Storms of Controversy. Palmiro Campagna
report on the meeting showed.36
As an early strategy at trying to interest the Americans further, notwithstanding this meeting, it was proposed that the Arrow be compared with the F-106 and F-108 aircraft to demonstrate the Arrow’s superior capabilities. Performance characteristics for the American aircraft would be needed, and it was expected the information would be made available since Canada had always shared data willingly. This would not prove to be the case. In 1958, repeated attempts at trying to obtain the data on the American aircraft failed. A request was even made through Air Marshal Slemon, now deputy commander-in-chief of NORAD, but this, too, yielded nothing. An exasperated staff officer would note, “The purposes of the letter are a) to pt. out to Senior Officers the importance of exactly comparable missions … and b) a last ditch effort to obtain F-106 operating data…. It would almost appear that the USAF are withholding this data…. 16 June 1958.”37
American interest in the Arrow was changing at a time when the aircraft was beginning to prove its capabilities. Was the USAF truly disinterested in a project it had supported since inception? Had the USAF obtained the solution to the technical problems its own manufacturers were facing and was it now pulling back, or was it being told that it no longer had an interest in the Arrow by some other authority that felt threatened? According to John Orr, then director of engineering research at the DRB, it is claimed that the USAF submitted a confidential evaluation of the technical and operational capabilities of the aircraft to the Canadian officials. This report had supposedly been written by a junior officer subject to influence by U.S. aircraft manufacturers who might see the Arrow as a threat to business. This author located one other individual who claims to have seen such a report, but the report itself, if it exists, has not yet come to light. Still, why would anyone go to such lengths?38
The facts clearly demonstrate that the USAF kept the project moving, with the RCAF seemingly following orders. American officials had not only been sought after for consultation on the project but were asked directly for the go-ahead to continue. The situation evolving was not unlike that in the late 1980s with the design and development of the Israeli fighter, the Lavi. Just as the prototypes were commencing flight tests, the United States removed support and effectively killed the program. The primary difference was that the United States was actually subsidizing the development of the Lavi and was likely well within its rights to pull out of the development if it so desired. Still, why did it not stop the project sooner? It is as if the Arrow and Lavi developments were simply a means of conducting research and development by exploiting foreign talent. In the case of Canada, this talent was being made available free of charge and always with the hope of a sale. But also in the case of Canada, why not purchase the aircraft? Was it really a problem with U.S. industry or were other factors involved? It is as if the more Avro and the Arrow proved themselves, the more important it became to stop the program.
What is perhaps most distressing is the seeming lack of Canadian confidence in the program, most notably from certain quarters of the NAE. Independent experts in both the United States and the United Kingdom were most impressed by A.V. Roe’s technical talent and its grasp of the problems being faced. Both were also in disagreement with the NAE, and still the NAE persisted in raising problems that seemingly were not there, giving every impression, perhaps inadvertently, of trying to thwart the program just to prove it was right.
What was it about this aircraft, which on the one hand was hailed by the international technical community, but on the other sparked a delayed lack of interest from foreign governments? Was it superior or not, and in which ways? What about that first flight? Would it prove to be Avro’s undoing?
Until recently, high-performance aircraft were not committed to production until after flight testing of one or more prototypes…. The Arrow programme is unusual in Canada in that even the first flying model has been built on production tooling.
— Avro News, October 4, 19571
The CF-105, or Avro Arrow, had begun as a project under the Liberal government of Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent. However, after assuming power in June 1957, the Conservative government of Prime Minister John George Diefenbaker would mark the official unveiling of the Arrow program on October 4, 1957. Remarkably, the aircraft had been built and made ready to fly in just four years, an incredible achievement. As a time-saving measure, Avro did not hand-build the first aircraft, but moved from drawing board to production line tooling and manufacture. This technique would be repeated 30 years later on the Stealth bomber using advanced, computer-aided design techniques unavailable to Avro at the time. As well, the man-hours expended in actual construction of the Arrow were 20 percent less than in projects of similar size and complexity.2 Aviation Week, one of the most prestigious journals of its day, reported, “Avro CF-105 Arrow has given Canada a serious contender for the top military aircraft of the next several years. The large, decidedly advanced delta-wing fighter was rolled out of the Malton plant a few days ago…. The Arrow’s power, weight and general design leave little doubt of its performance potential.”3 Likewise, Flight, a respected international publication, would call Arrow “the biggest, most powerful, most expensive and potentially the fastest fighter that the world has yet seen.”4
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