily more likely to be threatening or lead to opposition than those that framed as optional recommendations, as shown by opposition