Storms of Controversy. Palmiro Campagna
as to whether or not the change is to be incorporated…. [I]f engineering feels that they must make the change for safety sake, it will be made immediately and it is not a matter to be discussed.”21
The NAE must have been aware of these policies through the DRB: in 1955, Crawford Gordon, then Avro’s president and general manager, had personally supported a proposal to have a DRB individual attached to the project in the plant in Toronto; also, records show that the NAE fully supported the formation of aerodynamic and structural subcommittees of which they enjoyed participation. Under these circumstances, such a letter seems quite ludicrous.22
July 18, 1957, saw the visit of Dr. Courtland Perkins, chief scientist, USAF, to Avro. Dr. Perkins told Floyd that the USAF had issued a contract for a design study on a long-range interceptor complete with engine, missiles, and fire-control system. The project was losing support in view of the aircraft weight and the situation in dollars for defence. He stated that should the aircraft be cancelled, there was a good chance that the USAF would consider the Arrow and that it should be kept abreast of all developments. He then outlined the requirements, which included the abilities to fly out to 250 nautical miles, loiter for one hour, proceed at Mach 3 for another 325 nautical miles, and to engage targets up to 70,000 feet at 1.2 g and Mach 3. It was a tall order, but Avro thought it might be achievable with some modifications and if refuelling were allowed during the loiter. Dr. Perkins asked to be kept abreast of all ideas.23 One must indeed begin to wonder if, in a very subtle way, the USAF wanted Avro to do much of the work, perhaps thinking that U.S. manufacturers were unable to handle the project. On the other hand, maybe the USAF’s strategy was a surreptitious attempt to find out just how capable the Avro was. This author contacted Dr. Perkins several times during the preparation of this book in 1991. Dr. Perkins admitted to having visited Avro, but said he was not connected with the project in any way and did not recall what had been discussed at the meeting other than the circular wing flying saucer (Avrocar) being developed by John Frost of Avro. His parting comments on the Arrow were that he was not involved then and still is not today.
The whole subject of the Arrow was again reviewed, this time in Washington, between the Canadian vice chief of the air staff, Air Vice Marshal Larry Dunlap; the air member technical services, Air Vice Marshal Hendrick; and high-ranking officers of the USAF. Results of this meeting were reported at the 273rd Air Council meeting held October 19, 1957, in Ottawa. The vice chief of the air staff stated that the Americans thought North America must be defended against manned bombers and the intercontinental ballistic missile for the period 1960 to 1970. The United States also believed that the Soviet Union could have a supersonic intercontinental bomber by 1965, possibly even a nuclear-powered one. Therefore, the American concept of defence was to counter with an in-depth array of complementary weapons: long-range interceptors that would attack oncoming bombs at a great distance with nuclear weapons, followed by surface-to-air missiles within the heartland should some enemy bombers get through the initial long-range encounter.24
The Americans had stated that surface-to-air missiles would necessarily be limited in range to 250 miles. (Presumably, this was due to the distance limitations of radar acquisition that would guide the missile to the target; that is, SAGE.) Therefore, they would likely replace short-range interceptors as mentioned earlier, and perhaps some medium-range interceptors, as well, in the 1963–1965 period. There still remained the requirement, though, for a long-range interceptor that had the inherent advantages of flexibility, range, and human discrimination.
The Avro Arrow was regarded by the Americans as a long-range interceptor because of its radius of action and because of the geographical location of the bases from which it could be operated. Indeed, Dr. John J. Green, the DRB scientific adviser to the RCAF, had written the following in a memorandum dated June 10, 1954:
In computing combat radius different conditions are stipulated by the RCAF and the USAF. For instance, the USAF permits the use of external tanks, whereas the RCAF specification does not. If the combat radius of the CF-105 is calculated in accordance with the conditions permitted by the USAF specification, a figure of 782 nautical miles is obtained, which is not far short of the 1,000 nautical miles specified by the USAF. Incidentally, the combat radius based on the RCAF specification but with full internal tanks is 635 nautical miles for JP4 fuel and 665 nautical miles for JP1 fuel.25
Calculation of combat radius must also consider the type of mission to be carried out, but the memorandum from Dr. Green does point out some of the numerous other factors to be considered. This issue of combat radius would later become a source of confusion; the prime minister and others would state the figures incorrectly, giving rise to the mistaken belief that the Arrow’s range would be so limited as to render it useless.
In addition to being regarded as a long-range interceptor, the air member technical services who was responsible for the Arrow development program added that the aircraft would not only fill the gap from 1962 to 1965 but that its true potential could be exploited after 1965 to deal with the supersonic bomber threat through increased range and speed. Limitations to speed were thought to be due to thermal heating of the aircraft skin in supersonic slight, but the air member emphasized this might not prove to be the problem once thought. In supersonic flight, airborne particles and molecules strike the aircraft with such force that the skin heats up due to friction. This can cause the wings and other parts to distort because of uneven heating, possibly resulting in the loss of the aircraft.26
Meanwhile, at the Ottawa 273rd Air Council meeting, members were told that the Americans were pushing ahead with the Bomarc missile and were planning to improve the SAGE system. But the Bomarc and SAGE combination would only be useful against manned bombers and would be used primarily against the bombers that got through the initial encounter from the defending long-range interceptors. What about the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), against which interceptors and the Bomarc would be useless? No decisions had yet been reached on how to counter the ICBM threat, but several weapons were under development. In an interview with this author on July 31, 1991, Air Vice Marshal John Easton confirmed that an anti-ICBM capability was being considered for the Arrow. The Americans had provided charts and estimates of proposed defensive weapons, performance capabilities of Soviet bombers to 1965, costs of the Bomarc in relation to aircraft such as the F-106, hypothetical attack scenarios, and defence strategies against the supersonic bomber threat. It seemed the old subsonic Soviet bombers were slowly being replaced with supersonic bombers.27
The air member technical services stated that his own view, like the Americans’, was for an all-encompassing program of Arrow, Bomarc, and improved radar defences. The vice chief of the air staff agreed, but did not believe the economy could afford a variety of expensive weapons. At this same meeting, the air member personnel, Air Vice Marshal J. Gordon Kerr, questioned the value of continuing with the Arrow given that it would be in use for only two or three years before the American long-range interceptors were ready and that less expensive Bomarcs would also soon be available. His position was to improve the ground environment and build missile bases. He, too, expressed the opinion that together “the cost of both Bomarc and the Arrow was prohibitive.” This combined cost would eventually erroneously translate into only the cost of the Arrow as being prohibitive.28
Unfortunately, it appears that Air Vice Marshal Kerr did not fully understand the technical discussion that had preceded his comments on the need for long-range interception and the differences between aircraft and missiles for varying roles. This lack of understanding is not surprising, as he was a non-technical participant. The question, though, is whether his comments deflected the course of the conversation or influenced the outcome. Did he expect the Americans to handle Canadian long-range requirements, or were they expected just to provide their aircraft without charge? The Bomarc was short-range, yet why did he think it could replace the long-range Arrow? Was the Canadian air defence strategy truly thought out? And what of the future potential of the Arrow discussed at this same meeting? Was this group truly capable of discussing the question of defence and the role of the Arrow in an intelligent fashion, or were the concepts beyond their comprehension?
Like the United States, the Royal Air Force in the United Kingdom was well aware of the CF-105 developments. In December 1955, the British minister of supply requested permission from the Canadian government for a team of experts