Institution Building in Weak States. Andrew Radin
24Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983).
25Another group of works offers normative suggestions for what types of institutions foreign actors should build to achieve positive outcomes, including recommending specific electoral systems or suggestions of best practices for what form institution should take. Reilly, “Political Engineering and Party Politics”; Roeder and Rothchild, Sustainable Peace; David A. Lake, The Statebuilder’s Dilemma: On the Limits of Foreign Intervention (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016), 15–16; and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice (Paris: OECD, 2007).
26For example, Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace; and Dobbins et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building.
27Acemoglu and Robinson, Why Nations Fail, chaps. 3, 4, and 7; Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay, chaps. 4 and 11; and Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Ruesche-meyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 169–91.
28Brownlee, “Can America Nation-Build?”; Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), 38–39.
29William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good (New York: Penguin, 2007); and Fukuyama, State-Building, 139.
30Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” International Security 22, no. 2 (1997): 5–53.
31Michael Barnett, Songying Fang, and Christoph Zürcher, “Compromised Peacebuilding,” International Studies Quarterly 58, no. 3 (September 1, 2014): 609.
32Christoph Zürcher, Carrie Manning, Kristie Evenson, Rachel Hayman, Sarah Riese, and Nora Roehner, Costly Democracy: Peacebuilding and Democratization after War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013), 29. Stephen Biddle, Julia Macdonald, and Ryan Baker also describe how the divergent interests between the United States and elites in partner countries can undermine security force assistance, but they do not explore in detail how particular local interests lead to different forms of opposition. “Small Footprint, Small Payoff: The Military Effectiveness of Security Force Assistance,” Journal of Strategic Studies 41, no. 1–2 (February 23, 2018): 89–142.
33Séverine Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
34Astri Suhrke writes, “[The concept of local ownership] in itself accentuates the external origin of the programmes; local ownership clearly means ‘their’ ownership of ‘our’ ideas, rather than the other way around.” Astri Suhrke, “Reconstruction as Modernisation: The ‘Post-Conflict’ Project in Afghanistan,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 7 (2007): 1292; see also Timothy Donais, “Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Processes,” Peace & Change 34, no. 1 (January 2009): 3–26.
35For example, Philippe Leroux-Martin, Diplomatic Counterinsurgency: Lesson from Bosnia and Herzegovina (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Louis-Alexandre Berg, “From Weakness to Strength: The Political Roots of Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” International Peacekeeping 21, no. 2 (2014): 149–64; Stefanie Wodrig and Julia Grauvogel, “Talking Past Each Other: Regional and Domestic Resistance in the Burundian Intervention Scene,” Cooperation and Conflict 51, no. 3 (September 2016): 272–90; and James D. Savage, Reconstructing Iraq’s Budgetary Institutions: Coalition Statebuilding after Saddam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
36See, for example, Berg, “From Weakness to Strength”; and Skendaj, Creating Kosovo. While Skendaj studies specific institution-building efforts, he predicts that building effective state institutions is more successful when international missions “insulate public administration from political and societal influences” and that “democracy is enhanced through international support of public participation and contestation.” His argument about state institutions is contrary to my domestic opposition theory—by insulating state institutions from societal influences, institution builders ignore domestic political concerns and risk domestic opposition. I contrast our arguments in chapter 3 in analyzing the development of central government institutions in Kosovo.
37See also Pellumb Kelmendi and Andrew Radin, “UNsatisfied? Public Support for Post-Conflict International Missions,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 62, no. 5 (May 2018): 983–1011.
38See Lisa Gross, Peacebuilding and Post-War Transitions: Assessing the Impact of External-Domestic Interactions (New York: Routledge, 2017); and Skendaj, Creating Kosovo.
39For example, Christopher Paul and colleagues emphasize the importance of the alignment of aims of the US and partner nations for security cooperation but does not examine how shifting US objectives influence this alignment of interests. Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill, Stephanie Young, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, and Christine Leah, What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and under What Circumstances? (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013), 38–39.
40Zürcher et al., Costly Democracy, 148–50.
41Barnett, Fang, and Zürcher, “Compromised Peacebuilding,” 616–17.
42Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace; Paris, At War’s End, 55; Lake, Statebuilder’s Dilemma; and Dobbins et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building.
43For example, Fukuyama, drawing on the work of Lant Pritchett and Michael Woolcock, finds the goal of foreign state builders is “getting to Denmark,” “a mythical place that is known to have good political and economic institutions.” Fukuyama, Origins of Political Order, 14–16; and Lant Pritchett and Michael Woolcock, “Solutions When the Solution Is the Problem: Arraying the Disarray in Development,” World Development 32, no. 2 (2004): 192–93. See also Colin Jackson, “Government in a Box: Counter-Insurgency, State Building, and the Technocratic Conceit” in The New Counterinsurgency Era in Critical Perspective, ed. Celeste Ward Gventer, David Martin Jones, and Michael Lawrence Rowan Smith (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 82–110.
44This definition of effectiveness