Storms of Controversy. Palmiro Campagna
Like the F-102, the Bomarc, an unproven missile under development, would be restricted to target acquisition within the SAGE network. The SAGE network itself would be subject to electronic jamming, a technology the Russians were known to possess. Eventually, the Bomarc would, in fact, prove to be a disaster, while the F-102 cum F-106 would remain in service until the early 1980s.
Throughout the two-day meeting, Avro was asked to provide facts and information. The following is recorded by the RCAF within the conclusions of the meeting and speaks to the professionalism of the company:
It should be pointed out that the Company provided the meeting with complete facilities and information exactly as required in terms of quality and content. They made every effort to carry out the spirit of the requests made upon them by the CAS [chief of the air staff] and did this to perfection. There was absolutely no indication whatever of salesmanship or extravagant claims and only the engineering staff made contact with the visiting party. They provided only the information that they were requested to do and stuck strictly to their terms of reference. Mr. Floyd provided a short discussion on the future potential of the aircraft, showed a film of the test models that had been made and fired and explained design characteristics of the mock-up. Mr. Grinyer described the design philosophy of his engine and its present status and timing…. Both engineers were most objective about the problems that they were facing, were not at all reticent to describe their difficulties, and the ways in which they had hoped to overcome them.13
A letter dated November 9, 1955, was sent to the Honourable Ralph Campney, minister of national defence, from Donald A. Quarles, secretary of the air force. In it Quarles stated that as a result of the evaluation it was recommended that “development and production of the CF-105 proceed as now planned.”14 He also included a summary of the meeting that showed a preference for the Arrow in northern areas or offshore by “a fair margin over the F-102B … due to the CF-105 having twin-engine reliability; having with its additional crewman, a better navigation and search radar capability; [and] being better adapted to operations from marginal airfields.”15
The USAF liked the aircraft, had faith in the design team, believed that Orenda would succeed in developing the Iroquois, and wondered about the utility of this engine in American aircraft. It even gave Canada the go-ahead to proceed with the program. One must wonder, “Which government was controlling the project?” Moreover, although increasing cost had been mentioned as a potential problem by the RCAF, money to continue was made available now that the Americans had spoken. The Americans had issued their decree and this was all that mattered. Still, why was the RCAF persisting on the complex fire control and Sparrow missile? What source of advice was more important than the Americans’ on these issues? In conversation with this author, Dr. Solandt would only proffer that the RCAF wanted the absolute best and placed this above the actual requirements. And what of the NAE and the DRB?
From the same information available to the U.S. team, the DRB and the NAE had somehow concluded that the Arrow would probably be no better than the F-102. This assessment in a letter dated November 3, 1955, perhaps in anticipation of the American reply, prompted the following response from Air Vice Marshal Hendrick, air member technical services, on December 9, 1955. Commenting on the fact that numerous subsequent discussions had been held with the company and the DRB as well as with the CF-105 Aerodynamic Subcommittee, he added:
[T]here is a wide difference of opinion between NAE and A.V. Roe on the possible performance of this aircraft…. We note your statement that you can find no serious grounds for differing with the NAE figures. I think it only fair to say however that we as a Service, can find no serious grounds for differing materially with the Company who are our contractors and the designers of this aircraft…. [U]nder the worst conditions the 105 is likely to be as good as or better than the 102 in aerodynamic performance. This is a statement which you have agreed on more than one occasion…. [T]he tactical and fighting advantages of the CF-105 by virtue of its two men, two engines, large radar, etc., give it such superiority as a weapons system as to justify continuation of the project…. We do not accept the contention that the 102B and the 105 are geometrically similar and that simple arithmetic comparisons of their performance can be made…. [T]he difference between the high wing and the low wing aircraft are sufficiently great to make such forms of comparison oversimplified and dangerous.16
In January 1956, Orenda received official notification that the USAF was interested in the Arrow only if it were to be fitted with the PS-13 Iroquois engine and not with the lower-powered American J-75 engine, which was also being considered. In addition, it was disclosed that the USAF was interested in the Iroquois for other aircraft, including its B-52 bomber.17 Clearly, the USAF wanted the engine program to continue. It must be realized that quite apart from the engine itself, the manufacturing and research knowledge gained from both the engine and the airframe programs would be of immense value to similar programs in the United States and other countries, especially if they would eventually prove successful. A.V. Roe would be solving technical problems not only for itself but for the rest of the world, including potential enemies.
By January 1957, John Orr, director of engineering research at the DRB, was reporting that Avro and NAE performance figures were finally coming into agreement. Avro had reduced its 2-g manoeuvrability figure to 1.63, and the NAE had raised its to 1.62. As noted by Orr in a letter to the chief of the air staff, this was still far superior to any other aircraft. Still, the cautions were evident, and by January 21, 1957, the NAE was claiming that its estimates were more accurate than Avro’s. The bottom line, however, was that the Arrow was being shown to be a better aircraft by orders of magnitude above the rest, and later flight testing would show that the 2-g requirement could indeed be achieved.18
In February 1957, another meeting was held in Toronto. This time it was by the Advanced Interceptor Committee, chaired by General Boyd of the USAF. The committee agreed with Canadian thinking on the design and operational requirements for an aircraft like the Arrow, and in April 1957, the RCAF was informed that the USAF wanted to be kept up-to-date on all developments. It seemed that American aircraft programs were indeed falling behind considerably in their schedules and that the Arrow might fill the gap.19
As before, though, the NAE sent another letter to the DRB, this one dated June 20, 1957, and signed by the new director, D.C. MacPhail. Now the NAE was claiming the aircraft would break up in flight:
We understand that the CF-105 is to be equipped with an artificial stability augmentation system which goes considerably beyond what is being attempted in the design of other high speed aircraft. The essential difference is that the CF-105 system is required to provide augmentation of static directional stability, as well as the now generally required damping. The result of this development is that failure of the servo system can be expected to cause nearly instantaneous breakup of the aircraft in several regions within its normal flight envelope…. The reason for this work is, of course, that we believe it should be possible to design the airframe so that even if artificial damping is needed to provide acceptable handling characteristics, the safety of the aircraft is not dependent on its functioning satisfactorily. We know that the attainment of this standard of safety is being demanded and achieved by the British, French, and Americans and we are continually astonished that it is neither being demanded or achieved in Canada in the case of the CF-105 aircraft.20
The letter is most curious. By this time, the subjects of safety, lateral stability, and so on had been well addressed by the Avro team in its presentations to NACA and, as will be shown later, as discussed with experts from the United Kingdom. The tone in the letter is also somewhat strong and could lead one to believe that the NAE was again being more obstructionist than helpful.
In fact, the question of safety was paramount in Jim Floyd’s mind and led him into several heated discussions with Harvey Smith, vice-president of manufacturing. It was Floyd’s opinion that if engineering realized during production — perhaps as a result of additional testing — that a given component might have a higher risk associated with it, then the component should be corrected if possible. This, of course, could lead to delays in production; with the tight schedules involved, delays would be unacceptable to Smith. The matter was resolved by Fred Smye, the president and general manager, who stated, “[I]n regard to safety of the first airplane, it is Floyd’s