Storms of Controversy. Palmiro Campagna
any answer from the USAF. Also, one might ask how well the defence of Canada had been studied by the experts before embarking on the Arrow, and if Canadian confidence was so low that the RCAF had to keep running to the United States for answers and advice. Would this become a factor in the cancellation later on?4
The USAF team was also told that the development of a new engine, the PS-13, or Iroquois, was linked to the airframe development, and that cancellation of the airframe would remove justification to proceed with the PS-13. Finally, USAF views were sought regarding choice of missiles, fire control, development costs with respect to similar U.S. projects, and comparisons to other U.S. aircraft under development. To help in its deliberations, the USAF team was handed the latest facts and figures on the project, with the parting comment that Canadian requirements in terms of numbers of aircraft would be small and therefore unit costs would be high. Even at such an early stage, it seems every vulnerability was being exposed and the very future of the project was being placed squarely in the hands of the United States.5
During the ensuing discussions, the differences in the performance between Avro’s calculations and those of the NAE and the DRB were again tabled and discussed. The U.S. team also inspected the mock-ups and tooling bays in the plant and was told of the versatility that could be incorporated into the aircraft. A full briefing was provided on the Iroquois engine being developed by Orenda.
On technical soundness, the delegation thought the risks were reasonable for such an advanced design: “In their opinion to attempt to achieve Mach 1.5 and a 2-g turn at 50,000 feet was quite a technical advance, but they saw no reason why the design should get into any particular trouble…. The delegation did not seem unduly perturbed by the fact that there was a difference of opinion about what the performance might actually be.”6
The USAF requirement for manoeuvrability was only 1.2 g at combat ceiling. Most aircraft will pull far more than 2 g, but to do it at altitude without losing power or height is quite remarkable even by today’s standards. (G measures the force of gravity on an accelerating body. To appreciate g force, think of the feeling of being pulled sideways when you make a sharp turn in a car. Or think of a roller coaster; as you go screaming down to the trough, g builds up, so that when you abruptly curve and go upward again, you feel g force pinning you to the back of your seat.)
A list of U.S. aircraft under development or consideration was tabled. It included the short-range F-102B, the medium-range F-103 to be available by 1962 or 1963, the long-range F-101B, and the long-range LR-1x1 and LR-1x2. The conclusion drawn by the Americans was that the CF-105 would be the only aircraft available to supplement the limited altitude capabilities of the F-101B prior to service of the LR-1x1 interceptor.
In fact, the U.S. team admitted that if the LR-1x1 was given the go-ahead, it would probably not be ready for service until some five to six years after the Arrow, well into the 1960s. It was also noted that for the LR-1x1 to obtain the hoped for 100-mile acquisition range for targets, a technical breakthrough in radar development would be required, and this could further delay its in-service timing. There were also stated problems with the navigation, communication, and fire-control subsystems of the aircraft.7 The long-range project would eventually be cancelled, and some people would use this as justification for the Arrow cancellation, stating that the manned interceptor was considered obsolete. But given all the problems cited by the Americans, was the LR-1x1 not cancelled for technical reasons?
With respect to the F-102B, the Canadians asked if it could operate outside the Semiautomated Ground Environment (SAGE). SAGE was a ground-based surveillance and weapons control system that could transmit data to the aircraft and automatically guide it to the target. The answer was that the F-102 was not the best aircraft to operate outside the SAGE. Hence, the utility of the F-102 for target interception would be limited to the range of the SAGE system, even though the aircraft might physically fly beyond the SAGE perimeter. This range problem would later prove to be one of the limitations of the Bomarc missile, as well. The Arrow, however, was designed to operate well beyond SAGE and did not require the assistance of SAGE during the target-interception process. In his memoirs, Prime Minister John Diefenbaker would intimate that it was the Arrow that could not operate outside of this sophisticated ground environment.
The medium-range F-103 was also discussed, but the USAF pointed out that no funds had yet been committed to this project and that technical advances in electronics would likely be needed to achieve its required performance. The Arrow appeared to remain the best aircraft that would be available in the time required, reinforcing the opinion that no American aircraft were suitable to meet the RCAF requirements.8
Considerable opinion was expressed concerning the PS-13, which Orenda was designing as a titanium engine. U.S. engine manufacturers had experienced numerous problems with titanium; however, as pointed out by the Americans, their companies were trying to integrate titanium parts into existing engines, while Orenda was designing with titanium from the start. Therefore, they expected that Orenda would not encounter the same difficulties. Given the expected high performance of the engine, the American team also wondered how the performance of its LR-1x1 could be improved.9
The American team believed that the greatest technical risk area would be that of the integrated electronic and fire-control system. The RCAF wanted the aircraft to operate within SAGE for a fully automatic interception of enemy aircraft as well as allowing manual control by the pilot outside SAGE boundaries. The Americans argued this was counter to the flexibility provided by the two-man crew and two engines, and therefore the complexity of incorporating electronic “smarts” for operation within SAGE were not required. They also stated that since the proposed designer for the electronic and fire-control system would be the Hughes Aircraft Corporation, a complicated design would overburden this company, which was already committed to American programs. It was suggested that a less sophisticated system be chosen with only essential components provided by Hughes. RCA and North American Downey were suggested as potential suppliers.
In July 1956, Fred Smye would be told by the chief of the air staff that the RCAF had selected RCA to provide the complete sophisticated system and that co-operation from Avro was expected. Avro had argued, unaware of the American advice, that such a system was too complex, too costly, not necessary, and could threaten the entire project. In short, after soliciting American advice, which in turn was echoed by Avro, the RCAF ignored it, only to have this part of the project terminated due to cost, as Smye had predicted.10
Finally, the American team was asked which missile suite it would prefer, the Hughes-designed Falcon or the Sparrow 2, currently under development by the U.S. Navy. Avro had argued with the RCAF that the best choice would be the Hughes Falcon because the Sparrow 2 had been designed for lower-performance aircraft. The U.S. delegation essentially stated the same. The Falcon had been designed for greater height, could carry infrared or radar homing, and had the same “kill” probability as the Sparrow. Also, because it was half the size, eight Falcons could be carried by the Arrow instead of four Sparrows. The Falcon was also less expensive. In a conversation with this author in June 1991, Dr. Solandt stated that the DRB had provided similar advice to the RCAF. However, Canadian Air Commodore Jack A. Easton thought that the American team did not know enough about the Sparrow to make an accurate comparison. He believed the Sparrow was better and this would eventually become the weapon of choice. Later, in late 1956, the U.S. Navy would abandon development of the Sparrow, only to have it taken over by Canada, adding yet another major development burden to the program and one that was certainly not required.11
The U.S. team was then asked for its opinion of the Bomarc missile and its impact on the role of the manned interceptor. General Price indicated that this missile was being developed by Boeing aircraft as an addition to the manned interceptor. It was ground-launched, with the Bomarc A having a range of 125 miles and the Bomarc B a range of 250 miles. Bomarc might replace the F-102, but Price “did not foresee the day of the phasing out of the manned interceptors as he felt there would always be a need for judgement and mobility in a weapon system.”12 In other words, once aimed and launched, the missile would destroy its target regardless of whether the target was truly a hostile aircraft or a civilian plane that had strayed off course and been mistaken for an enemy warplane. A man in an aircraft, on the other hand, could exercise judgment