Storms of Controversy. Palmiro Campagna
Aeronautical Establishment, the deputy chief of staff of the RAF, and others descended upon Avro in January 1956. It was acknowledged at the outset that the Arrow had been designed with Canadian geography in mind. However, this geography would not be unlike Britain if one considered the North Sea to be akin to the vast stretches of the Canadian northwest.
Conclusions from the British report agreed generally with the Americans. The U.K. team thought that Avro’s claims were reasonable. They pointed to the differences of opinion between Avro and Canada’s NAE and said that further wind-tunnel testing would be needed to augment the numerical calculations. Still, they addressed the contentious point of drag due to trim at supersonic speed. Explaining that this drag results when the elevators are deflected upward to help control and stabilize the aircraft, the report goes on to state:
For the control derivatives (a), an analysis of NACA data on delta wings, suitably corrected for minor variations in geometry along the lines suggested by theory, would seem to support the values being quoted by the firm. We are therefore in disagreement with NAE on this point since they are suggesting lower control effectiveness…. Broadly speaking, the firm’s estimates for thrust and drag are not seriously in error, i.e., probably not more than 5–10% optimistic. If we have understood the NAE estimates for trim drag correctly, we would say that they are over estimating the value of this quantity…. The amount of work done by the firm at this stage on the intake is especially laudable.29
The British experts were essentially agreeing that Avro’s numbers were probably correct and that those of the NAE might be in error by a greater amount. It is known that the NAE received a copy of the U.K. results, but Jim Floyd does not recall having seen them. Still, this type of assessment might have upset those in the NAE who were certain the NAE was correct.
Further on, the report discusses, in some detail, the electronic automatic stability augmentation system, failure of which the NAE thought would cause the aircraft to break apart while in certain regions of the flight envelope. NACA had already stated electronic stability was feasible. Noting that failure of such a system could create severe problems, the British experts concluded:
Any aircraft of the performance of the CF-105 will require artificial stability and damping of some kind…. [W]hile most firms are adopting the philosophy of designing the aircraft to have the best possible inherent stability characteristics, and then bringing the aircraft to the required standard by the minimum of artificial means, this firm has taken the view that since artificial stability is required it should be exploited to the full…. Their arguments include the saving of weight … and better handling characteristics generally. The clear indication is that a high degree of reliability will be required from the system which may cause delays in development, since it is in any case very advanced in concept…. We were however impressed with the thorough and realistic manner in which they are tackling the project. Their avowed objective is to obtain a system reliability equivalent to that demanded of the engines on a twin-engine aircraft…. The CF-105 has a higher performance than the F-153 (Javelin) and the RCAF intends to equip it to a more effective standard than we could achieve in the same time. When fitted with British equipment the CF-105 would still be better than the F-153 but our less versatile weapons would tend to reduce its margin of superiority.30
The artificial stability system being discussed in this and the NAE letter are today part of the fly-by-wire systems that are used in the most advanced jets, including the F/A-18 Hornet, Canada’s newest fighter. More will be explained later, as fly-by-wire was indeed built into and successfully flown in the Arrow. Unlike the Avro engineers who were thinking toward the future, it is clear that the NAE wanted to take the lower-risk traditional approach, but as had been pointed out by NACA and now the British team, the traditional approach would give poorer performance. In fact, given that the British report was released to the NAE before its memo of June 20, 1957, one wonders if the NAE was not simply extracting from selected portions of the report, leaving out the comments regarding the high degree of confidence the British team had in Avro. The F/A-18 is also inherently unstable, but it is precisely this feature that gives it its agility and manoeuvrability. The British report goes on to say that these types of controls will be “essential in higher speed aircraft and experience of them in the CF-105 would be invaluable.” Indeed, this has proven to be the case.31
The visiting U.K. team also undertook to examine closely the building and manufacture of the engines and airframe and to look at planning, scheduling, salary, morale of employees, and numerous other factors. The report states:
There is no doubt that the firm is capable with its present labour force and space of meeting the likely demands for the RCAF and in fact exceeding them considerably. An output of over 10 CF-105s per month on a single shift basis is well within the capabilities of the firm…. Orenda Engines Ltd…. Is excellently equipped and there is no doubt whatever in its ability to match the aircraft programme in mind by Avro Aircraft Ltd.32
The report finds remarkable the friendly relationship between the design and manufacturing staffs and the care taken in measuring the progress at every stage. In conclusion the report states that the best choice for the RAF would be the Arrow “as is.” So, yet again, independent experts from another country informed the RCAF that the project was sound, that they had great confidence in the Avro engineers, and that they disagreed with the NAE on the major technical issues.
With respect to purchases, though, it was believed that the aircraft might be too costly if manufactured in Canada. To keep costs in check, licensing arrangements were proposed. The report itself had included cost and scheduling estimates for various production scenarios involving 100 aircraft produced in Britain at costs ranging between $3.2 and $3.7 million per copy. Then, in May 1956, Air Marshal Pike (RAF) stated that although the Arrow was a very attractive aircraft, its proposed delivery date would be too late to meet the RAF requirement. Therefore, the chances of obtaining the aircraft would be small since Britain would rather obtain an aircraft that would be available sooner. Interest from the United Kingdom seemed to dwindle at this point only to re-emerge after the cancellation for the purpose of obtaining reports and technical data that might assist Britain in developing the TSR-2 aircraft.33
Meanwhile, on January 29, 1958, the Canadian ambassador to Washington, Norman Robertson, was the luncheon guest of James H. Douglas, secretary of the air force. It proved to be a fateful meeting! With him were Lieutenant-General D.L. Putt, deputy chief of staff, research and development; Major-General H.M. Estes, assistant chief of staff for air defense systems; and Dudley C. Sharp, assistant secretary (matériel), Department of the Air Force. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the CF-105. Douglas displayed considerable knowledge of the Arrow, Canada’s concerns about foreign sales to reduce cost, and continental defence. He stated categorically that there was no place in the USAF inventory for the CF-105. He stated that the USAF was going ahead with the F-108 long-range interceptor because it believed that fighter would be more advanced and capable. Later, of course, it would be cancelled.34
Still, the door had not been completely closed. The secretary stated his personal view that in the context of continental defence the USAF could purchase the Arrow in squadron strength to operate from Canadian bases and to be manned and maintained by the RCAF. The Canadian ambassador interpreted this as some form of charity and suggested that Canada wished to be a contributor to defence and not a beneficiary. He further stated there would be political problems with this arrangement.
General Putt speculated whether a plan through North American Air (later Aerospace) Defense Command (NORAD) could not be established that would call for more CF-105 squadrons than currently envisaged by Canada, with the difference being funded by the USAF. As an alternative, he mentioned that eight Strategic Air Command (SAC) refuelling bases were being planned for installation in Canada and that perhaps a swap could be arranged; the purchase of CF-105s in exchange for work done in Canada in readying the refuelling bases.35 On the one hand, it seemed the USAF was saying no, while on the other it seemed the Americans were saying the Arrow was wanted and needed, especially for protection in the continent’s north.
In a priority message back to Canada, air staff in Washington indicated that the meeting had been far from conclusive, but that the opportunity was at hand for an official approach to the USAF. The message