Institution Building in Weak States. Andrew Radin
Press, 2014), 14.
9See Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (New York: Crown, 2012), chap. 3. In other work, they define political institutions as “the social and political arrangements that allocate de jure political power” and offer the example of a political institution as “an electoral rule that gives the right to decide fiscal policies to the party that obtains 51 percent of the vote.” Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 21–22.
10Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), 450.
11“Institutional Capacity Building,” Defense Security Cooperation Agency website (n.d.), https://www.dsca.mil/programs/institutional-programs.
12The 2017 National Security Strategy states, “We will help our partners develop and responsibly employ the capacity to degrade and maintain persistent pressure against terrorists and will encourage partners to work independently of U.S. assistance.” Similarly, the 2018 National Defense Strategy proposes building “a capable alliance and partnership network.” White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” December 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf, 11; see also Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge,” https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf, 4.
13Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 President’s Budget,” February 2018, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/ defbudget/fy2019/ Security_Cooperation_Budget_Display_OUSDC.pdf, 3. US doctrine and policy analysis describe efforts to help partners using various overlapping terms, such as security assistance, security force assistance, foreign internal defense, and building partner capacity. Security cooperation is usually the most inclusive. See, inter alia, Derek S. Reveron, Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the US Military, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016); and Taylor P. White, “Security Cooperation: How It All Fits,” Joint Forces Quarterly 72, no. 1 (2014): 106–8.
14The World Bank’s International Development Association, for example, “works with ministries, agencies, and departments of the executive branch on managing public institutions and finances. On broader governance issues, IDA works with the legislative and judicial branches and other institutions that promote public accountability and greater engagement with society.” See World Bank, “The ABCs of IDA—Governance and Institution Building,” http://ida.worldbank.org/results/abcs/abcs-ida-governance-and-institution-building.
15On peace building, see Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006). Nation building in this context refers not to efforts to create a national identity but to efforts to “use military force to underpin a process of democratization.” James Dobbins, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel M. Swanger, and Anga R. Timilsina, America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 1; and Jeremi Suri, Liberty’s Surest Guardian: Rebuilding Nations after War from the Founders to Obama (New York: Free Press, 2012). On state building, see Paul D. Miller, Armed State Building: Confronting State Failure, 1898–2012 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013).
16See Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace, 46; James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90; Paul Collier, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003); Lars-Erik Cederman, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Halvard Buhaug, Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Marina Ottaway, “Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States,” Development and Change 33, no. 5 (November 1, 2002): 1001–23; and Call and Wyeth, Building States to Build Peace.
17UN Security Council, “No Exit without Strategy: Security Council Decision-Making and the Closure or Transition of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,” S/2001/394, New York, April 20, 2001, para 10.
18Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
19James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States,” International Security 28, no. 4 (2004): 5–43; Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Fixing Failed States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Stephen D. Krasner, “Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States,” International Security 29, no. 2 (October 1, 2004): 85–120; and Chester A. Crocker, “Engaging Failing States,” Foreign Affairs 82 (2003): 32.
20See, for example, Kenneth Pollack, “We Need to Begin Nation-Building in Syria Right Now,” New Republic, September 24, 2014, https://newrepublic.com/article/119556/obamas-syria-strategy-must-include-nation-building. Jeremy Suri writes that Americans are “a nation-building people” and observes that American’s commitment to building a democratic nation-state at home has ineluctably led them toward nation-building abroad. Suri, Liberty’s Surest Guardian, 1–9.
21By examining reforms within Kosovo, Elton Skendaj also examines institution-level reforms rather than intervention-level outcomes. Skendaj, Creating Kosovo, 3.
22See, inter alia, Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968); Fukuyama, Origins of Political Order; Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast, Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); and Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy.
23Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015), 320. See also Jason Brownlee, “Can America Nation-Build?,” World Politics 59, no. 2 (2007): 314–40; and Jeremy M. Weinstein, “Autonomous Recovery and International Intervention in Comparative Perspective,” Center